The Pitfalls and Potholes of Reconstruction: Understanding the Role of Infrastructure in Post-Conflict Reconstruction by Molfino, Emily Suzanne (Author) et al.
The Pitfalls and Potholes of Reconstruction:
Understanding the Role of Infrastructure in Post-Conflict Reconstruction
by
Emily Molfino
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirement for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved October 2014 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Clark Miller, Chair
Reed Wood
Erik Fisher
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
December 2014
ABSTRACT
National infrastructure form the bedrock for economic growth and social security,
both of which lowers conflict risks. This encourages states and international organi-
zations to invest heavily in post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction efforts, believ-
ing that infrastructure provision will reduce future political instability. This belief
is based largely on the perceived successes of reconstruction efforts in prior eras, es-
pecially after World War II. Today, post-conflict reconstruction efforts are much less
successful in this regard and, overall, are not reducing political instability—Iraq being
the quintessential example of such policy failure. In the face of both ongoing conflict
and persistent needs for infrastructure reconstruction after conflicts, therefore, there
is a critical need to understand two questions: Why are current reconstruction efforts
failing to reduce political instability or even, in some cases, increasing it? And, how
can reconstruction efforts be organized to do better? To address these questions, this
dissertation examines infrastructure reconstruction across a wide range of national
contexts. In doing this, an updated viewpoint is provided on the role of infras-
tructure in conflict-prone areas to include a long-term perspective on infrastructure
system’s role in society, technological integration, and relationship between the state
and conflicting groups. This dissertation finds that though provision of different types
of infrastructure might increase conflict risks in the short term, such provision can
reduce conflict in the long run depending on how and where infrastructure is pro-
vided vis-a´-vis excluded populations. These results provide crucial input towards the
redesign of reconstruction policies to limit future political instability risks through
infrastructure.
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Chapter 1
SURVEYING THE LAND FOR FUTURE RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
Infrastructure networks form the bedrock for economic and social security (ASCE
Critical Infrastructure Guidance Task Committee 2009). This prevalent claim under-
states the impact of society’s dependency on national infrastructure—a dependency
that results in society being deeply embedded and structured around infrastructure’s
technical configurations. Failure in these technical configurations results in political
crises and social upheaval. One must not look far to see the vulnerabilities such in-
frastructure failures can create. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the failure
of the levy networks resulted in massive flooding and chaos on the streets of New
Orleans. A software bug in 2003 ignited the second largest blackout and life in the
Northeast, Midwest, and Ontario province was essentially suspended for days. The
terrorist attack on 9/11 targeted and destroyed a portion of Manhattan’s buildings
and transportation infrastructure, which shut the city down for weeks and a decade-
long rebuilding process is just being completed. In fact, the mere threat of failure
with the infamous Y2K bug ignited paranoia as people prepared for the shut-down
of electronic infrastructure in the developed world.
These events lead to consequences far beyond the infrastructure networks them-
selves. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and President George W. Bush faced extreme accusations and political con-
sequences in their failed preparation for and response to Katrina. Following 9/11,
the United States’ (US) federal government sent the military to airports to symbol-
ically and physically protect airport infrastructure, restructured the Transportation
Security Agency, and created the Department of Homeland Security. In response
1
to the Y2K scare, billions of dollars were spent worldwide by governments and the
private sector to reprogram information technology systems and prevent future po-
tential data and digital shutdowns (especially in the form of hacking). These political
and social responses occurred as policymakers and the general public recognized that
infrastructure networks and surrounding systems are in fact “too big to fail” before
the concept was popularized.
Even with this risk of failure and upheaval, citizens expect to have access to infras-
tructure for public use at some basic level (see: Mody 1996; Abadie 2006; Salehyan
and Gleditsch 2006; Rotberg and West 2004; Gompert et al. 2009; Sen 1999). At
the national level though, infrastructure has often proven itself as a public good—its
intrinsic characteristics of communal consumption, non-excludability, and invisible
payoffs garner little incentive for private actors to provide such goods (Olson 2009;
Mody 1996; ASCE Critical Infrastructure Guidance Task Committee 2009). Thus,
states have had to step in themselves or through subsidies if their populations are to
have full access to critical national infrastructure.1 As populations have come to
rely on and demand of their political leaders to provide these public goods, national
infrastructure have come to embody a modern social contract between a population’s
expectations and the obligations of their government (Brown 2001; Rhoads 1985).
But, what of situations where the state is incapable of neither providing the nec-
essary public goods let alone responding to an extreme infrastructure failure and
resulting social upheaval—especially when that failure was caused by conflict? In the
resulting post-conflict reconstruction policies, infrastructure must by rebuilt due to
being destroyed or damaged during a conflict or newly provided as a conflict prevented
its provision.
1Critical infrastructure are those infrastructures deemed necessary for a functioning state by
policymakers and business leaders.
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The Success and Failures of Reconstruction Policies
Foreign policymakers have not always recognized post-conflict reconstruction pol-
icy as an available strategic option to achieve international goals. For most of history,
states did not feel strategically obligated nor were they morally pressured to help re-
store their enemies after a conflict’s end—case in point being Article 231 of the Treaty
of Versailles, also known as the “Guilt Clause.” Then came the unparalleled after-
math and destruction of World War II (WWII). With much of their infrastructure
destroyed, Western European countries were financially incapable and too politically
anemic to rebuild on their own. Seeing the potential consequences to American power
and position in the international system, Secretary of State George Marshall stood at
Harvard University on June 5, 1947 and ignited the official beginning of post-conflict
reconstruction by proposing that the US would provide direct and indirect assistance
to Western European counties for economic and physical reconstruction—on the con-
dition that they create their own reconstruction plans. The resulting Marshall Plan
and infrastructure laid the groundwork for Western European unification and helped
point the region away from Soviet communist influence and towards America’s eco-
nomic market and democratic ideals (Dobbins 2003; Agnew and Entrikin 2004).
On the other side of the globe, a similar process was taking place in Japan.
Throughout WWII, Japan’s infrastructure took hits from extensive air raids and
the dropping of two atomic bombs. Ultimately, over 40% of Japan’s urban infras-
tructure had some level of damage by the war’s end (Azimi, Fuller, and Nakayama
2003). In contrast to the multilateral efforts taking place in Western Europe, the US
conducted a majority of Japanese reconstruction efforts under the unilateral direction
of General Douglas MacArthur. Nonetheless, Japanese reconstruction was similarly
successful in helping guide the country towards economic prosperity under America’s
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umbrella of influence (Dobbins 2003; Agnew and Entrikin 2004).
The successes of both European and Japanese reconstruction remained prominent
within the mindset of foreign policymakers. In due course, these programs became
metaphorical guiding lights for modern post-conflict reconstruction operations (Ag-
new and Entrikin 2004). With these exemplars in mind, the US has invested heavily
in post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction in the developing world under the belief
that similar results would be produced. Yet, this belief assumes that post-WWII
and post-Cold War eras of reconstruction are similar—an assumption that ultimately
contributed to the failure to create stable environments on which growth can occur.
Such failure is epitomized in the second largest foreign assistance program since
the Marshall Plan: Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction operations following the
Iraqi War in 2003 (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2009).2 Shortly after the removal of Saddam Hussain, Iraq quickly plummeted
into political, social, and economic chaos: looters ran rampant, sectarian violence
grew, and the economy halted. Moreover, what was left of the Iraqi government was
nearing failure and unable to to provide basic services, let alone infrastructure recon-
struction (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). Once
recognized, the US deemed the inability of the Iraqi government to provide public
goods as politically unacceptable and that any new government or occupying force
could not legitimately control Iraq without providing basic public goods, like security
and infrastructure. Thus, reconstruction intervention was necessary if the US was
to maintain Iraq until indigenous leadership could take over its allocation (Majeski
and Sylvan 2009). Nevertheless, more then a decade into post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, Iraq is still experiencing recurrent economic breakdown and continued political
2Iraq initially held the top position until stabilization and reconstruction operations in
Afghanistan took over in 2013 (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2013).
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crises, sectarian violence is an everyday threat throughout the country, and national
infrastructure systems persistently fail. As of 2013, Iraqi households are averaging
only about 7.6 hours of electricity and 2 hours of potable drinking water access a day
(London˜o 2013; Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009).
This potential failure was recognized shortly after the start of Iraqi reconstruction.
Congress reacted to this risk by establishing an independent agency to provide objec-
tive leadership and coordination in Iraq—the Office of Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) (United States 2004). During it’s tenure, SIGIR con-
ducted 200 audits and 170 inspections on various reconstruction projects. Budgetary
benefits from these actions included over $1.61 billion from audits and $191 million
from investigations (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2013). Ultimately, stories of mis-spending, waste, and inadequate resources during
Iraq’s reconstruction are abundant. According to Special Inspector General Stuart
Bowen, over $8 billion was wasted throughout Iraqi reconstruction out of $60 billion
spent, while the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did not have the power nor
organizational structure to accomplish it’s large reconstruction goals (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). Based on its experiences
on the ground and seeing how Iraqi infrastructure projects often suffered from inade-
quate design, poor government oversight, and lack of sustainability, SIGIR provided
some lessons learned to help better plan and execute future reconstruction projects
(Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013). Many of
these recommendations focused on reforming reconstruction provision—how to man-
age contractors, how to plan unified reconstruction efforts, and how to prevent waste
and fraud (see: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2006ab
2007 2009 2011 2013; Dobbins 2003; Orr 2004).
Though these are needed areas of inquiry, they converge on changing the means
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of reconstruction while failing to address the reasons behind why current reconstruc-
tion policies tend to lead to political instability. SIGIR does attempt to address the
greater goals and assumptions of reconstruction by recommending larger policy ad-
justments that shifts the yardstick of reconstruction success away from mere project
numbers, such as: not viewing the defeated state as an enemy, recognizing the need
to have soft programs to develop the capacity of people and systems through the
local population, and having policies that address local needs and priorities to avoid
a crisis of sustainability. Yet, resulting policy recommendations do not go beyond a
focus on the means of reconstruction. Even the argument for designing reconstruc-
tion projects based on local needs and input is placed in terms of waste prevention
by ensuring that unneeded or unnecessary projects are not conducted (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2012c).3
Yet, the most poignant recommendation by SIGIR is left unattended. Recon-
struction operations are complimentary components of how foreign policy helps frag-
ile states, which is to keep them from failing. In these cases, reconstruction policies
can obviate those fragile states in becoming nests of threats (Bowen 2014). Bowen
recognized this and argued for fact that reconstruction is “an extension of political
strategy” (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009, p.
333). Yet, following reports, recommendations, and policy changes never elaborated
on how or if this can be done. Turning to German and Japanese reconstruction for an
answer would provide little insight, as at the center of the Iraqi reconstruction failure
is a theoretical gap created by a fundamentally changed environment surrounding
reconstruction in the 21st Century. Unlike the post-WWII era, the pressing issue
for most states confronting political instability today is no longer the dynamics of
3See Chapters 2 and 6 for more on Iraqi reconstruction failures, successes, and resulting policy
recommendations.
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global power. Rather, reconstruction efforts take place in states where conflict is
commonplace, internal strife looms, governments are corrupt and weak, and public
goods are increasingly limited. Additionally, these are places that can catch fire and
then require continued military engagement and assertion of US power (Bowen 2014).
In the face of both ongoing conflict and persistent needs for infrastructure re-
construction, therefore, there is a critical need for reconstruction policymakers to
understand two questions: Why are current reconstruction efforts failing to reduce
political instability or even, in some cases, increasing it? And, how can reconstruc-
tion efforts be organized to do better? To accomplish this, clear connections between
reconstruction policies, infrastructure, and political instability must be made.4
Limitations in Exiting Literature
Statecraft and substantive fixes in response to policy failures must be comple-
mented with appropriate theoretical insight.5 Yet, behind recent reconstruction
policy failures is a theoretical limitation regarding infrastructure as a public good.
In existing conflict literature, infrastructure is either overlooked, viewed with deter-
ministic qualities, or assumed to be a neutral tool to be employed. The researcher
might discuss the poor quality of roads or include infrastructure as a control or proxy
variable (for example, mega watts used per capita is a widely accepted as a proxy for
development along side of GDP). Yet, rarely is infrastructure the central independent
variable of interest. Briefly, there are three broad shortcomings in the literature when
it comes to connecting infrastructure and reconstruction to political instability.
4See Chapter 2 for an in-depth definition and discussion on political instability.
5I do not desire nor have the room to discuss the policy versus academia debate. For more
detail on this divide, see: Fearon (1998), Walt (2005), and Hill and Beshoff (1994). I am taking
the position here and throughout this dissertation that academic and policy debates are inherently
interconnected and one cannot fully grasp failure or provide policies that work by addressing one
without the other.
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The first is explanatory. Current theories addressing the relationship between
infrastructure and political instability conceptualize infrastructure as a resource for
political elites to allocate. The provision or withholding of infrastructure and other
types of public goods is viewed as a type of short-term accommodation (towards a
selectorate or dissident group to limit the risk of future conflict) or repression (against
perceived dissident groups or a divergent selectorate as a form of punishment by not
meeting infrastructure expectations). Dissidents then react to such political strategies
in ways that can increase resentment and demands against the state (Lichbach 1987;
Roniger 2004; Cunnhingham and Weidmann 2007). Yet, these strategic decisions by
the political elite are not as straightforward as described and come with their own set
of influences (mainly private interests and incentives) and reaction to infrastructure
provision or non-provision is not bound by time or place.
On top of this, many types of infrastructure are also strategic coordination goods,
whose key purpose is to connect people and ideas—for example, roads allow for travel
between places while broadband networks allow for communication between people.
While these connections offer immense economic benefits, previous literature describes
how such connections created by infrastructure can also be detrimental to political
instability in conflict-prone areas. “For dissidents in coercive states, power lies in
numbers” (DeNardo 1985, p. 270). Infrastructure allows dissidents a way to as-
semble resources, recruit supporters, and increase their power by acting in concert
via these connections (Francisco 1995; DeNardo 1985; Arendt 1970; Lichbach 1987;
Gates 2002; Moore 1998). Additionally, new connections created by infrastructure
can also lead to political instability by way of intermingling or the connecting or
mixing together groups who were previously geographically separated—the effects of
such intermingling is especially great if those connected have a history of conflict
(Van Evera 2001).
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Current literature claims that the political elite, especially in authoritative regimes,
will balance the risks behind strategic coordination and the benefits of economic
growth by limiting such goods at large, like national infrastructure, while still pro-
viding goods that promote economic growth at some some level to the selectorate
(Bueno de Mesquita and Down 2005). In short, this literature foresees a high chance
that post-conflict regimes might opt not to provide infrastructure at the national
level because the perceived costs (e.g. dissident mobilization) are high and often out-
weigh the perceived benefits (e.g. support and potential economic growth). Yet, the
mere lack of infrastructure poses a long-term threat to the political elite by increases
conflict risks.
Because they focus on whether goods are provided (or not) by the state and the
immediate, short-term reaction to this action or non-action, existing literature is
not in a position to explain whether infrastructure provision might have long-term
value for reducing political instability. Put differently, the underlying assumption in
existing literature on infrastructure is that the public good is merely consumed or
not consumed. There is no reciprocal role for good provision to shape an actor’s
long-term decisions, goals, or behaviors. Moreover, the only agency allowed is lin-
ear, adaptive reaction—there is no time for learning over time. A new theoretical
framework is necessary to explore how and under what conditions reconstruction in
the altered post-Cold War dynamics contribute to long-term political instability. As
will be discussed in following chapters, the long-term availability or unavailability of
infrastructure can be accompanied by social re-organization, thus leading to different
political and conflict dynamics between the state and society (e.g. Bronner (2008)).
A second shortcoming relates to an errant accusation on the causes of negative
infrastructure consequences, which ultimately limits potential fixes. Any political
system exhibits some level of clientelism or corruption—defined both normatively
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and legally as those actions where public power is abused for private ends. Yet,
states experiencing or recovering from conflict tend to have higher rates of endemic
corruption (Roniger 2004; Waterbury 1973, p. 533). Owing to the financial and
political expense of infrastructure projects, the incentive structure of corrupt political
elites leads to misappropriation of infrastructure funds for personal gain, not for the
general public good.
A significant source of such corrupt public good misallocation, as described in
exiting literature, comes from the structural relationship between the political elite’s
winning coalition and size of the selectorate or the slice of society from which the
winning coalition is drawn—a political elite within a small selectorate system is best
sustained by directing private goods to its members (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005).
Such privately incentivized elites are also shown to increase political instability risks
by being proximate causes of internally driven conflict (Brown 2001, p. 16). Recog-
nizing corruption’s risk to political instability, existing literature focuses on preventing
political instability surrounding infrastructure by fixing the the structural causes of
corruption and misallocation of public goods generally and infrastructure specifically.
Yet, this policy prescription assumes that fixing the structural causes of corruption
will automatically lead to less conflict and lower levels of political instability. This
is not always the case, as the consequences of corruption are contested within the
same system. In fact, structural causes of corruption might not be as dire a situation
that requires immediate action (Johnston 1986; Nye 1967). If the ultimate goal of
the political elite following a war is to reduce political instability risks (a common
goal for state regimes in general), it is possible that the same structure that pro-
motes corruption might also have the political capacity to reduce political instability
vis-a´-vis infrastructure and reconstruction. Moreover, when the blame for negative
consequences of infrastructure is placed solely on structural incentives, no valid nor-
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mative claims may be raised—to include political stability. A political structure is
automatically viewed as ‘bad’ and in need of immediate fixing (to include interven-
tion) once corruption is perceived as endemic. When normative disputes and claims
are included into the discussion surrounding the relationship between reconstruction
and political instability, infrastructure solutions can be formed that go beyond a focus
on entrenched structural inefficiencies to a focus on decreasing political instability.
Rather than trying to change government structure, which can take years and is often
unsuccessful, attention can be placed on finding ways to allocate public funds and/or
infrastructure to create a stable social and political order.
The third shortcoming of existing literature relates to its value for policymakers.
Current theories largely predict that infrastructure provision will fail to reduce insta-
bility in the short term. They thus suggest to rational actors that they not invest in
infrastructure, especially if not your own. Yet, state decisions not to provide public
goods like infrastructure can also provoke dissident groups to fight against the state
(Cunnhingham and Weidmann 2007; Gompert et al. 2009). Thus, current theories are
unable to provide meaningful guidance on infrastructure investment in the short term.
Equally importantly, they also do not provide guidance on how to structure infras-
tructure investments so that long-term dynamics will reduce political instability. Such
misguidance is seen within the aforementioned discussion on current reconstruction
policy fixes to prevent future Iraqi-type failures that focus on structural misallocation,
bureaucratic competition, and efficiency. These solutions underestimate how or why
long-term consequences occur around infrastructure provision and fail to appreciate
infrastructure’s intrinsic long-term qualities.
In summary, existing literature has failed to see the unique complexities behind
infrastructure as a public good: they view infrastructure as an capability rather than
part of an ever-changing system that shapes political stability and instability; agency
11
is limited to be linear and in the short term while learning (direct and indirect)
is outside their scope; and current solutions revolve around preventing structural
misallocation of public goods rather than incorporating normative ideals such as
political stability. A new theory is needed that incorporates infrastructure’s long-
term qualities and role in shaping society along side the normative goal of political
stability.
Call for a New Theory
To avoid the same problems as past research, I propose a new theory. This theory
represents a middle ground approach as it “deterministic and constructivist argument
while adding a time-sensitive perspective” within a technical systems focus (Hughes
1969; Fritsch 2011, pg. 33). In Chapter 2, I develop such a theoretical framework,
Infrastructure Stability Theory (IST), that aims to explain why some kinds of in-
frastructure reconstruction policies reduce political instability while others do not.
With IST, I argue that there are two types of infrastructure politics present: first and
second order politics. In first order politics, infrastructure is a material capability,
where actors and politics are concerned with immediate intents and adaptation to
conflict that are driven by short-term goals and retaliation. In second order politics,
the focus shifts to a long-term perspective on the politics surrounding socio-technical
system where the interaction of infrastructure, power structures, and the public over
time leads to conflict being driven by long-standing grievances and group identity. In
short, agency is given to society (and thus politics) while acknowledging technology’s
push in specific directions (Fritsch 2011). From IST, hypotheses are presented in
Chapter 2 that pertain to both the observed effect of infrastructure provision and
non-provision on conflict over time and the specific second order causal mechanisms
connecting national infrastructure systems to political instability.
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As explained in Chapter 2, IST is a new framework through to understand the
role of and effect of infrastructure in conflict-prone countries. Though built upon
past research and knowledge on both conflict and technology, IST’s conceptualiza-
tion of second-order and different long-term consequences of infrastructure is novel.
As such, before past theories can be updated or new theories created based on IST
insight, I must illustrate the existence of long-term consequences (second order poli-
tics) and acquire an understanding of just how and why infrastructure shapes political
instability over-time. Such a task requires data that capture both infrastructure and
conflict across time and the long-term social/political effects of reconstruction policy
decisions. Such data are case-specific, does not exist, and/or is often inadequate,
which limits direct analysis. To overcome this, a triangulation approach helps point
to the complexities of infrastructure consequences and answer the what, how, and
why behind post-conflict reconstruction induced political instability (Schock 1999).
This dissertation uses, to the best of my knowledge, a unique combination of
methods: a geospatial longitudinal study on a population of thirty-two cases, a fuzzy-
set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), and process tracing on a case study:
Ethiopia. These methods complement one another and each provides a piece to the
larger IST framework: a geospatial longitudinal study provides both visual evidence
of infrastructure and conflict over time and hypothesis testing; fsQCA provides an
evaluation of the hypothesized causal mechanisms to past cases and data both in-
dependently and in conjunction with each other; while, process tracing allows for
an understanding of the narrative behind infrastructure and reconstruction induced
political instability in addition to seeing the unique benefits of an IST framework.
The first step required in this dissertation is to demonstrate that IST is actually
needed in that there are different long-term effects of infrastructure, which previous
theories cannot adequately capture. Chapter 3 presents a geospatial-temporal study
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on 32 post conflict cases where reconstruction was needed.6 The resulting longitudi-
nal analysis uses infrastructure data across time, created using geographic information
system (GIS) software. This model accomplishes three things: 1) it allows me to con-
nect place, time, and attributes (Paul et al. 2005), 2) it models how levels of different
types of infrastructure influences political stability, and 3) it tests the existence of
IST’s novel second order politics. Supporting the the longitudinal analysis are two
vignettes. The results demonstrate how conflict surrounding infrastructure morphs
as time passes after infrastructure provision and how the lack of infrastructure in the
peripheries increase conflict risks over time.
It is not enough to merely show the existence of different long-term consequences
of infrastructure and second order politics. I must also demonstrate how these varying
effects are occurring. To do this, Chapter 4 examines IST’s necessary and sufficient
properties by way of a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Schneider
and Wagemann 2012; Rihoux 2008; Ragin 2008). By employing fsQCA, I am able to
directly address the hurdles involved in examining post-conflict reconstruction and
political instability (such as endogeneity, asymmetry, and limited case diversity).
Following this, I describe in detail how four reconstruction conditions (cut off periph-
eries, reconstruction aid discrepancies, high unemployment during reconstruction,
and poor infrastructure quality) explain past cases of political instability. Ultimately,
this fsQCA will evaluate whether the hypothesized causal mechanisms are supported
by case knowledge and data by examining between- and within-cases (Schneider and
Wagemann 2012, p. 304). The findings presented in this chapter provide support for
my hypotheses in regards to how reconstruction conditions can play into both relative
and absolute deprivation theories and can hinder national unity.
Projecting policy outcomes requires information about why things (infrastructure,
6This set of cases is used both for Chapter 3’s geo-spatial study and Chapter 4’s fsQCA.
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politics, conflict, society, etc.) look and work the way they do in an actual case. This
calls for a case study approach favoring thick and in-depth description (Fritsch 2011).
As such, Chapter 5 includes a qualitative case study into IST’s causal mechanisms via
process tracing (Bennett 2008; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; George and Bennett
2005). The case examined in this chapter, Ethiopia, was chosen based on the results of
the previous two chapters. As Ethiopia had two consecutive periods of reconstruction,
this case provided a unique opportunity to trace policy changes and varying conse-
quences in a most-similar situation. In describing why IST’s causal mechanisms have
led to political instability, this narrative engages with elements previously left out in
the geo-spatial and fsQCA studies: political grievances, history, learning, power, and
infrastructure design. In the end, this chapter depicts how Ethiopia’s political elite
could not foresee the long-term consequences of the reconstruction decisions and thus
bolstered feelings of relative deprivation and psychological separation.
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to provide policy recommendations for
future reconstruction projects. As s new theory on the relationship between infras-
tructure and political instability, IST will provide useful input into the redesign of re-
construction policies that unintentionally increase the probability of instability. The
final chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 6) brings together the results from the
previously described three approaches to form such policy recommendations and pro-
jections. An expert interview with the Special Inspector for Iraqi Reconstruction,
Stuart Bowen, on US reconstruction policies plays a large role in these recommenda-
tions as a way to maintain policy feasibility and placed within current policy debates.
The five policy recommendations presented in Chapter 6 can help the US and others
avoid the failures seen in Iraqi reconstruction in future operations.
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Conclusion
Populations around the world are dependent on infrastructure networks and sys-
tems. When these collapse or are destroyed, like they were in Iraq, the consequences
spread beyond the infrastructure and into all corners of society. As such, policy-
makers must be prepared to both prevent such collapse and have a political strategy
ready when collapse does occur. The failures of Iraqi reconstruction, where neither
was present, ring the alarm for policymakers and researchers alike to pay attention to
the influence of national infrastructure and make such plans. These plans can then
be incorporated into political strategies to help the state achieve long-term goals such
as lower political instability risks. No longer can we depend on successes seen last
century in today’s changed environment. Before this can be done though, theoreti-
cal perspectives must mirror this shift and incorporate contemporary knowledge on
the long-term qualities of infrastructure as a component of a larger complex system
shaping political instability risks. This new perspective will then act as a foundation
to understand past failures and build successful reconstruction politics.
By doing this, this dissertation, as a whole, strengthens academic and policy
ties between political science and science and technology studies (STS). An inter-
disciplinary approach between these fields provides a broader understanding of how
technology and politics interact, which then opens a door for new research on pub-
lic good provision and the use of technology by state and non-state actors (Fritsch
2011; Kolodziej 1992). This dissertation takes takes such an approach by conditioning
political science’s theories about conflict and public goods with STS’ insight on tech-
nological systems and complexity to understand the dynamics behind infrastructure
decisions and consequences. this dynamic is both political and economic and driven
by actions and choices both within and outside of these systems (Skolnikoff 1994).
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Chapter 2
DECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: INFRASTRUCTURE STABILITY
THOERY
Whether a state is in post-conflict situation or not, political elites desire politi-
cal stability over political instability. Yet, political stability and instability are not
merely characteristics of states. They are dynamic outcomes of a complex system.
Where political instability is “a long-term degenerate disease,” political stability is
a continual course of action that fluctuates across time (Zartman 1995, p. 8). Con-
ceptually, political stability and instability form the ends of a spectrum. Yet, there
is a qualitative asymmetry between the negative and positive poles of this political
stability/instability spectrum (i.e. peace is not the absence of war). This means that
any explanation of political instability non-occurrence is not a complete explanation
of political stability occurrence (Goertz 2006). For instance, if one were to demon-
strate that poor quality infrastructure increases political instability risks, this does
not mean that having good quality infrastructure will necessarily directly ensure po-
litical stability. Though the factors that explain political instability do help explain
the existence of political stability at some level, there are separate conditions that
better explain increased political stability—e.g. debt ratio, education equality, and
rights protection.
Knowing this, political stability and political instability should be examined on
their own terms. With the recent Iraqi reconstruction failure discussed in Chapter
1, this dissertation focuses on explaining post-conflict political instability—defined
as the threat (both perceived and actual) that the central government’s legitimacy
and/or control will be undermined or overthrown. The same post-conflict reconstruc-
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tion theory examined in this dissertation cannot fully explain post-conflict politi-
cal stability. Nevertheless, understanding how to promote political stability requires
knowledge on why failure and political instability have occurred in the past. A state
may enact many policies to promote political stability (i.e. liberalization of the econ-
omy and increasing the general living standard of the population). However, if con-
ditions still exist in the state that promote political instability (i.e. mass corruption
and economic inequalities), then the threat of conflict and political instability will re-
main and potentially fracture any political stability achieved with little warning—see
the Arab Spring protests in Egypt that ousted then President Hosni Mubarak. Such
ignorance of political instability conditions can be seen in a contemporary ‘success
story.’ China’s political elites have been greatly successful in creating a prospering
economy, increasing the population’s living standards, and raising the country’s po-
sition in the international system. However, this growth came at a cost by ignoring
immense economic inequalities and failing to comprehensively invest in infrastructure
to the entire population1 —conditions that reinforced an underlining risk of political
instability.
Nevertheless, how to capture political instability, let alone the conditions that in-
fluence it, is highly debated. There has been some convergence in existing literature
and political instability measures on borders, centralized control over state agents,
security, physical power, legitimacy, and regime measures that include type, length,
or durability (Marshall and Cole 2010; Foltz 1995; Zartman 1995; Brown 2001). How-
ever, the literature has generally given short shrift to the extremely important role
of non-security based public good provision in the modern state. These goods range
1When one thinks of China’s infrastructure, they often conjure images of Beijing Airport, one
of the most expensive airports in the world, or the high-speed rail that connects the eastern cities.
Though these are spectacular infrastructure project, this is not the norm in China. The widespread
and deadly distraction of recent earthquakes in the Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces demon-
strated the poor quality of rural infrastructure in the west and southwest.
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from health services, education, social security, financial infrastructure, and physical
infrastructure (Weaver and Rockman 1993). Such goods do not directly help increase
individual or national security as traditionally understood by policymakers and re-
alist frameworks, but they provide crucial social nets, structures, or capabilities to
the population at large. This oversight in existing political instability conceptualiza-
tion leads to a limited understanding of the impact of certain types of public good
provision—including infrastructure provision—to observed political instability. In re-
sponse, I argue that the ability to effectively allocate public goods beyond security
must be emphasized in political instability conceptualizations.2
Though infrastructure is just one type of such non-security based public good, I
argue that these technologies are, in fact, major components in the success and failure
of post-conflict policy and cannot be overlooked—when there is failure in infrastruc-
ture’s technical configurations, political crises and social upheaval become pervasive
throughout a country. Thus, it is through this re-conceptualization of political insta-
bility where infrastructure provision is a key component that it becomes possible to
provide a new perspective on why previous post-conflict reconstruction efforts have
led states into continued political instability. Incorporating this will allows for a bet-
ter understanding of just how reconstruction can become a part of political strategy
in post-conflict operations.
Doing this requires addressing four relevant policy variables related to infrastruc-
ture and infrastructure networks as part of a complex system: when, who, where, and
how. The “when” element must consider both short and long-term components. The
“whom” that receives or does not receive infrastructure matters because individuals
are rational entities with agency to both adapt and learn. “Where” infrastructure
2This does open the door to endogeneity problems, but the ability to allocate infrastructure and
other public goods is an integral part of political stability/instability and cannot be ignored. As will
be discussed in Chapter 4, this endogeneity does not preclude an analytical study from occurring.
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is built requires a comprehensive view of the state’s geography and infrastructure
network. And, the “how” infrastructure is constructed captures who receives recon-
struction benefits and the strength and longevity of these benefits. By combining
elements from both conflict literature and STS, this chapter develops a theory that
provides insight into how each variable influences political instability in post-conflict
reconstruction areas: Infrastructure-Stability Theory (IST). IST is not intended to be
a standalone theory; IST is a framework on how to view the effects of infrastructure
and reconstruction policies. By using this new framework, existing literature can be
reframed and updated while new theories are formed that building on IST’s insights.
In developing IST, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I reframe exiting liter-
ature’s short term perspective on infrastructure as a capability (first order politics),
and argue for the need to have a long-term perspective of infrastructure (second or-
der politics) in order to fully understand infrastructure’s role in shaping to political
instability. I then present hypotheses concerning both the observed effect of infras-
tructure on conflict over time and the second order causal mechanisms connecting
national infrastructure networks and reconstruction to political instability. IST is
not solely an academic theory of political instability; IST is a framework to help plan
future post-conflict reconstruction projects. As such, the concluding portion of this
chapter covers the policy implications of IST on reconstruction planning and infras-
tructure construction. Lastly, I reframe Iraqi reconstruction failures within IST to
demonstrate its potential utility to policymakers.
Infrastructure Networks Across Time
As defined in this dissertation, infrastructures are the material technologies (both
structures and facilities) that are essential for economic endeavors and quality of
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life.3 Examples of such infrastructure include: roads, railroad lines, power plants,
water/sewage pipes, and broadband towers. Connecting separate infrastructure to-
gether so that they work together to achieve a single purpose creates infrastructure
networks (i.e. connecting multiple power lines and a power station creates a power
network whose purpose is to provide a reliable source of electricity). I acknowledge
that this definition precludes vital organizational infrastructure (e.g. governance, law,
and banking infrastructure), which are the systems that control power and assign indi-
vidual/group responsibilities (American Society of Civil Engineers 2013). Yet, where
material infrastructure technology is physical, organizational infrastructure is social
and adds an human element to an already complex causal story. Adding such a social
element would make it more difficult to pinpoint the source of policy failure and polit-
ical instability (Perrow 2011). For this reason, I exclude bureaucratic infrastructure
from this dissertation’s central independent variable.4
National infrastructure is necessary for a well-functioning state.5 Yet, the pro-
vision of infrastructure specifically and public goods generally requires financial and
political capital. As a state transitions from a conflict to post-conflict environment,
political elites are faced with decisions on where to allocate these limited resources,
and rarely do these states have enough of both physical and political capital to rebuild
and perform other necessary post-conflict responsibilities. States do have the option
3In lieu of material, policy papers often use the descriptor “hard” to define the same category
of infrastructure. Though the two labels are interchangeable, the word hard invokes certain charac-
teristics that, I argue, are not always present in post-conflict reconstruction. Hard technologies and
hard infrastructure implies immobile, unchanging, and inanimate. As I explain in this chapter, these
qualities are not always accurate over time: infrastructure technologies shape society; infrastructure
changes as it erodes due to lack of maintenance; and, infrastructure’s benefits move well beyond the
technology itself.
4Although I leave the application of IST on organizational infrastructure to future research, I
postulate IST will also provide key insights, as organizational and material infrastructure are often
if not always interrelated.
5See Chapter 1 for further details on why infrastructure in necessary for a functioning, stable
state.
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on whether to accept foreign aid and/or have international actors provide the infras-
tructure they cannot provide, but this comes with it obligations and/or concessions
that the political elite or society may find unpalatable.
Nevertheless, it must also be noted that infrastructure and reconstruction deci-
sions are not the only decisions occurring in post-conflict situations. After a conflict,
the political elite face decisions on security (where to station military troops and
deciding whether to restructure the military), the economy (how to transition into
the global market and whether to enact liberalization policies), and political arena (is
there a need to create a new political coalition or begin democratization of the polit-
ical system). Such decisions affect how infrastructure is provided—the selectorate of
a new coalition might expect to be rewarded or transitioning to a democracy might
slow public good allocation as policymakers create and learn a new decision-making
structure. At the same time, these decisions are not independent from each other.
a military requires infrastructure to transport people and supplies, thus the places
where the military is sent either needs to have infrastructure or infrastructure needs to
be built at the expense of building infrastructure in different areas; economic growth
requires national infrastructure to transport goods, services, and workers, yet eco-
nomic cost-benefit analysis hinders potential invest went investment (Alesina, Baqir,
and Easterly 1999; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2007).
This interdependence of post-conflict decisions across many realms makes it more
essential to understand the role of infrastructure in post-conflict political instability
so that infrastructure decisions fortify the decisions made in the security, economic,
and political arenas (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2009; Roland 2002; Cohen 2009).
Any infrastructure decisions made though must contend with the fact that al-
though infrastructure tends to remain stationary, its consequences are anything but
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fixed.6 These moving consequences come as a result of the unfolding relationship
between infrastructure and political instability across time, moving from what I term
first order politics to second order politics—see Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Infrastructure Across Time
In first order politics, technology is politicized; infrastructure is a private good
and tool in power plays during its construction and use (Brown 2009; Herrera 2003).
As will be discussed in further detail below, first order politics revolve around the
immediate goals of political elites and dissidents with infrastructure viewed as a capa-
bility in either conflict management (e.g. accommodation and repression) or dissident
strategies. In second order politics though, infrastructure becomes un-politicized, be-
comes a public good, and is no longer an active tool for conflict management or
strategies. This does not mean though that politics are absent. Contrary to first
order politics, second order politics revolve around the socio-technical system at large
6Relocating a road or communication network is financially impractical and at most physically
impossible. This does not mean that networks are unchangeable. Additional roads or power lines
can be added, which does change that infrastructure network. Moreover, infrastructure can be
completely destroyed—as shown by the initial need for reconstruction. This distinction is important.
It demonstrates the need to consider the long-term consequences of infrastructure early in the
planning process. But, as these infrastructure networks are changeable, current and future policy
makers have the opportunity to change directions.
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where the public, power structures, and infrastructure continuously shape each other
across time (Jasanoff 2003). This long-term conceptualization and system model of
infrastructure’s role in political instability has been missing from previous theories,
which focuses on the short term and, I argue, first order politics.
The shift from first to second order politics is a shift in focus from the decisions
of political elites and dissidents to a focus on the long-term effect of infrastructure
systems on the greater public. It might seem that the main driver of this shift between
first to second politics is time, and time does play an important role here, but time
does not explain everything behind this shift. The shift between first order to second
order politics involves a shift in the focal points and perspective. Actors within first-
order politics essentially act with blinders; they only see what is immediately in front
of them. These blinders are the result of various structural incentives to merely focus
on the short term. Once the blinders are removed, one’s perspective expands and
shifts into the long term and second order politics. In other words, shifting to second
order from first order politics involves allowing more information/data/input to enter
one’s evaluation and decision making. This requires a cognitive choice to remove
one’s first-order blinders and look at the larger, long-term picture. This is not easy,
as there is often information overload once the blinders are removed. Yet, IST and the
causal mechanisms between infrastructure and reconstruction to political instability
described below provide guiding posts to help order, comprehend, and act on this
new information.
Nevertheless, first and second order politics are intrinsically connected. Political
elites acting solely with a short-term perspective in first order politics cannot ade-
quately anticipate second order politics in the long term. Yet, changes in the second
order require adaptation in the first order. It is then of increased imperative to be
able to differentiate between first and second order politics and their subsequent short
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and long-term consequences to political instability.7 If they are connected, why are
the politics surrounding infrastructure and reconstruction different in the initial years
as compared to many years out? The answer lies in the focus. A couple of years out
from infrastructure provision, it is still hard to see plausible long-term outcomes or
consequences, which is why the focus remains on the short term and immediate re-
actions. Yet, actions and decisions in the first-order build on top of each other and
eventually add up to form second-order politics and consequences. Many years after
provision, it becomes more possible to see how a policy is or is not achieving long-term
goals and changes can be made accordingly.8
First Order Politics
In first order politics, decisions by the political elite regarding infrastructure pro-
vision are based on private good logic with the goal to immediately increase loy-
alty, punish dissidents, or fulfill international agreements (Lichbach 1987; Bueno de
Mesquita and Down 2005; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). The populous (to include
infrastructure users and non-users, dissident groups, selectorate, and non-committed)
react to this infrastructure provision or non-provision. This reaction comes in many
7A similar perspective is used within emerging technology discourse in regards to the “upstream”
and “downstream” policies. Technological development’s downstream includes regulations and mar-
ket mechanisms and its upstream includes research policies and technology assessment (Fisher, Ma-
hajan, and Mitcham 2006). Though there are many similarities between the upstream/downstream
and first/second order, I am hesitant to bring this metaphor over to this discussion on infrastructure
technology primarily due to the diffuse effects of infrastructure over time. Where downstream de-
velopment policies are seemingly most common by the political elite and revolve around regulation
and market mechanisms, second order policies are commonly ignored and revolve around forecasting
and sustainability.
8This is a common problem in regards to evaluating policy. Looking at the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), this becomes apparent. The ultimate long-term goal of the ACA was to increase the health
of the nation. Yet, in the initial years of its implementation, successes had to be measured using
short-term metrics (numbers of newly insured or changes in costs and benefits) that do not really
capture changes in the nation’s long-term health, because there was little other available data and
these were the numbers the policymakers wanted to help make their claim. At the same time, it
does not become possible to fully measure this until many years later after the initial changes start
taking hold and shaping health outcomes. It is then that different policies can be made to help
better align the ACA towards improving the long-term health of the nation.
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forms, such as: supporting or resenting the political elites, employing new infrastruc-
ture in their strategies, igniting new conflict due to ‘bad’ infrastructure provision, or
fighting neighbors as a result of new connections and intermingling (Francisco 1995;
DeNardo 1985; Arendt 1970; Lichbach 1987; Gates 2002; Moore 1998; Van Evera
2001; Gompert et al. 2009). After seeing how others react to their decisions, the
political elite adapt future infrastructure provision decisions(Lichbach 1987; Roniger
2004; Cunnhingham and Weidmann 2007)—Figure 2.2 depicts this cycle.
Such first order politics is seen in the West Bank where Israeli leaders decided to
build an additional road in 2004 between Jerusalem to Maaleh Adumim—an already
well-connected settlement with a population of over 31,000 Israeli settlers—in order
to gain support from local lawmakers upset with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan
to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Though successful in that regard, this decision
was perceived as a road misallocation. Palestinians in the West Bank wondered why
an area, which already had the needed infrastructure, was getting new infrastructure
when they did not have access to all-weather roads or only very poor quality roads.
This fed into local anger and frustration (P-I News Services 2004). First order politics
are also seen in how infrastructure reduce barriers to collection action, increase the
ability to mobilize insurgents, and increase the likelihood of insurgency within a given
area. Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013), for example, show how spatial variation in
access to communication technologies help explain the location of insurgent violence,
which occurs as a result of the positive influence communication and information
sharing has on rebel mobilization. In both cases, infrastructure was viewed as a tool
or capability. This led to a near-sighted perception of infrastructure’s consequences
and costs/benefits. Long-term effects to political instability were not addressed.
By viewing infrastructure as a capability and private good, actors’ limited agency
to enact change while acting in first order politics becomes evident—the political
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Figure 2.2: First Order Politics
Political elite decides to 
provide or not provide 
infrastructure
Provision/ Output
Political elite decides 
where, what, and how to 
allocate infrastructure 
based on immediate intent
Populous  Reacts by:
- Supporting/resenting political elites
- Use infrastructure as it was intended
- Continue as normal with no infrastructure
- Continue violence using the infrastructure
- Ignite new conflict due to reaent
- Act on old grievances or with newly 
connected neightbors 
Adapt:
- Political elite adapt future 
infrastructure allocation and 
population adapts future reaction to 
better meet short-term goals
elite and the populous can only adapt to infrastructure and react to failing or new
strategies by changing their behavior (Haas 1990; Hall 1993; Sabatier 1988; Levy
1994). Within IST, adaptation is observed in infrastructure provision policies or in
dissident tactics. Political elites can adapt future infrastructure projects in first order
politics to mitigate conflict risk or to punish dissident actions. Dissident groups adapt
to infrastructure provision and use infrastructure in their mobilization strategies. As
shown in Figure 2.2, first order politics is a continuous and vicious cycle of reaction
and adaptation to an other’s action. By continuously adapting policies, the political
elite and dissident groups primarily execute reactive strategies in hopes to prevent the
other side from gaining great leads. Yet, such reactive strategies that are concerned
about protecting ones position from an other can only regulate violence rather than
preventing it all together (Bar-Siman-Tov 1994; Mitchell 1981).
In terms of the observable effects on conflict type, first order politics triggers
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reactionary and counteraction violence where the political elite or dissident groups
employ quick, tit-for-tat strategies using infrastructure as a tool. Such conflict is
based on short-term goals or those goals that achieve immediate results (i.e. ending a
protest, destroying military capabilities, eliminating government officials, or gaining
control of a town). Tough policymakers and dissidents do have long-term goals (i.e.
secession, democracy, regime security, and economic growth), their focus remains
on immediate goals that have built-in tools for implementation (Majeski and Sylvan
2009). In short, dissidents and the political elite in first order politics are opportunistic
in their conflict tactics to gain immediate benefits—resulting success is quick to see
and greatly rewarded. With a focus on immediate benefits, there is no incentive to
either act or recognize potential long-term consequences of their infrastructure and
reconstruction policies to political instability (Weinstein 2007).
With first order politics’ short-term perspective, there is no time to understand
how actors can learn from or be shaped by infrastructure or socio-technical systems
as actors are focused on the material technology and short-term reactions to these
technologies. This does not mean that learning is not occurring, just that neither
side recognizes that learning is occurring and having real consequences to political
instability. In short, the consequences of learning are larger and are more severe
than first order politics can appreciate. This adaptation versus learning distinction
is important in regards to post-conflict reconstruction as it is through learning that
conflict prevention and decreased political instability is allowed.
When comparing this description of first order politics to exiting literature’s treat-
ment of infrastructure in conflict areas (described in Chapter 1), it becomes clear that
there is very little difference between the two beyond technical terms—this was delib-
erate. IST does not replace previous theories, but adds an additional layer that was
missing as existing literature cuts the relationship between infrastructure and polit-
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ical instability short and discounts infrastructure’s long-term qualities. By adding
this long-term perspective via my conceptualization of second order politics, exist-
ing literature could be reframed so that it better captures how infrastructure as a
capability influences conflict on the ground. It then becomes possible to appreciate
infrastructure’s long-term influence and role in society.
Second Order Politics
Infrastructure has an intrinsic long-term quality in that its consequences both re-
main and change long after the initial investment. Beginning at an infrastructure’s
construction and as time passes, an increasing-returns yet path-dependent situation
forms where the relative benefits of staying with that infrastructure and the costs of
switching paths to new or different infrastructure increase over time (Pierson 2000;
Hughes 1994; Kennedy 2008).9 One aspect of such change across time is how infras-
tructure shifts from being a private benefit into a public good where the consequences
(both good and bad) are felt by the public (users and non-users; selectorate) at large.
As first order politics focuses on the short term and immediate consequences, a per-
spective is needed that accounts for this long-term quality and infrastructure as a
public good in order to fully understand how infrastructure shapes political instabil-
ity over time—a perspective provided in IST’s second order politics.
Second order politics takes a system-level approach towards infrastructure. Where
infrastructure is a tool/capability in first order politics, infrastructure becomes its
9An example: a well is built and the builders leave; the community grows surrounding the well;
the community becomes dependent on that source of water; the builders remain far away while
their product continues to benefit the community; the community now could not exist without that
well and switching to a different water infrastructure network (i.e. piped in from a local reservoir)
becomes costly as residents invest in other technologies dependent on the well; the well provides
security in the community to invest in its growth.
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own component within a larger socio-technical system (Jasanoff 2003).10 These
socio-technical systems are comprised of not only the various infrastructure and in-
frastructure networks, but also power structures (social structures that reinforce in-
equalities between groups of people, to include: social orders, economic arrangements,
and political constituencies) and the actions occurring within the system (i.e. the in-
teractions created by transportation networks and patterns of social activity)—see
Figure 2.3.11 In such systems, these elements continuously interact and influence
each other—in other words, society, technology, and power structure become depen-
dent on each other. This interaction ultimately effects how the public (individuals
and groups) both act and feel—note that this does not always occur as the original
‘planner’ intended (Kennedy 2008). Infrastructure shapes individual daily actions
and ultimately their identity. Separating these elements, which a short-term perspec-
tive does, causes one to miss power dynamics and important lines of inquiry (Winner
1986).12
The dynamic nature of socio-technical system makes it susceptible to manipulation
and allows actors to push the system towards their own goals and ideology. Ideology is
symbolically important in second order politics by envisioning and framing a desired
future ‘public’. This is not say that ideology is not absent in first order politics;
ideology tells the political elite and dissidents who their supporters are that need
10Note, socio-technical systems are not ‘soft technology’. As traditionally used, soft infrastructure
technologies are bureaucratic, immaterial structures. For more discussion on the difference between
material and bureaucratic infrastructure and why the latter is not included in this discussion, see
Chapter 1.
11An individual or society can be affected by multiple socio-technical systems at one time. These
systems might even pull in opposite directions. As described in this dissertation, I am looking at
socio-technical systems incorporating national infrastructure in its entirety. Excluded is the effect
of international socio-technical systems (i.e. roads crossing borders and international satellites).
Though these systems are impotent in shaping society, I am currently focusing on the national level.
12For instance, a focus on infrastructure as a capability may capture the various ways dissidents
use that technology but not see how the power structures reinforced by infrastructure may ignite
long-held, simmering grievances or even create new, deep grievances.
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Figure 2.3: Second Order Politics
private goods, why retaliation is needed, and what any other short-term goals are.13
Such manipulation is seen within governmentality where technologies (here infras-
tructure) discipline citizens by guiding their daily lives towards or against the goals of
the state and ideology (Keeley 1990). If the political elite wishes to maintain power,
a continual process of governmentality is needed, which a maintained infrastructure
network can do over a long period of time (Jasanoff 2003; Ferguson 1990; Nye 1994).
Please note that I am not taking a deterministic stance in regards to infrastructure. A
deterministic stance (X technology directly leads to Y consequence with little agency
given to society) would not allow for the type of change IST foresees in second order
politics (Winner 1986). In second order politics, agency is given to actors (the polit-
ical elite and public) within and around a socio-technical system (and thus politics)
while acknowledging technology’s continual push (Fritsch 2011).
13As an illustration of this dual role of ideology, Chinese ideology envisions a future with a Chinese
people under communist rule and part of a capitalist superpower. This then requires a socio-technical
system that promotes communist norms, economic growth, and unified identity.
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Figure 2.3 illustrates how the socio-technical system shapes political instability as
an outcome. Yet, this outcome is the result of a complex system over time. Because
of this long-term quality, infrastructure viewed with a short-term perspective are per-
ceived as stable, as only the physical infrastructure and immediate consequences are
seen. Yet, these systems are anything by stable over time. What is not seen with
a short-term perspective is how these socio-technical systems are in constant refor-
mation and any change is gradual and cumulative in nature. For instance, UNHCR
refugee camp designers, using first order logic, failed to understand how the camp’s
infrastructure would be operated by the inhabitants over time—the original builders
assumed these camps were temporary, when, in fact, they became a long-term homes
for many. This meant that UNHCR was unable to foresee how their camp structure
and technology would actually obstruct community values and provide shielding for
illicit activity later on (Kennedy 2008).
By extending the time frame, it becomes possible to see how infrastructure is
more than just a technology. It is a component of a dynamic, larger, socio-technical
system. Infrastructure shapes individual daily actions, which cumulate together to
ultimately shape their identity. Infrastructure also gives power or takes power away
from certain individuals or groups. Yet, none of this exists independently from societal
and political influences. Human actors have power in shaping infrastructure design
and use. This dynamic complexity represents a potentially destabilizing force by
reinforcing previous outcomes or allowing these systems to be quickly overturned
through endogenous and exogenous forces (Perrow 2011). A case in point being when
lines of conflict occur as non-users see themselves as separate from the central state
or when actors within the population learn to ‘misuse the system’ against the state
(Skolnikoff 1994).
In contrast to the adaptation seen in first order politics, learning around and
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within the socio-technical system in second order politics is the deliberate or unin-
tentional attempt to adjust policy goals and values in response to a combination of
failures, feedback loops, perception changes, and increased information (Hall 1993;
Sabatier 1988; Malici 2011). Such learning in regards to infrastructure takes time
as changes are incremental and must be continuously reinforced. When viewed in
first order politics, these incremental changes appear as individual acts. Yet, when
amalgamated together these compounding acts, these changes appear as learning.
Such learning appears in many forms across post-conflict reconstruction. In dissi-
dent strategies, infrastructure can reinforce long running grievances or create new
grievances that leads to that group changing their goals and values (i.e shifting
from attacking political elites themselves to attacking those sites that symbolize the
regime’s attempt to quell their movement and identity). Moreover, dissident groups
can find ways to undermine the state by manipulating the socio-technical system to-
wards their goals and away from state goals often leading to infrastructure destruction
(Habyarimana et al. 2007). Alternatively, the lack of infrastructure can cause groups
to learn new ideational grievances by promoting physical and psychological ethnic
separations (Van Evera 2001). Learning can also be seen in the political elite’s poli-
cies that manipulate the system to purposively push segments of the population away.
In other words, resentment and grievances are baked into the socio-technical system,
which the populous then learns from as it’s being shaped by the system. Is it through
this learning in second order politics that the intentional sabotage of infrastructure
and/or denial of a state provided good by ideological forces becomes comprehensible.
This type of learned “misuse” of infrastructure is recognition that: infrastructure is
important and long-term political instability is connected to infrastructure—a second
order focus.
Though learning can take different forms, what they have in common is that
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they invoke proactive conflict strategies based on long-term goals—long-term goals
are those objects that have no immediate solution and it takes a chain of different
actions to achieve an outcome (Majeski and Sylvan 2009). Proactive strategies are not
concerned with finding ways to eliminate the enemy quickly. Instead, they involve
diminishing the capabilities and resources of dissidents or the political elite slowly
to a point where they can be absorbed into society and the political structure or
until compensation must be made before a complete takeover (Posen 2001/02). As
such, conflict driven by second order politics comes as a result of deeper, simmering
grievances where the goals of the state clash with the goals of a group—often seen
as a build up of prolonged conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). This learning must
be understood as it has substantially different conflict effects compared to first oder
politics.14
Israel offers an illuming example of the socio-technical system and first and sec-
ond order politics. Israel has been adopting policies to gain legitimacy and sustain
a particular identity they believe and desire Israelis to have (Ezrahi 1997). This is
done by building Israeli settlements in the West Bank to force that area in the Israeli
national identity while pushing out, via infrastructure, those not belonging to this
perceived identity. For instance, a stoplight exists separating Beit Hanina (a Pales-
tinian neighborhood) and Pisgaat Zeev (a Jewish settlement). Local Palestinians tell
the story of how the light remains green for settlers for five minutes and only briefly
for those in Beit Hanina. After hearing this, an international news investigation found
that stoplights stay green in Jewish settlements for an average of a minute and a half
while stoplights did in fact stay green for an average of 20 seconds in Palestinian
areas (Guarnieri 2010). Little if any objective justification for such a dichotomy ex-
14More will be discussed on different second order politics’ learned strategies/tactics and grievances
in the rest of this chapter’s discussion on second order causal mechanisms and policy implications.
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ists. Looking at other types of infrastructure, the high contention behind water rights
and infrastructure can be traced back to Israeli state formation and failed Oslo peace
accords, which was supposed to be a temporary solution to water rights by freezing
quantities. Yet, such levels cannot adequately nourish the West Bank’s growing popu-
lation in the arid region. As Palestinians continuously adapt to blatant infrastructure
discrepancies and water shortages, resentment builds that reinforces a separate Pales-
tinian identity in the West Bank—an identity Israeli political elites are attempting
to lessen within the national Israeli identity (Sel 2003; Alatout 2009). “It’s a feeling
of frustration and of not belonging...that the government and state is excluding you
and you are not counted as an equal,” a local Palestinian resident explained of the
effect of this socio-technical manipulation (Guarnieri 2010).
Where there is second order politics, there are first order politics. By framing
infrastructure policy in a security framework, Israel has politicized infrastructure in
hopes to gain legitimacy internally and internationally using first order politics. After
the second intifada in September 2000, the Israeli Defense Forces closed many of West
Bank’s major roads for non-Jewish settlers claiming safety concerns both on the road
and in regards to combatants traveling between sites—ten of these major roads were
still closed nine years later. This separate infrastructure policy (essentially making
infrastructure a private good for Israeli citizens) was further upheld in March 2008
when the Israeli Supreme Court made an interim decision allowing for additional
separated roads to be built in the West Bank for Palestinians. Having gained the
label of ‘Apartheid Roads’ by Palestinians, these were not separate-but-equal roads,
as neither their utility nor quality measured up to the original road (Carey 2001;
Bronner 2008). Access to water follows a similar track as water infrastructure is
used a private good tool to support the Israeli selectorate at the cost of providing
inadequate water access to Palestinians. Though Israel’s water comes from its own
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aquifers, the West Bank and Israelis share groundwater basins (Alatout 2006; Sel 2003;
Allan and Allan 2002). In both cases, the resentment ignited by the initial decision
to punish dissidents and non-selectorate by limiting infrastructure has morphed into
second order consequences. As they are being routinely pushed out these first order
decisions and the socio-technical system, Palestinians’s separate identity and long-
term grievances are also being continuously re-enforced.
Conflict Surrounding Infrastructure
In summary, first order politics and existing literature largely predict that con-
flict risks will spike shortly after infrastructure provision and the initial phases of
reconstruction. Yet, not all infrastructure provision will illicit conflict. Such conflict
occurs in subnational/local areas where there was already a history of conflict between
groups, there was high political distrust in the central government, and/or there was
a latent dissident group. When infrastructure is newly provided in these areas, new
conflict can be sparked based on: the intermingling of groups with a violent history,
dissidents reacting defensively to perceived repression, and groups taking advantage
of their increased capacity to mobilize support and resources. If these conditions did
not exist, then there is a low risk that newly provided infrastructure will spark a spike
in conflict and new infrastructure provision would likely reduce grievances and be ac-
cepted. Nevertheless, the conditions that lead to conflict are common in many areas
of post-conflict states, which is one reason why helps explain why current literature
has focused on such first-order consequences.
Nonetheless, I also argue that second order politics offers the potential for a drop
in conflict because of these socio-technical systems. Infrastructure can connect areas
physically to the political core, national economy, and national identity. This follows
Tobler’s first law of geography where “everything is related to everything else, but
36
near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970, p. 236). If national
infrastructure is dispersed throughout the country, distant areas from the political
core are no longer distant and the influence of the political core will not decay across
large territories.15
If second order politics are accounted for in reconstruction policies, the risk of
future conflict will drop—creating an inverted-U shape of conflict risks. With this
inverted-U conflict risk, conflict is inevitable. However, if policymakers acknowledge
and plan for the initial outburst and forecasts are accounted for during the planning
process, conflict risks will fall. This brings me to my first hypothesis about the ob-
servable/geographic effects of this shift from infrastructure’s short-term consequences
(first-order) to long-term consequences (second order).
H1: Conflict risks after infrastructure provision follows an inverted pat-
tern where conflict risks spike after provision and then drops as time
passes.
In testing H1, I am specifically looking at the consequences (conflict events) of
the surrounding infrastructure networks. Confirming this hypothesis will provide
evidence for the existence of second order politics. If I cannot show the distinction
between first order and second order consequences, IST is in jeopardy as its novelty
comes from the theorized existence of second order politics.
Second Order Causal Mechanisms
Nevertheless, it is not enough to show the existence of second order politics; also
needed is an understanding how second order politics leads to political instability.
15The political core is the central geographic location of the political elites—in most all cases, this
is also the country’s capital (Campante and Do 2009).
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The hypothesized causal mechanisms discussed in this section revolve around recon-
struction conditions that lead to higher political instability risks over time in regards
to integration, power, and system security. In other words, the presence of these
conditions means that the hypothesized inverted-U relationship will not occur and
there will not be an eventual drop in conflict after reconstruction.
National Unity
Socio-technical systems were pivotal in the creation of the modern state. As de-
scribed Anderson (2006), these systems created a vital “we” that connected people
who might never meet, have little in common, and yet live within the same invisi-
ble borders.16 In his narrative of the “unfolding of national destiny,” Nye (1994)
illustrates how the US came to be in part due to technology’s ability to unify and
create a single ‘American Identity.’ The US federal government needed to create a
national bond as the country expanded westward—republicanism, as a creed, meant
that politics itself could not be the unifying element needed as its politics were fo-
cused more on debate (Nye 1994, p. 76). Jackson’s manifest philosophy intertwined
with the Industrial Revolution’s mechanical philosophy and sparked the creation of
the first Transcontinental Railway connecting San Francisco, California to the East
Coast, which cemented the American identity to both coasts. The creation of such
nationalistic feelings required and still calls for central leadership.
Just as fledging states needed to create a unified we, the need for a unified state
after a major conflict is also paramount in order to create national trust and concord
after turbulent times. Yet, the modern state is still “a compulsory association with
a territorial bases” where national identity and nationalism more closely linked with
16For more on how technologies has shaped national identities, see: Lansing (2006) and Scott
(1998).
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the territory and people and not necessarily with the state or regime at large (Weber
2009; Coakley 2003; Gourevitch 1979; Wright 1991, p 156). Given that states recov-
ering from conflict are also commonly composed of a diverse set of people (ethnically
and religiously) across a large land area, the risk of potential separatist feelings and
increased political instability remain high if left unattended (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Once this diversity is politically, economically, and ideationally marginalized along
territorial lines, the risk of conflict is high (see Tir and Vasquez (2010) and Hensel
(2012) for how territory affects conflict onset and escalation; see: Vasquez (1993) and
Senese and Vasquez (2008) for how territory can be the underlying cause of conflict).
In these situations, the risk of successful separatist mobilization based on periph-
eral nationalism increases based on the degree of such marginalization (Buhaug 2006;
Olzak 1983; Wright 1991; Gourevitch 1979).17
Existing literature highlights two available options for the state to curb such risks:
changing territory boundaries or relocating the group in question (Coakley 2003).
Both of these options, however, fail in two areas. First, both risk sparking new
conflicts. Secondly, post-conflict governments are often too weak to implement such
ambitious policies. IST offers a third option for states to overcome diverse and/or
fractionalized populations: having a national infrastructure system that connects
periphery to the political center.
Infrastructure is dependent on the ground its sits upon. Where first order poli-
tics only sees the technology and immediate land it sits upon, second order politics’
systems approach broadens the scope to include the surrounding territory at large.
17Buhaug (2006) argues though that such peripheral secessionist conflict primarily occurs within
a large country. Dissidents in small states primarily want to take over the government rather than
seceded due to limited land area to be ‘separate from the core’. This structuralist argument though
ignores the actions of the political elite to both incorporate or push away certain populations.
Moreover, what constitutes small or large state is purely subjective and that a group can still desire
a separate state on a relatively small area—see Sri Lanka.
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Just as all parts of human body must be connected to the heart via the vascular sys-
tem, the socio-technical system can limit political instability only if the system runs
through the entire country, thus creating a single and unified “we”. By doing this,
peripherality is formed with “the subordination of a group to the authority of a geo-
graphical center or core over its fate and possessing minimal reduces for the defiance
of its distinctiveness against outside pressures” (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, p. 299). A
system that connects territories decreases the costs of the continued governmentality
needed to combat political instability.
If peripheries are cut off from this political core, the control and influence of the
political elite will decay in these areas. Cut off peripheries created by the lack of
infrastructure are prone generate feelings of psychological separations, which increase
grievances, resentment, and mobilization against the political core (Olzak 1983).
Moreover, areas with little or no infrastructure offers rebel groups sanctuary from
the governments control and military (Fearon and Laitin 2003).18 Thus, misap-
propriation of infrastructure creates socio-technical systems that enforce “lines of
conflict” between how individuals view themselves and how actors in power force
them to behave. This type of ‘a rule by nobody’ leads to political instability, as those
without power have a tendency to push back (Arendt 1970; Barnett and Duvall 2005;
Scott 1998). As such, the aforementioned inverted U relationship where conflict risks
eventually drops, will not occur.19 Preventing such a situation requires the politi-
cal elite to recognize infrastructure’s long-term, technical qualities and second order
politics—this recognition is not easy as the peripheries are commonly not part of the
18Nonetheless, I argue that this effect of distance decay can be altered and diminished (seen as
spatial autocorrelation) with a unified socio-technical system where those areas that are also far
away will still be tied to the political core—as argued in H1.
19I am not making an assumption here though that the population will be resentful of non-
provision. A group might be content that they are being separated as it matches their long-term
goals.
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political elite’s selectorate and there is minimal incentive to provide them goods over
their selectorate.
H2: If peripheries are cut off from the political core by a lack of infras-
tructure, there will be an increased probability of political instability.
Individual Capabilities
Existing measures to capture these infrastructure benefits concentrate on use and
availability. I argue that such statistics, though, only capture first order, short-term
benefits. In second order politics, power is delivered to society at large via capability-
building benefits—benefits that increase those individual capabilities that allowing
individuals to better themselves and their families and thus boost real, sustainable
freedom (Sen 1999). Take the capability building benefit of basic eduction for exam-
ple. Increasing literacy rates opens the door to more employment and higher educa-
tion opportunities, which then allows an individual to economically better themselves
well into the future.
In post-conflict reconstruction, such capability-building benefits are offered from
the skills learned by both building and maintaining the infrastructure networks and
from the job opportunities at large. The construction, engineering, and management
skills acquired on reconstruction projects provides many benefits: gives individuals
the power to improve their lives long after that project ends, allows infrastructure net-
works to be self-sustainable overtime, individuals are able to improve their lives after
a project ends, and ultimately promotes a sustainable socio-technical system. More-
over, employment on reconstruction projects allows an individual to economically
provide for their families, which in turn provides a multitude of indirect benefits—for
instance, a steady family income increases the probability of the children attending
school and improve health of the household in general (Sen 1999).
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Reconstruction’s capability-building benefits is seen historically within Western
Germany’s reconstruction. German industries partaking in Technical Assistance Pro-
grams as part of the Marshall Plan gained knowledge about productivity and related
statistical measurement from worker-exchange programs—American economists, statis-
ticians, and engineers visited German industries as they rebuilt and German workers
traveled to America to visit operating American industries so that they can rebuild
their own industries in a similar fashion (Agnew and Entrikin 2004; Sorel and Padoan
2008). The learned knowledge and skills allowed Western Germany to sustainably re-
build, which allowed industry and economic growth long after the initial aid period.
Conditions that remove these opportunities mitigate society’s power to help them-
selves and leads to an increase risk of political instability, as resentment and tensions
rise. In post-conflict reconstruction, a major risk to locals not receiving these capa-
bility building benefits (besides complete non-provision) is the diverse array of recon-
struction actors, many of whom are foreign.20 This foreign involvement often comes
in the form of contractors charged with doing the actual construction and manage-
ment. By itself, foreign involvement does not necessarily increase or decrease political
instability. However, when paired with conditions like high unemployment, foreign
involvement will begin to increase political instability—a contingent relationship. As
an individual or group sees that others are receiving benefits they feel entitled to,
feelings of being deprived increases (Walker and Smith 2002; Bayertz 1999; Olson,
Herman, and Zanna 1986).
The use of local/national workers is a long-term, second order investment. De-
spite an abundance of local workers, claims of efficiency (the perception of one’s own
20I focus here on international foreign actors taking away national, which I term local, reconstruc-
tion benefits. Nonetheless, a similar argument can be made for national actors taking away local
reconstruction benefits. These actors are also considered to be an ‘other’ whether because of being
from a different tribe, ethnicity, region, or religion.
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workers having a comparative advance compared to local resources) or contractual
claims (international contracts requiring foreign workers in order to minimize political
attacks on spending their own money to support another country) lead foreign entities
or governments to utilize foreign labor. Such decisions reflect a focus on short-term,
first order politics. Seeing foreign entities benefit from local resources increases re-
sentment and feelings of impotency by the local population willing and able to hold
these jobs. This feeling of deprivation may lead individuals to be recruited into social
movements and political violence against the political regime as they fight for what
they view as rightfully theirs (Gurr 1970). Moreover, where economic opportunities
are few, individuals are increasingly likely to engage in criminal behaviors or engage
in armed challenges to the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).
H3: When the local population is not receiving the capability building ben-
efits of reconstruction, the risk of political instability increases.
Sustainability
As previously described, socio-technical systems are constant flux. This opens the
door to a seemingly stable system rupturing to produce political instability at any
point. As a result, if infrastructure is to reduce long-term political instability, the
system surrounding infrastructure must both limit political instability risks and be
secure overtime itself. Such, sustainability in socio-technical systems require infras-
tructure and infrastructure networks that pass the test of time by being well built
and continuously, domestically maintained. If the system is at risk of failing due
to erosion or lack of aid when external revenue sources dry up, those who depend
on the system will be unsure about its future and the risks of political instability
increase as grievances grow and any stability created via the socio-technical system
crumbles away. Poor quality infrastructure—infrastructure deteriorated enough to
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prevent maximum use—is just one characteristic of an unsustained infrastructure
brought about by the lack of investment and maintenance that puts a system at risk
of failing. In the long-term, poor quality infrastructure increases system uncertainty,
which makes it more prone to political instability.
The need for a sustained socio-technical system is imperative as infrastructure is
not independent from other public goods provided by the state and visa versa. Where
service public goods (i.e. education and health services) increase life spans and social
capital, infrastructure goods promotes national economic growth and group capabil-
ities. Yet, successful provision of these public goods are dependent on each other.
Health care provision is not independent from the hospitals and clinics that house
those services; roads, railroads, and airports are not independent from transportation
and security services that allow for safe and reliable use of the infrastructure. Thus,
investment into sustaining infrastructure goes not only to the physical technology,
but also to the state’s public good system at large.
Yet, sustainability within socio-technical systems is difficult for a state econom-
ically and politically recovering from a recent conflict. Moreover, infrastructure’s
benefits are not self-reinforcing and the initial investment must be continuously re-
provided in order to maintain infrastructure benefits (Sen 1999). This requires both
the capital (political and financial) and technical knowledge to plan and invest in
infrastructure sustainability over a long period of time. Both of which might not be
possible in reconstruction areas due to limited resources and government effectiveness
(Brinkerhoff 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). Complicating this investment further is
the fact that the potential benefits of infrastructure tend to be indiscernible at the
time of investment, which makes infrastructure’s high sunk costs risky for political
elites who are conceded about their own selectorate and maintaining power (Olson
2009).
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H4: If infrastructure is unsustained, the probability of instability increases.
Policy Implications for Future Reconstruction
Decisions on where and how to reconstruct a state after a conflict have real conse-
quences beyond infrastructure, which makes understanding the relationship between
infrastructure and political instability necessary for the success of future reconstruc-
tion projects. Just as their politics are different, first order and second order politics
imply different types of post-conflict reconstruction policies.
Planning infrastructure within first order politics means constructing infrastruc-
ture in places that support one’s selectorate, withholding infrastructure provision to
repress dissidents or out of fear of dissident mobilization, or planning reconstruction
projects based on aggregate numbers and aid requirements. These different design
choices are visible—one can see where infrastructure has or has not been built. Yet,
such policies increase political instability risks, as the political elites, in a reactive
position, are merely designing infrastructure projects based on immediate objectives.
Long-term goals, such as political stability, remain secondary in the planning and im-
plementation of infrastructure provision behind more proximate, conflict-driven, and
patronage goals such as the management of violence levels, rewarding loyalty from
their selectorate, or to appeasing international donors.
International reconstruction policymakers are not immune to first order politics.
Viewing infrastructure as a capability, those actors providing post-conflict reconstruc-
tion aid focus on infrastructure projects rather than the entire socio-technical system.
Thus, success is ultimately measured by the presence of infrastructure and not the
long-term social and political consequences of that infrastructure coming as a result
of its socio-technical system. They assume economic benefits will occur and that this
will lead to less conflict. Yet, such measures are insufficient in regards to capturing
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infrastructure’s role in creating political stability or instability. Merely having infras-
tructure is not enough to eliminate political instability risks. Such overstatements on
the power of technology via technological fixes and jumps are common. Yet, they are
not the only determinants of an outcome. Moreover, when conflict occurs either as a
result of or around an infrastructure project, infrastructure providers have a tendency
retreat (physically or financially) and halt reconstruction in that area without regards
to potential long-term losses to their long-term goals.
Nevertheless, reducing political instability more than just the reactive policies seen
in first order politics—it requires an effective proactive strategy. Proactive policies
utilize reactive strategies’ positive returns and secure large gains towards long-term
goals, such as lower political instability risks (Posen 2001/02; Van Evera 1984).21
Such strategies and second order policies entail a cognizant political elite and policies
that break the logic of first order politics to create a stable socio-technical system
that limits political instability. This requires foreseeing how potential infrastructure
consequences might affect their ideology and view of the public as a whole and plan-
ing accordingly (Kennedy 2008; Winner 1986). Such design choices require answering
system questions about sustainability (how can infrastructure be built so that initial
investments continue to bring benefits while being cost-effectively maintained), ben-
efits (how can infrastructure be built so that positive externalities spread beyond the
technology to create a stable, competent society around the political elite), and inte-
gration (how can infrastructure be built to support a central, cohesive state around
the political state).
Reconstructing infrastructure needs then to be based on forecasting “what so-
21This is not to say that the state should focus all their resources on proactive strategies and
second-order politics. Focusing solely on proactive strategies creates vicious cycle of escalation and
having the necessary reactive strategies limits the need of a continued proactive actions (Van Evera
1984).
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ciety ought to be.” Society must “imagine and seek” specific technologies that fit
with certain political ends (Winner 1986, p. 53). Yet, forecasting is not a simple
task; the ability for actors to plan and construct reconstruction projects towards
specific goals decreases as time passes after implementation of that technology. In
other words, likely infrastructure outcomes are indistinguishable from plausible or
possible outcomes before implementation and only become more apparent after the
infrastructure is built and in use—termed the Collingridge Dilemma (Collingridge
1980). As such, reconstruction policies to remain flexible and been seen as a cycle
of “assessment and intervention, using [a] palette of localized tools, in response to
the previous adaptions [and learning]” (Kennedy 2008, p.221). At the same time,
forecasters must avoid the temptation to hold deterministic viewpoints of infrastruc-
ture or recommend non-provision. As stated throughout this dissertation, providing
infrastructure does not solve all development or political instability problems. At the
same time, I argue against Winner (1986) who argues that if a technology is incom-
patible to the desired future, then the technology must be excluded. Besides the fact
that infrastructure is a development necessity, non-provision comes with it its own
risks or political instability—such a viewpoint is deterministic, but in the opposite
direction.
The goal then of such forecasting involves reducing the risk of political instability
and conflict, setting the game up to favor both the state’s perceived desired future and
political stability, and remain flexible. There might still be unintended consequences
and policy changes must still be made to combat these—I do not wish to make the
claim that IST ‘solves’ the Collingridge Dilemma. Yet, by preparing for passable
long-term consequences, the political elite will be better equipped to adapt to and
learn from,these unforeseen consequences.
With the inverted-U conflict risk described in the H1, conflict is inevitable. How-
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ever, if policymakers acknowledge and plan for this initial outburst and forecasts are
accounted for during the planning process, political instability will fall. Ultimately,
this requires policymakers to convince constituents and funding agencies to continue
investing in infrastructure throughout turbulent times.
IST Insights into Iraqi Reconstruction
IST addresses a theoretical limitation concerning the relationship of infrastructure
to political instability across time. From this, the successes and/or failures of past
and current infrastructure and post-conflict reconstruction policies can be reframed
and thus better understood. The Iraqi reconstruction failure described in Chapter 1
offers a concrete illustration to understand reconstruction policy failures. Specifically,
this section attempts to address policy concerns over why IST matters and potential
policy implications when shifting to a second-order perspective of infrastructure and
reconstruction (Shapin 1994).22
Technological Fixes
Reconstructing infrastructure requires financial capital to do everything from buy-
ing the needed materials to paying workers themselves. Yet, Iraqi reconstruction faced
financial limitations that neither the Marshal Plan nor Japanese reconstruction had to
face. The successes of both of these reconstruction projects were dependent on large
levels of financial investment—the Marshall Plan itself was a set of policies total-
ing $120 billion while Japanese post-war reconstruction totaled around $15.2 billion
(Serafino, Tarnoff, and Nanto 2006; Dobbins 2003).23 Conversely, policymakers were
hesitant to set aside similar levels of financial investment for post-conflict Iraqi recon-
22See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth discussion of Iraq reconstruction’s successes and failures and
IST-informed policy recommendations.
23Both totals listed in in 2005 dollars.
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struction (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). This
hesitancy is more troubling considering the large difference in expectations, which
came about from the initial disparities between the US and the country needing re-
construction. Compared to the development levels of pre-war Germany and Japan,
Iraq was much less developed at the start of US intervention. As such, while a ma-
jority of aid in Japan and Europe was humanitarian and went towards infrastructure
rebuilding, the US faced higher expectations in Iraq to both democratize and build
Iraq’s physical reconstruction from scratch (Serafino, Tarnoff, and Nanto 2006).
A disastrous contradiction fed into this inadequate investment: though the worst-
case humanitarian situation was prepared for in Iraq, the best-case reconstruction
situation was expected.24 To combat the grim infrastructure situation they faced
once on the ground, reconstruction agencies focused on increasing the number of
infrastructure projects and viewed technology as a financially-efficient fix for Iraq’s
problems.
In viewing infrastructure as a technological fix, Iraq reconstruction policymakers
essentially viewed reconstruction as a technical task and infrastructure as a neutral
tool with deterministic outcomes instead of appreciating infrastructure and socio-
technical system’s long-term influence and role . As such, spending rates became
a way to measure success in Iraq (London˜o 2013; Office of the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). This focus on technological fixes is a first order
perspective. For instance, US officials decided to reconstruct a destroyed oil and gas
pipe line under the Tigris River rather than replacing the original line above under the
assumption that more and newer technologies are always better. This occurred even
24This is all the more puzzling as the causes of poor humanitarian situations were the same that
lead to the need of reconstruction (i.e. insurgencies), but they were either ignored or incorrectly
assumed. Data about every import into Iraq did exist due to international sanctions before the war
that could have been used to understand the humanitarian and infrastructure conditions in Iraq,
but it was not used (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009).
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with reports and the local population warning about sandy soil. Over $100 million
was spent before the project was stopped and the original bridge and pipe were fixed
(London˜o 2013; Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009).
In light of technological advances in infrastructure construction, there has also
been a growing argument that private actors provide infrastructure services more
efficiently, both after a conflict and in general (Mody 1996)—such a private-actor
focus is evident in the sheer numbers of foreign contracting companies brought into
Iraq. This assumes though that private actors would be willing to accept the risks
(financial and personal) involved with infrastructure investment, which is frequently
not the case. Private actors in post-conflict situations are more concerned with their
own profit, whether in the form of future revenue from sales or a large initial contract.
Yet, rarely do profit-generating infrastructure in these areas make substantial profit
(if any), and the areas such projects take place are often insecure which makes them
a high liability. Missing from this is the added value to long-term goals and second-
order norms like political stability, which private actors have no incentive to truly
consider.
Ultimately, Iraqi post-conflict reconstruction investment projects have not reduced
political instability as promised. SIGIR recently recognized measuring success based
on the amount spent was counterproductive (Office of the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction 2012c 2013). This is essentially an indirect measure of activity,
which can be easily disordered based on infrastructure type. Yet, no alternative metric
to measure reconstruction success is offered. IST offers such an alternative measure for
infrastructure and reconstruction outcomes: decreasing the risk of political instability
via how and where infrastructure is provided.
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Goal of Reconstruction
As with any policy, the absolute goal of post-conflict reconstruction policy is im-
portant as it shapes the types of tools and mechanisms available for policymakers
(Majeski and Sylvan 2009). Reconstruction managers did not define specific goals,
objectives, measures, and metrics until very late in the planning process (Office of
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013). Beginning from pre-
war planning, the State Department, USAID, and Department of Defense (DOD)
officials held different pre-war evaluations and post-conflict goals shaped by “histor-
ically rooted conceptions of defense, diplomacy, and development” (United States
Department of State 2003; Ginty 2003; Office of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction 2009, pg. 325). The Pentagon believed they could follow a lib-
eration model and get in and out of Iraq within months. Consequently, they did
not make or feel the need to consider alternative, long-term plans. USAID, on the
other hand, saw reconstruction as a long-term, nation-building endeavor. The State
Department underscored the need to make an humanitarian argument for removing
Saddam Hussain via military intervention. Though both the State Department and
USAID were heavily involved in post-war Iraq, President George W. Bush ultimately
gave postwar planning responsibility to agencies within the DOD. As a result, the
blueprint for post-conflict Iraq was established on DOD evaluations, principles, and
goals.
Following this, the initial goal of reconstruction was to (quickly) rebuild infras-
tructure damaged during the invasion, which was to act as a foundation of Iraq-led
growth after American forces left. However, as the reality of the situation hit and
the US shifted from a liberation model to nation-building, post-war Iraq policy went
from repairing war damage to full scale nation-building (Office of the Special Inspector
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General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). This change in goals though did not appear in
Iraqi reconstruction policy until much later and the goal of reconstruction remained
on rebuilding infrastructure networks, albeit on a grander scale. In other words, the
goal of reconstruction shifted from micro-level rehabilitation to large-scale rebuilding
often from scratch (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2009). To aid in this, the CPA created the Program Management Office (PMO),
whose purpose was large scale infrastructure projects. Yet, the PMO did not have
the power nor organizational structure to accomplish it’s large reconstruction goals.
If the number of large scale infrastructure projects was the goal and the agency in
charge had inadequate power, the use of local contractors makes logical sense. It is
also unsurprising that the infrastructure projects suffered from inadequate design and
government oversight (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2009).
Having goals merely focused on infrastructure projects (a first order focus) means
that long-term, second order consequences could not be adequately planned for.25
Sustainability was rarely considered and projects handed over to Iraqi hands often
failed (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009 2013).
Additionally, there was little connection between infrastructure construction to the
political stabilization and democratization occurring in the political core, Baghdad.
As stated in Chapter 1, SIGIR states that reconstruction must be an extension
of political strategy. What then was the goal of political strategy in Iraq? Different
departments might give different answers. But they converge on some basic elements:
political stability and lower conflict risks both in the short term and after the US
would ultimately leave. Adequately addressing such a goal, which is needed for the
25The consequences of short-term goals were seen throughout post-Iraq policies. For instance,
the de-Ba’athification in the first weeks of reconstruction where the military, a potential source of
reconstruction resources was dissolved.
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success of future reconstruction efforts, requires recognizing infrastructure’s long-term
consequences and second order politics. The US could use its resources and sheer brut
force to bring about some basically level of stability. However, such political stability
would not be guaranteed once the US left. By incorporating a long-term perspective
into their planning, the US and interim Iraq government could have set the foundation
for political stability and reduced conflict risks in preparation.
Case Specificity
As described in Chapter 1, West German and Japanese reconstruction acted as
the foundation and guiding-light for Iraqi reconstruction to a point that it was as-
sumed Iraq’s reconstruction would parallel Germany’s reconstruction. The harmful
consequences of this misguided assumption becomes apparent when comparing recon-
struction preparations for both eras.
Beginning in Europe, much of the Marshall Plan’s aid was transferred directly over
to the receiving country, which was then spent to purchase American goods to rebuild
infrastructure under the advice of U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)
officials. The ECA also provided direct training from American businessmen and
industrial workers while the US Bureau of Labor Statistics produced labor statistics
and productivity research for countries receiving Marshall Plan aid. This was done to
increase industrial efficiency as industries rebuilt both physical and workforce assets.
Such politics were done in recognition of Germany’s industrial past. Policymakers
were able to use case-specific knowledge to understand how to use the country’s own
resources (human and material) to effectively and efficiently reconstruct after WWII.
In Japan, US policymakers and the Office of War Information commissioned social
scientist Ruth Benedict to conduct a report on Japan with the objective to bridge
intercultural understanding and help plan Japanese reconstruction. In her final re-
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port, Benedict stressed the importance of understanding the roots of a culture before
one (read: the United States) could truly understand (read: shape) the politics and
political decisions of that country. By understanding the Emperor’s role in Japanese
society and culture, Benedict was able to recommend some key policies that aided
future reconstruction success: the continuation of Japanese institutions (the same in-
stitutions that helped conduct the war against the US.), not abolishing the emperor
and incorporating his public support, gaining the private sector support, and recog-
nizing the importance of continuing egalitarian land and wealth policies (Benedict
1967; Rosenblatt 2004; Azimi, Fuller, and Nakayama 2003). By doing this, the U.S.
was able to earn the active support and participation of the Japanese people in the
reconstruction process with little resistance.
A comparable report to Benedict’s,“Future of Iraq Project,” was created for Iraqi
reconstruction to help develop plans for post-war Iraq—over seventeen working groups
were involved in this project that included more than two hundred exiled Iraqi oppo-
sition figureheads and professionals. Compiled in secret and at a cost of $5 million,
the “Future of Iraq Project” came about in the midst of intense bureaucratic infight-
ing. In the end, President Bush gave post-war responsibilities to the DOD, whose
liberation model ignored the “Future of Iraq Project.” Instead, West German and
Japanese reconstruction reports were distributed to the CPA and other reconstruction
actors to help guide reconstruction policy decisions (Caldwell 2011; Office of the Spe-
cial Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009, pg. 119-120). In other words,
the DoD decided “whose knowledge counts,” and Iraqi’s knowledge did not (Jasanoff
and Martello 2004, pg. 19). When US forces did go into Iraq, there was a general
misunderstanding of what three major wars and a decade of sanctions would do to a
country’s infrastructure and psyche (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction 2013).
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Though IST argues that political stability and reduced political instability are
normative goals across cases, it recognizes that there are many paths to political in-
stability.26 Although similar patterns of casual mechanisms can be found connecting
infrastructure and reconstruction to political instability, addressing how to to fix and
prevent them depends on that case’s history, social structure, and national and local
politics—case specificity. I argue that it is okay to use past success as examples, but
policymakers must also know their host country and plan reconstruction policies that
are fitted for that country. As recommended by SIGIR, this requires strengthening
host country relationships (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Recon-
struction 2009, 2013). IST offers a way to see how history and circumstances on
the ground might feed into conditions that would increase long-term reconstruction-
induced political instability.27
Policy Discussions
As Iraqi reconstruction progressed, a deteriorating security situation meant that
almost every post-conflict Iraq decision was made based on security—even in regards
to infrastructure reconstruction. After a new US Embassy inherited Iraqi reconstruc-
tion projects from the CPA and the security situation worsened in 2005, there was
a major shift of resources into the security and economic sectors. Following this,
reconstruction goals shifted again from long-term goals to short-term goals where
success was based on how that project helped counterinsurgency efforts (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009 2013). Yet, security directly
affected rebuilding with high rates of of worker absenteeism, disrupted logistics, de-
layed countless projects, escalated security and project costs, and forced projects to
26See Chapter 4 for more discussion on and direct analysis of this equifinality.
27See Chapter 5 for an illustrative case-study into these connections.
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shut down. In short, it was impossible to meet completion dates on time, which led
to the scaling down of projects and contributed to the complaints from Iraqis about
the transfer of semi-completed projects (Office of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction 2013)
Between May 1, 2003, and August 31, 2010, an estimated 719 people were killed
while engaged in reconstruction or stabilization activities in Iraq—513 of these were
participating in infrastructure and governance projects and 1 auditor was killed in
2008 (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2012b). More-
over, SIGIR’s own actions in Iraq were quite literally “oversight under fire” and
eighteen project site visits were canceled between June 2005 to August 2008 due to
security threats (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013,
pg ix). SIGIR auditors were later authorized to travel under DOD authority by Gen-
eral David Petraeus, the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commanding General (Office of
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
Seeing the effect of this unsafe situation, common threads in policy discussions
regarding future policies include the necessity of security during reconstruction to
order to protect those doing reconstruction—while planning Iraqi reconstruction,it
was assumed that security would be at safe levels merely due to US presence (Office
of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). As such, there is
a push for future reconstruction projected to only include projects near US bases
to build goodwill and enhance security in a protected environment (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013). Based on interviews of
battalion commanders, success measured by reduced violence levels was seen as useful
and a manageable tool for future operations and that other goals (like expanding
government capability) were weak and insufficient (Office of the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction 2012a). In fact, local violence did decline in those
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areas that received higher levels of reconstruction spending in Iraq (Berman, Shapiro,
and Felter 2011).
Where I would agree that the goal of reducing violence as a goal is appropriate,
I argue that the current focus is still on first order infrastructure measures. Suc-
cess occurs when an infrastructure project reduces conflict in that area in the short
term rather than decreasing long-term political instability risks via socio-technical
systems. The policy consequences of this is seen in SIGIR’s recommendation that
the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) cap the financial size of
projects in order to increase success likelihood and reduce fraud while also making
sure that these project occurs in secure zones to limit resource stress (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2012a). Such recommendations are
first-order reactions to conflict and only address US short-term tactical goals rather
than the longer-term need of Iraq (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Re-
construction 2013). As described by IST, initial infrastructure provision might evoke
a spike of political instability. However, if causal mechanisms that connect such vio-
lence to infrastructure and reconstruction are accounted for, the risk of violence and
political instability will drop over time.28
Conclusion
Overstatements on the power of infrastructure are unsurprising considering first
order infrastructure-as-a-capability focus. Yet, having or not having a particular in-
frastructure is not the only determent of political instability—it is also about the
social and political (Skolnikoff 1994). IST adds these social and political elements in
its framing of existing literature into first order politics and novel conceptualization
of second order politics. With it’s long-term perspective, second order politics views
28See Chapter 3 for more on the inverted-U conflict pattern.
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infrastructure as part of a larger socio-technical system. This allows for an appre-
ciation of how society is embedded and structured around infrastructure, and it is
through this system that resentment can be either baked in or partitions limited and
grievances redressed (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Moreover, this long-term perspective
allows for values like political stability to become part of the reconstruction narrative,
which then allows for a discussion on how to improve future reconstruction policies
to do better by being an extension of political strategy (Bozeman 2002).
Though second order politics in regards to infrastructure and reconstruction is
a new concept, researchers have long been discussing similar ideas (i.e. grievances
and identity politics). Yet, these conversations have occurred outside the realm of
infrastructure, which I argue is a major oversight especially in post-conflict areas. By
reconceptualizing the relationship between infrastructure and political instability into
first and second order politics, it becomes possible to reposition this literature into
reconstruction policy debates and build new theories with IST as the foundation. I
caution here, though, of any structural or path dependent argument of why certain
actors act in first or second order politics. While an organizational structure might
constrain available tactical options, this does not limit a group to only short-term
goals at the cost of long-term goals. (For more on the influence of organizational
structure to strategic and tactical choices, see: Weinstein 2007 and Moe 1984.) In
the same vain, I am not making a greed versus grievance argument even though
it might seem that first order politics are solely based on greed while second order
politics is concerned with long-standing grievances. One can be altruistic but still act
with a short-term perspective by merely reacting to changes without consideration to
long-term consequences.
I recognize that repressive regimes can use the same insights provided by IST
to help solidify their control and reduce potential dissent. Although IST does not
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specifically address the role of regime type behind infrastructure and reconstruction
decisions, IST does not condone repressive regimes. The political elite in repres-
sive regimes might perceive their state as stable per the definition used here, but
their perspective is bounded in the short term. As the events in Egypt, Syria, and
Libya have shown, order brought by repressive regimes can be quickly ruptured by
the populous. Economic growth brought by infrastructure creates a growing middle
class that will want control of its own fate and thus risk rupturing political stability
(Bueno de Mesquita and Down 2005). In fact, IST’s model of second order politics
allows for the analysis pre- and post-rupture. Nevertheless, IST is not about building
a democracy (examples of such imagining and building of democracies can be seen
in Ezrahi (1997) and Winner (1986)). Though it can been argued that democracies
are historically shown to be best suited to deal with such diverse populations (see
Ireland with the IRA and Spain with the ETA) and better provide public goods,
non-democracies or transitioning governments can still incorporate fragmentation by
manipulating socio-technical systems (Buhaug 2006).29 Ultimately, IST is both a
normative theory about understanding the relationship between political instability
and infrastructure specifically and reconstruction generally while also being a policy
theory on how to choose infrastructure projects and design reconstruction project
that mold a socio-technical system that limits political instability.
29Moreover, being a democracy does not preclude a state from such socio-technical manipulation—
democracy and state control of technology is, in fact, compatible (Nye 1994).
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Chapter 3
THE GEOGRAPHY OF RECONSTRUCTION
Infrastructure, as a technology, has a particular yet immensely significant char-
acteristic: infrastructure is both the physical, man-made technology and the earth it
lays upon. This intimate connection between infrastructure and the ground must be
recognized when addressing why past reconstruction efforts have led to unintended
consequences. When coupled with the heavy financial investment needed to con-
struct infrastructure, this means that, once built, infrastructures are fixed to that
spot. Relocating infrastructure (such as a road or communication network) is finan-
cially impractical and at most physically impossible. Keep in mind though that this
immobility does not mean infrastructure networks are unchangeable: additional roads
or power lines can be added, infrastructure can be completely destroyed (as shown by
the initial need for reconstruction), and infrastructure availability can change based
on the season.1 Nevertheless, although infrastructure remains stationary, its con-
sequence, such as political crises and social upheaval, are anything but fixed to a
specific geographic region.2 It is then imperative to directly address the connection
between technology, location, and time to political instability.
With infrastructure tied to the land, IST is inherently a geographic-based theory.
This opens the door to use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) as a way to system-
atically testing the existence of second order politics and the long-term consequences
of infrastructure on political instability. If I cannot show this, then IST is essentially
1This distinction is key if IST is to be useful for future reconstruction policy, which must incor-
porate existing infrastructure.
2See Chapter 2 for a more detailed theoretical discussion on these changing consequences, which
comes as a result of the unfolding relationship between infrastructure and political instability across
time.
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unneeded as there is nothing to explain. As such, this chapter begins by restating the
geographic aspects of IST that I am specifically testing here. I then proceed into a
geo-spatial study (both quantitative and qualitative) on the influence of infrastructure
on conflict risks. First, I describe in detail the data used in this study, which includes
both established data and self-created infrastructure data. I then present the results
of the longitudinal analysis that models conflict to infrastructure across time. The
results show how though infrastructure independently increases conflict probabilities
(first order politics), certain infrastructure can then lead to a drop in conflict risks
over time (second order politics). Supplementing these findings are two vignettes of
Chad and Sierra Leone. In conclusion, I argue these results demonstrate the need for
IST. Infrastructure has long-term consequences that current theories cannot grasp.
Incorporating these varying consequences has implications for future research, policy,
and thus political strategy, which I discuss.
The Geography of Infrastructure Systems
I argue that the relationship between infrastructure and politics shift as as time
passes—moving from first order politics to second order politics.3 First order poli-
tics follows previous literature on the relationship between public goods, infrastruc-
ture, and conflict. In first order politics, decisions by the political elite regarding
infrastructure provision are based on private good logic with the goal of increasing
loyalty, punishing dissidents, or fulfilling international agreements (Lichbach 1987;
Bueno de Mesquita and Down 2005; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). The populous
(to include infrastructure users and non-users, dissident groups, the selectorate, and
non-committed) react to this infrastructure provision or non-provision by: support-
ing or resenting the political elites, employing new infrastructure in their mobilization
3See Chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation of these two different types of politics.
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strategies, igniting new conflict due to ‘bad’ infrastructure provision, or fighting neigh-
bors as a result of new connections and intermingling (Francisco 1995; DeNardo 1985;
Lichbach 1987; Gates 2002; Moore 1998; Van Evera 2001; Gompert et al. 2009). After
seeing how others react to their output, the political elite adapt from the success or
failure of their policies (Lichbach 1987; Roniger 2004; Cunnhingham and Weidmann
2007). Following this, conflict risks spike in first order politics. The rationale behind
such conflict is based on short-term goals or those goals that achieve immediate re-
sults (i.e. ending a protest, destroying military capabilities, eliminating government
officials, or gaining control of a town).4
In short, first order politics and existing literature largely predict that conflict risks
will spike shortly after infrastructure provision and the initial phases of reconstruc-
tion. Yet, not all infrastructure provision will illicit conflict. Such conflict occurs in
subnational/local areas where there was already a history of conflict between groups,
there was high political distrust in the central government, and/or there was a latent
dissident group. When infrastructure is newly provided in these areas, new conflict
can be sparked based on: the intermingling of groups with a violent history, dissi-
dents reacting defensively to perceived repression, and groups taking advantage of
their increased capacity to mobilize support and resources.
Yet, infrastructure has an intrinsic long-term quality in that its consequences both
remain and change long after the initial investment and construction. As infrastruc-
ture is designed to last for a long-period of time,5 infrastructure shifts from being
a private good into a public good where the consequences (both good and bad) are
felt by the public (users and non-users; selectorate and non-selectorate ) at large. As
4This does break the assumption seen in reconstruction and aid policy that the population will al-
ways be happy to have access to national infrastructure. ‘Bad’ infrastructure provision (as perceived
by the group receiving the good) can lead to just as devastating effects as non-provision.
5How long depends and the quality of investment, design, and construction.
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first order politics focuses on short-term consequences, an additional level is needed
that accounts for this long-term quality and infrastructure as a public good in order
to fully understand how infrastructure and reconstruction shapes political instability
across time.
In second order politics, infrastructure becomes part of a larger socio-technical
system that shapes political instability risks. In terms second order politics, socio-
technical systems contain not only the various infrastructure and infrastructure net-
works, but also power structures (social structures that reinforce inequalities between
groups of people, to include: social orders, political economics, and political con-
stituencies) and the actions occurring within the system (i.e. the interactions created
by transportation networks and patterns of social activity) (Jasanoff 2003). In such
systems, these elements continuously interact and shape each other, which ultimately
influences how society (individuals and groups) both act and feel.
I argue that second order politics offers the potential for a drop in conflict because
of these socio-technical systems. Infrastructure can connect areas physically to the
political core, national economy, and national identity. This follows Tobler’s first law
of geography where “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more
related than distant things” (Tobler 1970, p. 236)— seen as distance decay. If national
infrastructure is dispersed throughout the country, distant areas from the political
core are no longer distant and the influence of the political core6 will not decay across
large territories. If second order politics are accounted for in reconstruction policies,
the risk of future conflict will drop—creating an inverted-U shape of conflict risks.
With this inverted-U conflict risk, conflict is inevitable. However, if policymakers
acknowledge and plan for the initial outburst of conflict and forecasts are accounted
6The political core is the central geographic location of the political elites—in most all cases, this
is also the country’s capital (Campante and Do 2009).
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for during the planning process, conflict risks will fall. This brings me to my first
hypothesis about the observable/geographic effects of this shift from first to second
order politics.
H1: Conflict risks after infrastructure provision follows an inverted pat-
tern where conflict risks spike after provision and then drops as time
passes.
Second order politics can also trigger conflict coming as a result of the clash
between the long-term goals of the state with the long-term goals of a group. In
second order politics, dissident groups can find ways to undermine the state by di-
rectly exploiting the socio-technical system towards their goals and away from state
goals (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Or, the lack of infrastructure causes groups to indi-
rectly learn new ideational grievances by promoting physical and psychological ethnic
separations (Van Evera 2001). In short, resentment and grievances are baked into
socio-technical systems, which the current and future populous then learns from. As
such, the cause for conflict in the second order are rooted in long-term goals revolving
around issues of power and identity.
Given that states recovering from conflict are also commonly composed of a diverse
set of people (ethnically and religiously) across a large area, the risk of potential
separatist feelings and increased conflict risks remain high if left unattended (Fearon
and Laitin 2003). Moreover, when such diversity is geographically reinforced with
portions of the state separated from the political core (politically, economically, and
ideationally), the state is essentially broken into different pieces. Once marginalized
along territorial lines, the risk of conflict is high. Yet, current work on the connection
between social/political/ethnic characteristics and geographic conditions assumes a
direct connection between geographic-based conditions and conflict (e.g. Basedau
64
and Pierskalla 2014). Overlooked are the manmade changes to the geography (like
the type created by infrastructure), which ultimately alters conflict risks. As such,
second order politics offers an additional option for states to overcome diverse and/or
fractionalized populations: having a national infrastructure system that connects
periphery to the political center.
If peripheries are cut off from this political core, the control and influence of
the political elite will decay in these areas. Cut off peripheries created by the lack
of infrastructure are prone to having feelings of psychological separations, which
increase grievances, resentment, and mobilization against the political core (Olzak
1983). Moreover, active rebels would have a place to hide when sections of the state
are isolated from the central power in regards to infrastructure (Fearon and Laitin
2003).7 As such, the aforementioned inverted U relationship where conflict risks
eventually drops, will not occur.
H2: If peripheries are cut off from the political core by a lack of infras-
tructure, there will be an increased probability of political instability.
By confirming these hypotheses, I would show the existence of infrastructure’s
varying long-term consequences to political instability and the need to better under-
stand these connections.
Methods
This analysis proceeds in two steps: a geospatial-longitudinal study that connects
place, time, and attributes (Paul et al. 2005) and two case study vignettes to bet-
ter grasp the relationship between infrastructure and political instability. This will
7Nonetheless, I argue that this effect of distance decay can be altered and diminished (seen as
spatial autocorrelation) with a unified socio-technical system where those areas that are also far
away will still be tied to the political core—as argued in H1.
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provide the key test for this chapter: demonstrating that there are in fact different,
long-term consequences of infrastructure. Previous studies have limited the analysis
by shortening their time time or excluding time all together. Thus, they were never
able to see how their results may vary across time. As described below, time is a key
indecent variable of my analysis.
Where IST focuses on political instability, conflict is used here as a proxy for
political instability due to geo-coded data limitations in capturing other elements of
political instability (i.e. government effectiveness). I employ two definitions of conflict
in this dissertation. The first is broad and relates to pre-reconstruction conflict: large-
scale violence between two or more groups that destroyed life and infrastructure. With
this, I am making no assumptions on how infrastructure is destroyed or which side won
or lost. It can be argued, though, that infrastructure destroyed by international forces
might create a “rally around the flag” effect where nationalism and support for the
political regime increases when foreign entities attack. As such, the population would
be more forgiving of the lack of infrastructure provision. Such an argument though
ignores ethnic and political divisions common in those very cases that are prone to
have their infrastructure destroyed by another state. Moreover, these positive effects
will be mitigated as time passes as the initial spark of national support is dimmed by
long-lasting and everyday grievances.
The second conflict definition is narrower and relates to conflict that occurred
because of infrastructure provision or non-provision, reconstruction policy, and the
socio-technical system at large: intra-state violence. This second definition captures
many forms of violence that can be affected by infrastructure and reconstruction—
the political elite fighting against the local population, the local population fighting
against the political elite, and locals fighting locals. Excluded by this definition is
inter-state conflict. States in war with another state on the international level are
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doing so for a multitude of reasons that transcend national infrastructure (balance
of power, access to resources, ideology, etc.).8 Moreover, though reconstruction
planning and infrastructure construction can become an international event with in-
ternational actors and pressures, the use of infrastructure is a local event. This does
not preclude international influences in intrastate conflicts. Regional and/or inter-
state pressures can and often do force political elites to distribute goods differently
than if those pressures were not there.
I formed the relevant set of post conflict situations where reconstruction was
needed with this conflict conceptualization in mind. I used data from the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4 to derive a list of post-conflict situations (Gled-
itsch et al. 2002; Themne´r and Wallensteen 2002).9 This data was reduced to
those cases that ended during the contemporary reconstruction period: after the
Cold War or 1989.10 Unlike the post-WWII era of reconstruction, the pressing is-
sue for most states confronting political instability today is no longer the dynamics
of global power. Rather, reconstruction efforts take place in states where conflict is
commonplace, internal strife looms, governments are corrupt and weak, and public
goods are increasingly limited. At the same time, not all conflicts require reconstruc-
tion at a national level. Conflicts requiring reconstruction at this level also need to
be large enough to induce significant infrastructure destruction and/or to prevent
infrastructure from being allocated at large. As such, only cases that were listed as a
8As an example, infrastructure was far more likely to be a factor in India’s civil war than in
India’s war with Pakistan.
9I would ideally use data on the percentage of infrastructure destroyed in an conflict and the
number of infrastructure projects not completed/allocated due to the conflict. In reality, this data
is either not available (infrastructure data in general is limited) or difficult to measure (capturing
counterfactuals in data format would require too many assumptions and postulations).
10An end date is needed as my theory is concerned with post-conflict situations and reconstruction.
If the conflict reignites, there needed to be at least three complete and consecutive years of non-
conflict to allow for some basic level of reconstruction to occur before continued violence prevents
or destroys reconstruction projects at large. If conflict re-ignites, only the last conflict event was
included to represent that series of conflict.
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war (at least 1,000 battle field causalities) or had three or more consecutive years of
minor conflict (with culmination battle ground causalities of at least 1,000) before an
episode ended were included. I am assuming here that large-scale war and drawn-out
minor conflicts pose a risk to infrastructure directly or indirectly. These steps provide
a diverse population of 33 cases where post-conflict reconstruction was needed. Each
case was then expanded to cover ten years following war’s end beginning the year war
officially ended. In the cases with consecutive conflict in the sample, the end date
is the year before the next conflict-case begins. The sample of cases used for this
analysis and years covered are listed in Table 3.1.11 These cases are also used in the
following chapters.
11Due to the manner conflict was compiled in this dataset, a state can be listed as experiencing
simultaneous yet ‘separate’ conflicts. However, these are essentially one large conflict in the eyes
of the state and its strategies. As this dissertation takes a state prospective, these conflicts were
aggregated into a single case: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian War), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Civil
War), Iraq (1990 uprisings).
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This method of case selection is not perfect and opens the door to difficult cases
being included or cases that others might argue should be in the final sample. These
cases include areas where reconstruction did not occur (i.e. Myanmar), cases that the
political elite was seemingly never under ‘real’ direct threat (i.e. the United Kingdom
and Russia), and split geographic cases (Israel/Palestine and Serbia/Kosovo). To
begin with, I argue that cases of non-active reconstruction (whether by choice or by
inability) are still relevant cases as they are states in a post-conflict situation who
do have infrastructure at some level—removing such cases would bias this study.
Moreover, removing cases that are not necessarily unstable would create bias by
selection on the dependent variable. These cases can provide insight into why conflict
risks are lower. Moreover, this sample includes cases with disputed territorial claims:
Israel with Palestine and Serbia and Kosovo. Though one is internationally recognized
(Kosovo) while the other is not, I treated each as part of the larger country. This
was done as, in the eyes the central political elite, this territory is part of their state.
I recognize that this might trigger concerns, but I am not making claims of political
support for one side or the other. Including these territories, I argue, will provide
a more comprehensive picture of the post-conflict environment and infrastructure
consequences. Lastly, arguments can be made that this is not an exhaustive list of
cases that theoretically needed reconstruction at the national level—i.e. Mozambique.
Though missing from my analysis, these out-of-sample cases can provide useful insight
in the future, as long as they met this analysis’ scope conditions.
Although IST is a state-centric theory, these hypothesized outcomes are subna-
tional in nature. Thus, to adequate test the existence of second order politics, I must
also account for subnational independent and dependent variables. Following this,
the base data and unit of analysis for this analysis is the PRIO grid. The PRIO-
GRID dataset version 1.01 (Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012) is a population of
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standardized spatial grids worldwide.12 As these grids are systematically assigned,
a grid can cross national and subnational political and social boundaries. It is this
characteristic that makes the PRIO-GRID a powerful geographic unit of analysis.
Mainly, endogeneity issues are lessened compared to if the grids were assigned ac-
cording to some political demarcation, which can change and are often in dispute
after a conflict. Moreover, these grids absorb some of the spatial uncertainty involved
in geocoding landmarks, are small enough to capture the variability of infrastructure
access felt by individuals, and yet large enough to quiet noise and spurious variability.
Though all data is aggregated to this level of analysis, case characteristics must still
be accounted for. I do this through a mixed effects model where grids are grouped
by which case (country) a majority of the grid’s area lies.13 National administra-
tive border shapefiles were pulled form the database of Global Administrative Areas
version 2 (GADM) (Hijmans et al. 2011) and used to spatially clip the PRIO-GRID
and other geo-coded datasets where needed.
In this analysis, conflict is operationalized by whether a grid was located in a
conflict zone in that year—as related to the second definition of conflict previously
discussed.14 The data from this comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themne´r and Wallensteen 2002).15 Only those
conflicts that were coded as internationalized intrastate or intrastate conflict (civconf)
12Grids at the equator are approximately 55 x 55 kilometers with decreasing area with grids
at higher latitudes. See Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug (2012) for continued discussion on the
development of PRIO-GRID.
13This does mean a loss of area being analyzed with grids not in a majority of one of my cases.
Nonetheless, the majority role is common and most of my outside data sources follows the same
role.
14A measure of conflict presence is used over conflict count or number of deaths for two reasons.
First, reporting issues and bias makes intensity measures (i.e. death count) unreliable across such a
broad spectrum of cases. Nonetheless, in order for a grid to be counted as ‘in conflict’, there must
have been at least 25 battle related deaths.
15See Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug (2012) for more on how the UCDP/PRIO data was placed
in grid format.
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were included. As compared to the 1,000 battleground death threshold (large-scale
violence) used to shape the cases in this analysis, this dataset sets a 25 battlefield
death threshold (intrastate violence) to form conflict areas. By using this dataset,
this analysis is cut off at 2008, which does truncate some cases. I do not foresee this
as biasing the results due to the longitudinal structure where unbalanced data can be
accounted for. Moreover, these truncated cases offer opportunities to test the model
in future research to see if the predicted result is seen. As can be seen in Figure 3.1,
there is much variation both within and between cases on the proportion of grids in
conflict over time. I ague that such conflict variation cannot be fully understood in
such a two-dimensional mode—geographic location (or z) must be included.
Figure 3.1: Proportion of Conflict Presence Over Time
The independent variables of interest capture subnational infrastructure levels
(both location and access). Infrastructure data currently available is limited. The
World Bank and other data sources do have some basic infrastructure measures that
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capture both presence and quality (for example, % of paved roads or average kilowatt
of electricity consumed per capita). Yet, these are aggregated at the national level.
Yet, infrastructure is not evenly dispersed within a country with areas having higher
infrastructure density than others. Even infrastructure at the second or third admin-
istrative districts varies. Maps offer the best available option to capture infrastructure
access. As such, I made best use of available data, updated others, or created my own
where missing. This includes data on road networks, airports, railways, and power
plants—each is described in detail below. These infrastructure were chosen based on
the technologies being used in various forms by individuals at large following a conflict
(Edgerton 2008). Sample-wide density maps of these four infrastructure are provided
in Appendix A. As the hypotheses in this dissertation are system level hypotheses,
It can be asked why I did not create a general index of infrastructure access instead
of breaking up infrastructure type like I do here. Lumping various infrastructure
variables into one infrastructure index would only gloss over their different effects
and ignores the distinctive, individual aspects each infrastructure technology as both
independently and jointly within the system. This is especially true when the rest of
the chapter is already disaggregated in other areas, let along the difficulties involved
in weighting, operationalizing, and creating this new index.
Though my theory and hypotheses are system level and not infrastructure-type
specific, I still chose to separate the different types of infrastructure for several rea-
sons. First, all these different infrastructure types are necessary for a well-functioning
state and all four are focuses of reconstruction policies. Secondly, none of them have
deterministic outcomes in regards to political instability. By including them as sepa-
rate variables, I am able to incorporatate the fact that each type might have different
effects depending on how individuals interact with that infrastructure type on a daily
basis, where the infrastructure-type tends to be built, and the infrastructure’s history.
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Constructing an index measure of infrastructure access would be inadequate due to
these varying influences.
Road Networks: Road network data came from the Global Roads Open Access
Data Set, version 1 (gRoads). I limited the type of roads to major roads—roads
that were built in some manner and can handle a large amount of public traffic by
removing minor roads listed as territory, local/urban, trail, and private.16 IST is
primarily concerned with infrastructure that connects an area to the core that can
be used for private, public, and commercial uses. Minor roads cannot be used for
all three of these reasons. Nonetheless, not all roads have been classified in gRoads.
These unclassified roads were kept in the dataset as I had no justification to remove
them. As most of these roads are located in rural and periphery areas, I argue that
this actually biases the data against my theory. From here, I created a global density
raster of road density where each raster cell represented 10 square kilometers and a
search radius was set at 30 square kilometers.17 This raster was then aggregated to
the grid level by mode density score.18 A density measure is used to capture the
concentration of and varying levels of access to infrastructure.
Aeronautical Infrastructure: The Digital Chart of the World (DCW) project offers
a starting point for geo-coding some infrastructure networks (Danko 1992). This
dataset though does not included temporal information and is often incomplete. As
such, I updated DCW for the sample to include airports that operated commercial
flights and any appropriate first year of operation and/or closure dates—excluded
were solely military airports, airports with dirt/grass runways, or airports with no
16Roads listed as questionable existence were also removed.
17These settings were chosen so that each density cell would represent an average ‘daily life neigh-
borhood’ and the search radius would represent a large trade area. If no major roads amongst
themselves and thus be isolated.
18Aggregation by mode was used over mean to account for density cell scores.
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operating air-service. It is not enough to have air-service capabilities, aeronautical
infrastructure must be invested in, constructed, used by society at large, and reliable.
From this, I created a measure of aeronautical infrastructure proximity aggregated
(mode) to the grid level. The search radius for the aeronautical point density measure
was set at 250 kilometers.19
Railroads: DCW also acts for the foundation for railroad infrastructure data. The
railroad networks data though faced similar limitations as the aeronautical data.
Thus, I needed to update DCW railroad data to include information on when a line
rail line was constructed, in operation, and/or closed. Railroad infrastructure is highly
vulnerable to conflict destruction and looting. Thus, I also needed remove those lines
that were no longer in existence after a conflict. From this, a dummy variable on
whether a grid has railroad infrastructure and railroad network density.20
Power Plants: To ensure comparability across national boundaries, I compiled
geo-coded information about power plants from two web-based sources: Enipedia
(Davis et al. 2012) and the Global Energy Observatory (Global Energy Observatory
2013). Both these data sources are collaborative in nature, which is why both are
included as to insure comprehensiveness and counter potential holes coming as a
result of being open-sourced. Only those power plants that provide energy at a large
scale are included. There are many power-generating sites that make power at a
local level—especially in Indonesia. Such generators though are provided for by local
individuals/groups and not the central state. Moreover, I also make no distinction
on the type of power plant (e.g. diesel, hydro, nuclear)21 ; I am more concerned if a
19These setting were chosen as to represent the proximity of aeronautical national infrastructure.
While such infrastructure does not necessarily have to be in one’s grid area to benefit, the further
away an airport is, the more difficult it is for the general population to access it frequently. Density
measures capture such proximity.
20A presence measure is used instead of density measure due to the lack of data on rail station
locations cross-nationally.
21Not included here are green-sources of energy due to limited data: solar or wind.
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society has the benefits of power generating infrastructure and not where the power
is coming from. From this dataset, I created a measure of aggregated (mode) power
plant proximity. The search radius for the power plant point density measure was set
at 300 kilometers.22
I recognize that by using such infrastructure measures, I am not capturing most
of infrastructure’s initial provision as most of the infrastructure was pre-exiting. In
fact, the measures do not vary drastically across time if at all (gRoads is time in-
variant). Although I am not capturing the initial provision, I also argue that I am
capturing the point of ‘full use’, as war prevented the use of national infrastructure
to its full potential. Moreover, such pre-existing infrastructure must be included as
reconstruction policy must also contend with exiting infrastructure that survived the
initial war. These are not perfect measures, but its the best possible at this level and
across many cases.23
Literature has shown how political characteristics makes it harder for the politi-
cal elite to redress group grievances. Such grievances will affect how a group reacts
22Being in the proximity of a power plant does not necessarily mean that the local population
will have full access to its electricity. After construction, the local population can be ignored as
transmissions lines are strung directly to the capital—it is cheaper to ship electricity than it is coal.
What this measure is capturing then is the possibility of power access based on geographic location.
One option that has been popular across many fields is measuring the geographic distribution of
electrical use by using satellite imagery to capture night-time lighting (see Elvidge et al. (2009) for
an example of this). However, such imagery is not available across all years of this study.Other
types of temporal, cross-national, geographically disaggregated data on electricity use is currently
unavailable.
23One way to potentially capture infrastructure at the point of provision is to follow the aid money
(i.e. using Aid 2.0 data (Tierney et al. 2011)). There are two limitations to such data though. The
first is practical. Disaggregated data on aid type (which is needed to ensure that only aid that is
committed to infrastructure construction is used) is currently only available for Africa. Worldwide
infrastructure project data is available, but is limited to World Bank projects only, which only
represents a small portion of the aid going to infrastructure projects. Not captured in either are
infrastructure projects done and paid for my the political elite themselves. Moreover, such data
cannot be commonly disaggregated by type of infrastructure provided, which limits analysis. The
second shortcoming is conceptual. Aid commitments only capture one portion of infrastructure pro-
vision. Ignored are the multiple steps following aid provision: planning, allocation, and construction.
These steps are important in regards to infrastructure provision as infrastructure takes a long time
to provide/construct and there are multiple points where provision can go awry. Aid commitment
data as a proxy for infrastructure provision might be best suited for a micro level analysis where the
research can better trace the money from commitment to provision.
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to infrastructure provision or non-provision. For instance, those with pre-exiting
grievances will be less flexible to non-provision and see such decisions as a contin-
uation of their plight. Controlling for such pre-exiting grievances requires political
status and historical data on the politically-relevant groups living within a cell. Using
the GeoEPR-ETH, version 2 dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), I include
a control (Political Exclusion) on whether there was a significant portion of the pop-
ulation (more than 33%) that were excluded from the political system.24 And, using
the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Gurr 2009), I included a control (Lost Auton-
omy) on whether there is a significant portion of the population (more than 33% of
the population in that grid) that had a history of losing their autonomy.25 There is
a weak, negative significant correlation between these two measures of grievances.
Moreover, structural factors such as economic level, terrain, population size, and
natural resources that shape incentives and opportunities for insurgency must be
accounted for (e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Taber (1970), and Buhaug and Rød
(2006)).26 A proportion measure is included of how much of the grid is mountainous
or forested (Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012), as terrain influences both conflict
and the presence/type of infrastructure constructed. I also control for economic
conditions via a measure of gross cell product (gcppc), which is pulled from the G-
24Those groups that are listed dominant, junior partner, senior prawner, monopoly, regional au-
tonomy, separatist autonomy, or irrelevant were coded as 0 or in the political system. Those listed
as powerless, discriminated again, or in a state collapse are coded as 1 or excluded from the political
system.
25MAR’s measure of lost autonomy was recoded into a nominal control on whether that group
was autonomous, lost autonomy, or were never autonomous. Coding for these autonomy measures
was done following the coding procedures found in Siroky and Cuffe (2014).
26I did run the models with a spatial conflict lag to control for the share of ongoing conflict
(conf=1) among contiguous cells. However, these measures are high correlated with my dependent
variable. There was little error and thus little to no variance to explain: neighbors in conflicts a
proxy if an area is also in conflict. By itself, the fact that one’s neighbor is in conflict means that they
have a high probability of conflict is not theoretically interesting. If a different dependent variable
was used (i.e. conflict intensity), then such spatial lags will be useful controls as the correlation
would be far less.
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Econ dataset (Nordhaus 2006). A population density measures was created using
data from the Gridded Population of the World, version 3 (CIESIN).27 I also include
a control accounting for the presence of mining and drugs within in the cell (Lujala,
Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Lujala 2009). Key to my theory is the relationship
between the political core to an area—seen as spatial autocorrelation. To account
for such physical distance, the distance (“as the crow flies”) from the grid’s center to
national capital is included and comes from the cShapes dataset (Weidmann, Kuse,
and Gleditsch 2008). Lastly, I controlled for a case being disjointed geographically or
having a large portion of the country not geographically connected to the political core
(i.e. Indonesia, United Kingdom, and Azerbaijan) under the assumption that such
territories would be harder to control to the political core via a national infrastructure
system.
Finally, the ten years since war’s end were coded into an orthogonal time trend
measure (Quadratic Year)—this has been a key component missing from past re-
search. In H1, I theorize that the relationship between infrastructure and conflict
follows an inverted U shape across time (a negative quadratic time trend). Modeling
such a relationship is problematic though as TLinear and TQuadratic are highly corre-
lated, which then creates collinearity problems. Using orthogonal polynomials for the
time trend allows for such independence (Bock 1975). Keeping this time measure as
a fixed allow me to directly test my quadratic time trend hypothesis.28
Results
The results of the generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), can be seen in Table
3.2. GLMM models incorporate both random and fixed effects in a linear predictor
27As the latter two datasets only includes measures in 5-year increments, linear interpolation was
used to fill in the missing data years.
28In such models, the intercept term represents an average over time all else equal.
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using a logistic link function (the dependent variable here is dichotomous). I include
a random intercept at the case level with quadratic time treated as a fixed effect.29
Doing this allows for across year variance (both within and between effects) of conflict
dynamics. being controlled for while leaving year-based variances to be estimated
(Allison 2009). I acknowledge that many of the variables used (especially in regards
to infrastructure and terrain) rarely change or are completely time invariant at the
grid level. This does not create modeling problems as I do not include random effects
at the grid level but only at the case level. Moreover, these measure do differ with-in
a case. It is this variance that I am interested in and not necessarily the variances at
the grid level, which has no substantive meaning themselves.
I present three models in Table 3.2.30 The reduced model includes only the
infrastructure measures of interest; the control model includes only the control vari-
ables; and lastly, the full model includes all variables and controls. At first glance,
there are minimal substantive differences between the three. In fact, the prediction
rate between the three models are at best marginally different. While the final model
miss predicts 4% of the grid-years overall and miss predicts conflict (false negatives)
specifically 19% of the time (predicts no conflict when there actually was conflict),
the reduced model does marginally better at predicting conflict with a miss predict
rate at 18%. In comparison, the control model’s overall miss rate was also 4% while
the miss rate for conflict (false negatives) was 18%. Yet, comparing AIC and BICs,
29Concerns can be raised with the grouping effect set at the case level, as there are cases with
multiple case or multiple periods of post-conflict reconstruction periods. Yet, each case is the result
of a different conflict with different opposition and influences. Nonetheless, I did run the full model
with an additional random intercept at the country level. If these duplicate country cases were
not independent, then I would expect substantive differences in sign and significance. This was
not the case and this new model resulted in a higher BIC score, which penalizes for the additional
complexity.
30The same three models were also ran using linear time and linear + linear2 time. Reduced
measures of model quality across the board supported my decision to use an orthogonal quadratic
time tend measure.
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the full model appears to best represent the ‘true’ model. This appears even in the
BIC score, which discounts for model complexity, which my four infrastructure mea-
sures and interactions add. In fact, an anova test between the full and control models
comes back with a significant chi-square score of 1049. Thus, I can be confident in
continuing model interpretation using the full model.
Table 3.2: Model Results
Reduced Model Control Model Full Model
Random Effect
Case (Intercept) 6.06 (2.46) 3.87 (1.84) 4.39 (2.10)
Fixed Effects
(Intercept) -3.52 (0.44) *** -3.10 (.36) *** -3.69 (0.41) ***
Aero Proximity -0.48 (-0.16) ** -0.75 (-0.16) ***
Rail Presence 0.26 (0.04) *** 0.12 (0.04) **
Power Proximity 2.39 (0.10) *** 1.75 (0.11) ***
Road Density 0.09 (0.00) *** 0.06 (0.00) ***
Linear Year -0.51 (0.05) *** -0.45 (0.51) *** -0.56 (.05) ***
Quadratic Yave 1.88 (0.09) *** 1.33 (0.05) *** 2.02 (0.09) ***
Disjointed -3.29 (0.99) *** -3.32 (1.13) **
Capital Distance -0.00 (0.00) *** -0.00 (0.00) **
Drug 0.34 (0.04) *** 0.33 (0.05) ***
Mining -0.12 (0.10) -0.25 (0.10) *
Oil 0.30 (0.04) *** 0.35 (0.04) ***
Mountainous -0.04 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05) .
Forested -0.00 (0.00) *** -0.00 (0.00) ***
Political Status 0.02 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04)
Never Autonomous -0.14 (0.03) *** -0.04 (0.04)
GCPPC 0.00 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00) ***
Pop Density -0.00 (0.00) *** -0.00 (0.00) ***
Aero Proximity : Quadratic Year 2.22 (0.43) *** 1.73 (0.43) ***
Rail Presence : Quadratic Year -1.13 (0.11) *** -1.09 (0.11) ***
Power Proximity : Quadratic Year 1.49 (0.23) *** 1.37 (0.23) ***
Road Density : Quadratic Year -0.13 (0.01) *** -0.13 (0.01) ***
AIC 35086.61 35555.66 34522.70
BIC 35207.36 35706.59 34754.14
Standard errors listed in parentheses.
Number of observations: 173,237; Number of Groups: 33
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Figure 3.2 shows both the strengths and weakness of the model. The top panel
tests of case (random) effects. Considering the size of my case-level n, these random
effect residuals are normal distributed. Moreover, only two cases have insignificant
random effects: Somalia and Nepal. In short, though adding an additional level
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of complexity, the random effect specification is needed. As shown in this panel,
conflict’s over prediction is significantly above average when to the right of the zero
line or is below average when to the left of the zero line. With more outliers seen to the
right of the 0 line, my model better predicts where conflict should not be rather than
where conflict should be in some cases—conflict is over predicted. These residuals
are further broken down in the bottom panel where mean residuals are plotted by
case. Most of the mean residuals (represented by a point) are off the 0 line—the
further away from the 0-line, the residuals within a case are not normally distributed.
Yet, after pulling a random sample of 5,000 from the residuals and testing their
distribution, the residuals overall are found to be normally distributed. In addition,
a similar pattern of conflict’s over prediction of conflict is seen in this bottom panel.
Initial interpretation of the final model seen in Figure 3.2 seems to show that
adding infrastructure measures (both independently and across the quadratic time
trend) improves the overall model—all are significant. Nevertheless, significant lev-
els should be taken with a grain of salt due to the large N (173,237). Patterns and
correlations are bound to appear. Instead, I need to use my theory to analyze the
effect (size and direction) to offer better insight and hypotheses testing. These re-
sults are represented in Figure 3.3, which shows the effects on conflict probabilities
when moving from low to high levels of infrastructure. There is support here for first
order’s and exiting literature’s prediction of increase of conflict risks after infrastruc-
ture provision—seen in the positive change in predicted probability in the individual
infrastructure measures. Increased levels of infrastructure leads to higher levels of
conflict risks as compared to lower levels of that infrastructure. This is where past re-
search as stopped. The bottom set of variables add the essential time element. These
offer mixed support for H2 with the interaction measures being negative only half of
the time—more infrastructure leads to lower conflict probabilities across time as com-
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Figure 3.2: Model Diagnostics
Note: Segments represent 95% confidence interval.
pared to lower levels of that same infrastructure across time. As such, rail presence
and road density consistently matches my theory, power proximity is split (support-
ing first order politics but not my first hypothesis), and aero proximity consistently
going against my theory.
With the well documented effect of grievances on conflict, I recognize that these
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Figure 3.3: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Conflict from Min to Max Infras-
tructure
Note: Point segments represent 95% confidence interval.
results could be driven by pre-existing grievances.31 Though both my political
grievance controls are insignificant in the full model, I ran models with one grievance
measure instead of both to make sure that this lack of significancy was not the result
of measurement error. There were no significant differences between the models in
sign nor significance. Models were also ran that subset the sample into those grids
with some type of preexisting grievance and those without such grievances. No major
difference with sign nor significance was found when using the sample subset that have
some sort of grievance. Using a subset of sample with no grievance, all individual
31Additional tests were run to ensure that other triple interactions are not effecting these results.
Subsetting the sample based on dense or sparse population density measures (as compared to the
case’s mean population density) reveals no substantive changes in sign or significance other than
power density across quadratic time trend dropping out of significance. Moreover, there were minor
changes when subsetting the sample based being close of far to the capital city (as compared to the
mean distance for that case). For far grids, aero proximity across quadratic time changed signs with
grids far from the capital experiencing less conflict risks across time when also having higher aero
proximity—this supports my theory. In short, though there are minor changes, I can be ensured
that the results are not being driven by distance to capital or population density.
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infrastructure coefficients were positive while all interacted coefficients were negative
(aero proximity across quadratic time though lost significance)—these changes are
towards my theory. IST seems to marginally better fit in areas with no political
preexisting grievances. Such political grievances have been shown to lead to conflict
themselves and these areas did not need post-conflict reconstruction grievances to
ignite conflict.
An additional model was run with the grievance measures interacted with the
infrastructure measures, as to directly test how grievances play into infrastructure
provision consequences. These interactions were significant while also bringing back
into significance the grievance measures themselves. Initial results from this model
demonstrate that areas with a significant portion of the population excluded from
the political system or have lost autonomy and high levels of road density also have
lower conflict risk as compared to areas that are included within the political system
or never had autonomy and high road density. The costs of having high grievances
seem to be mitigated by having access to major roads, which follows IST and first
hypothesis. Nevertheless, the opposite is seen with power proximity where high levels
of power proximity in areas of high grievances actually experiencing higher conflict
risks. Though these results are interesting, they are outside the limits of this chapter.
I leave it for future research to further explore this relationship.
Figure 3.4 offers a clearer picture these relationships based on different levels of
infrastructure across time—note that these are all significant relationships. Briefly,
these varying result come as the result of where that infrastructure type is commonly
built, its history, and how individuals act with it on a daily basis. In other words,
the socio-technical dynamics of different kinds of infrastructure are different from one
another. Each operates differently with respect to what it enables people to do or
not to do, and thus we get different patterns of risk of conflict over time.
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Figure 3.4: Quadratic Interaction Effects
To begin with, the magnitude effects of airport proximity and rail presence as
compared to the other two infrastructure measures is significantly less. I did run
the model without these two infrastructure measures to make sure that these are
not hiding stronger or substantively different correlations in regards to the other two
infrastructure measures, which was not the case as minimal substantive change was
seen.32 These two types of infrastructure differ from roads and power plants in two
important ways that might explain this difference in influence. Airport and railroads
are not typically ‘everyday’ infrastructure. Though they are essential for national
economic growth by helping connect supply lines and large-distance travel, rarely
does an individual depend on railroads or airports for their everyday life in post-
32Moreover, I argue later that as reconstruction policy address all types of infrastructure together,
so must research.
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conflict zones. Moreover, airplane and railroads require expensive maintenance and
hardware (e.g. airplanes and locomotives) to use that individuals cannot afford or
conduct by themselves, which then requires a third party to intervene. As such, the
effect of these infrastructures will be smaller as compared to road density and power
plant proximity.
Keeping with these infrastructures, aero proximity and railroad presence do not
support H1 as the relationship seen follows a traditional U pattern in Figure 3.4:
while there is an initial drop in conflict risks, conflict risks increases as time passes.
In regards to railroads, the effect of long-term structuring around infrastructure is
seen even if the inverted U relationship is not. As seen in Figure 3.3, the independent
influence of rail infrastructure on increased conflict risk is minimal at best. Moving
from not having railroad infrastructure to having it significantly decreases conflict
risks as time passes by about 50%. Moreover, there is no significant difference on
conflict probability across time seen in Figure 3.4—the effect line can be a flat. This
overall but consistent drop in conflict risks across time surrounding railroads is the
result of the infrastructure’s colonial history. Railroads in areas of recent conflict
were often built by or with the help of colonial powers for economic reasons to benefit
those in power. As years and decades passed, the presence of railroad infrastructure
led to the formation of new cities and ways of life (socio-technical system) around the
railways (see: Jones (2013) for an example of how this occurs in regards to energy-
based infrastructure). Thus, these areas were also less susceptible to fluctuating
conflict risks post conflict as ‘their’ railway’ was still there and operating and thus
their way of life and socio-technical system were sustained. These results demonstrate
the long-term importance of this infrastructure history on shaping society.
Proximity to aeronautical infrastructure often went against IST independently
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and across time.33 The reason for this comes as the result of the particularities of
airport technology. A grid in proximity of an airport has lower (rather than increased)
independent conflict risks as airports cannot safely operate with commercial flights (a
key criteria of being included in the dataset) if there is conflict—an airline company
is not going to risk its profit margin. I am not saying that airports create non-conflict
in the short term but that operative airports post-conflict are more likely to be in
areas with less conflict risk overall—peace draws in airports. However, as time passes,
conflict risks increase in the proximate areas of aeronautical infrastructure. In short,
airports remain or increase in strategic value as a conflict target for rebels and/or the
political elite recognize the airport’s strategic value as a tool for rebels.34 Moreover,
airports are a resource-efficient target as little resources are needed to create a large
impact. Thus, conflict risks increase as time passes.
An inverted U relationship for road density interacted with quadratic time is
clearly visible in Figure 3.4 with high levels of road infrastructure, which supports H1.
Though high levels of road density might increase the probability of conflict over time
this risk will drop. Increased conflict risks brought about by grievances, intermingling,
and mobilization is tampered over time as individuals and groups are absorbed into
the national economy and identity.35 In other words, major roads are mostly a means
of conflict and are not a cause of conflict. Thus, conflict risks do eventually drop in
areas with high road density. Roads have limited uses—they are used to transport
people, livestock, private and public goods, and military/police forces. Such transport
thus increases individual and society livelihoods and capabilities, education and health
33Moreover, aeronautical proximity was also the most sensitive to various model tests.
34An example of such continued conflict surrounding airport infrastructure is seen in Ukraine after
the Crimean crisis. Both sides focused much of their attention on the Donetsk International airport.
As of October 2014, the airport remains severely damaged due to the fighting.
35See Chapter 2 for more discussion on this.
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services become easer to access, and economies can grow in scale. On the other hand,
though lower levels of infrastructure might decrease the probability of conflict due
to the inability to mobilize or intermingle, the magnitude of this decreased risk is
minor and will eventually increase over time as new identities are learned and/or
long-standing grievances are re-enforced. Groups find ways around not having access
to roads to mobilize and act as their grievances and motivation grow.
Varying consequences between infrastructure density levels is also seen with power
plant infrastructure. Rather than the theorized inverted U though, the effect of high
power proximity levels is a traditional U relationship. Conflict risks a year after war’s
end (T1) remains high, as if the war never ended in the proximity of power plants.
Power plant locations are not random; power plants are built in geographic areas that
can support power production. Often these are the very same places that also support
rebels: forested, remote, and/or economically poor areas (Buhaug 2006). Thus, power
plants located in conflict prone areas are never really truly ‘secure’ in regards to
conflict risks. This conflict risk does initially drop in the early years of post-conflict
reconstruction. As time passes though (T5), proximity to power plants fuel conflict as
conflict risks raise. Power proximity has many different uses. They power cell phones,
lighting, medical tools, refrigerators/freezers, computer/broadband equipment, and
radio/televisions. When receiving power for the first time, conflict risk drops as the
area begins to absorb the multitude of these newly gained capabilities. However, such
capabilities seem to eventually increase conflict risks. I suspect this is due to how
and what electricity is being used to do—i.e. making education easier with lighting
at night vs. downloading information and propaganda of radical groups. This follows
past research like Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013), who demonstrate how access
to communication technologies, which are dependent on access to electricity, helps
explain the location of insurgent violence due to the positive influence communication
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and information sharing has on rebel mobilization. I leave it to future research to
examine the mixed influence of power infrastructure after a conflict.
I recognize that these are post-hoc explanation of these relationships. At the
same time, some might argue against including non-road infrastructure types and the
results constantly match my theory in regards to road infrastructure. Yet, all must
be included and these results demonstrate the complexity that reconstruction policy
must contend with on the ground. All these infrastructure types are needed, they are
dependent on each other, all commonly existed at some level before the war, and one
type cannot be ignored for another.
Vignettes
With these results, I would expect to qualitatively see an initial uptick in conflict
numbers in the areas where infrastructure was provided. As time passes tough, I
would then expect to see a relative drop in conflict as conflict shifts location to the
periphery/areas lacking national infrastructure. To see if this is the case, I include
here brief vignettes into two cases of my population: Chad and Sri Lanka.
Chad (1994-2003)
Chad represents a case of overall low infrastructure levels and little infrastructure
change (even compared to other African countries). Nonetheless, Chad offers a great
opportunity to see clear divisions of infrastructure levels. As seen in Figure 3.5, road
density is less in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region in the north.36 In com-
parison, the southern portion of the state is quite connected to the capital. Moreover,
all other infrastructure is located in the south except for one airport. Though the
36The BET region was split into three separate regions in 2008: Borkou Region, Ennedi Region,
and Tibesti Region.
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BET region is also mostly comprised of the Sahara Desert and does not have a high
population (many of its inhabitants are nomadic), this division reenforces tensions
between the Arab-Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south
The initial need for reconstruction came after a string of conflict put Idriss De´by,
a northerner, into power. The following year were filled with coup attempts, a failed
peace agreement, and continued violence that resulted in a high number of civilian
casualties and large scale infrastructure destruction (Amnesty International 2001).
As seen in Figure 3.5, there were a number of conflict events initially during the
reconstruction period, which was focused in the south. In 1998, President De´by former
defense chief, Youssouf Togoimi formed the Movement for Democracy and Justice in
Chad (MDJT), an armed insurgency from in the north. Going back to Figure 3.5,
there was less conflict as time passed following war’s end, but the conflict that did
occur shifted to the north. The north was not only cut off from the political core in
regards to infrastructure, it faced Libyan pressures, which stemmed from the long-
lasting Libyan-Chad conflict and dispute of the Aouzou Strip along the Chad-Libya
border (Nalbandov 2013). This continued violence and destruction scared foreign
investors away from investing resources into Chad. Without private investment, Chad
was left with few options on how to reconstruct at the national level.37
37A peace deal in 2002 failed to end rebellion. Refugees from neighboring Sudan entered Chad
and jointed Chadian civilian in camps shoe were also trying to escape the continuing violence. With
help from Sudan, rebel groups stormed N’Djamena, which ignited a new Chadian civil war that
lasted from 2003 and 2010.
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Sri Lanka (2001-2008)
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) started fighting in 1983 for an
an independent state (Tamil Eelam) in the north and east of Sri Lanka—see Figure
3.6 for exact territorial claim. In Figure 3.6, the disconnect in regards to national
infrastructure between the Tamil area and political core becomes clear. Road density
is visibly greater than the non-Tamil Eelam area.38 This trend is only continuing.39
Power plant infrastructure is also focused in non-Tamil Eelam areas with only one
power plant in a contested area, which became operational in 2004. The most dis-
persed infrastructure, railways, focuses on connecting port areas economically to the
capital to support the political elite and not provided to help the population as a
whole. Nonetheless, the data do not include damage caused by the 2003 Tsunami.
But, much of the damage to infrastructure during this natural disaster was done to
fisheries, industries, and local costal roads—broad, large-scale damage did not nec-
essarily occur to major national infrastructure being studied here (United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) 2005). Moreover, the tsunami offered a chance to
rebuild with an influx of aid.
Though Tamil areas felt the most tsunami damage in 2003 (to both infrastructure
and lives), they did not receive a large portion of the aid that went to the country
and there was disagreement on who should be able to disperse the aid in these areas:
the Sri Lankan government or the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, who are are
closely tied to the LTTE. National reconstruction aid was perceived as a threat to
the LTTE who were not dependent on the local population due to international
38The high density of roads in the east is capturing more minor roads as compared to other area.
As previously mentioned,gRoads does not have classification data all roads especially in rural areas.
39An expressway (E02) began construction in 2009 that will connect Colombo and Kandy in the
middle of Sri Lanka (Road Development Authority (RDA) 2013).This is occurring outside the Tamil
areas, which is in dire need of such roads.
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resources and remittances while also running a de facto government in areas hit the
tsunami (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; Le Billon and Waizenegger 2007; United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 2005). In short, the Tamils learned to
exploit infrastructure (and forced non-provision) to their favor and long-term goals.
As such, they were never really absorbed into the national identity as seen by the
political elite and conflict continued. Though Sri Lanka did experience a lack of
infrastructure good provision following the civil war, the Tamils did not need these
additional reconstruction based grievances to motivate opposition forces.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the need for IST in order to fill
a theoretical gap and create improved infrastructure policies and political strategies.
According to IST, the relationship between infrastructure and infrastructure varies
across time; there are both short-and long-term consequences of infrastructure to
conflict risks. If I was unable to show these varying consequences, then current the-
ories of infrastructure would be adequate to address post-conflict reconstruction and
resulting political instability. However, this was not the case and the results support
the need for IST and my hypotheses about varying, geographically-unbounded conse-
quences of infrastructure across time to a country’s political instability. Thus, future
reconstruction and political strategies to combat political instability must incorporate
both types of politics and conflict.
An alternative hypothesis to my findings is that these post-war countries are
merely returning back to conflict. Countries with a history of conflict and poor
countries isn general are at a higher risk of future conflict. Yet, if this is merely the
case, one would not find the geo-spatial and temporal patterns I found here. My
findings are not just about conflict reigniting. IST and my methods allowed me to
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Figure 3.6: Sri Lanka Infrastructure (2001-2008)
Note: Where no year variation is shown, all operated on or before Year 1 (2001).
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look at where conflict is occurring (or not occurring) and when it is occurring (or not
occurring). The results of this chapter have shown the existence of both first and
second order politics and their differing consequences to political in stability risks.
This is important as it is IST’s conceptualization of shifting consequences across time
and second order politics that makes the theory novel and exciting. By providing
evidence to validate H1 and H2, continued IST evaluation can occur to explore the
causal mechanisms that connect infrastructure and post conflict reconstruction to
political instability.
Viewing infrastructure as a capability, actors providing post-conflict reconstruc-
tion focus on infrastructure projects and who is or is not receiving benefits and assume
economic benefits will occur, which will automatically lead to less conflict. Thus, suc-
cess was ultimately measured by the presence or lack of infrastructure and not the
long-term social and political consequences of that infrastructure. Such measures and
assumptions are insufficient in regards to capturing infrastructure’s role in conflict
risks over time. As shown in this chapter, merely having infrastructure is not enough
to eliminate conflict risks associated with having infrastructure Such overstatements
on the power of technology via technological fixes and jumps are common. Overlooked
here is an appreciation of how the population will use, become dependent on, and be
shaped by the infrastructure itself. This chapter shows how infrastructure’s influence
over time after a conflict should not be overlooked, which requires incorporating in-
frastructure’s long-term consequences and role in shaping a population. Populations
rely on and demand for some basic level of infrastructure. With infrastructure’s in-
verted U relationship and general drop of conflict risks as time passes, policymakers
must then convince constituents and funding agencies to continue investing in infras-
tructure throughout turbulent times and initial spikes of conflict if reconstruction is
going to be an useful aspect of political strategy. Preventing or preparing for system
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failure and unintended infrastructure consequences requires actors to remove their
blinders, which are limiting their perspective, and include long-term benefits and
costs into their decision-making processes.
Yet, this research also demonstrates that actors must consider different types in-
frastructure together during the planning and execution phases of reconstruction.
Current literature addressing infrastructure tends to focus on one type at a time with
a focus on high technology—i.e. cell phone use (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013).
Though such research is exciting and needed, it can only provide one perspective
to post-conflict reconstruction and risks leading to policies that are also narrow and
blind to other infrastructures. To begin with, infrastructure does not exist indepen-
dently from other types of national infrastructure and high technology (broadband
internet and cell phones) require basic forms of nationally provided “old technology”
like infrastructure (Edgerton 2008)—what use is a computer with internet access if
there is no reliable power source nearby? As described by Edgerton (2008), these
technologies, though common place in much of the world, achieve a greater status
in post-conflict areas who have had limited limited access to these basic technologies
before its transfer.
Moreover different types of national infrastructure have different relationships
with conflict risks during post-conflict reconstruction, which must be understood in
conjunction with infrastructure interdependence—an airport without electricity to
operate it and roads or rail lines to connect it to population and economic centers is
not a very useful airport. Yet, each infrastructure type is necessary, society interacts
with and depends on each infrastructure type both independently and in conjunction
with other infrastructure types, and all are components of reconstruction policy as a
whole. When considered together, one can truly begin to appreciate the role of in-
frastructure and difficulties in creating good and comprehensive reconstruction policy
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to achieve a desired long-term, strategic goal.
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Chapter 4
SEALING THE CRACKS OF RECONSTRUCTION
It is not enough to merely show the existence of different long-term consequences
of infrastructure and second order politics. I must also demonstrate how these vary-
ing effects are occurring. Society does not become embedded and structured around
infrastructure’s technical configurations overnight. And though it might appear to
do so, infrastructure systems do not suddenly collapse and fail. System failure is an
amalgamation of past decisions and actions. Thus, it is possible to see the various
decisions and conditions that eventually add up to promote failure in the future.1
One reason past literature fails to appreciate the role of infrastructure and recon-
struction in political instability across time, I argue, is due to its short-sighted and
deterministic viewpoint of infrastructure. IST takes a more comprehensive approach
by including both short and long-term perspectives in regards to how infrastructure
ultimately shapes political instability risks over time. To test how infrastructure and
reconstruction leads to political instability requires uncovering IST’s causal mecha-
nisms (H2, H3, and H4).
Rather than testing the causal mechanism hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 as
individual variables leading to political instability, these can be evaluated together as a
single entity by placing IST in terms of set relations and configurations of conditions.2
1For example, the infrastructure failure in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina was not
solely the result of an uncontrollable, naturally-occurring storm. The storm might have sparked
the failure, but decisions on where and how to build the levy networks vis-a´-vis disadvantaged
neighborhoods occurred years, if not centuries, before.
2Not only are set theoretic logic and relationships common within social science, necessary con-
dition arguments are a core component of social science. Goertz (2003) lays out 150 necessary set
hypotheses found in social science, many of which are the foundations of large research programs
(i.e. democratic peace).
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Set theory logic moves attention away from individual variables and onto the interplay
of reconstruction conditions that lead to political instability as an outcome. As shown
in Chapter 3, it is not sufficient to not have roads, electricity, or any other type
of infrastructure for a state’s infrastructure system to produce political instability.
However, when populations are cut off from the political core, capability-building
benefits created by reconstruction are unavailable, and infrastructure networks are
unsustained in the same space, conditions combine and interact to shape political
instability. By focusing on how these conditions manifested together in past cases of
post-conflict reconstruction, it becomes possible to evaluate IST hypotheses, better
understand how infrastructure and reconstruction leads to political instability, and
guide later analysis.
In theoretically and analytically evaluating these causal mechanisms, this chapter
proceeds as follows. First, I recapitulate ISTs theorized causal mechanisms discussed
in Chapter 2. Following this, I present an argument on the importance of employing
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative (fsQCA) analysis. From here, I set up a popu-
lation of 33 conflict-prone cases where post conflict reconstruction was needed and
describe in detail is how the outcome (political instability) and four conditions (cut
off peripheries, reconstruction aid discrepancies, high unemployment during recon-
struction, and poor infrastructure quality) are calibrated. From here, a truth table is
presented along with the final solution, which supports IST in regards to how recon-
struction conditions increase the risk of political instability via relative and absolute
deprivation and hindering a nationalistic we. The concluding portion of this chapter
places this Chapters results alongside of those from Chapter 3 and discusses the next
step of IST evaluation.
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IST Causal Mechanisms
Chapter 3 explored and provided evidence for IST’s first and second order politics
and the shifting consequences of infrastructure across time. Nevertheless, it is not
enough to show the existence of second order politics; also needed is an understanding
how second order politics leads to political instability. Following Chapter’s 3 results,
it is now possible to examine the causal connections, themselves. The theorized mech-
anisms discussed below revolve around conditions within the socio-technical system
that lead to political instability resulting from misallocation: integration, power, and
system security.3
National Unity
Though the Westphalian system normalized the current international structure,
the modern state is a compulsory association with its borders being artifacts of history
and politics (Wright 1991). Just as fledging states needed to create a unified “we”, the
need for a unified state after a conflict is also paramount in order to create national
trust and concord after turbulent times. If the state is essentially broken into different
pieces, the risk of separatist mobilization against the state and political core based
on peripheral nationalism increases based on the degree of marginalization (Buhaug
2006; Olzak 1983; Wright 1991; Gourevitch 1979; Coakley 2003). IST provides a way
for states and political elites to combat heterogeneous populations: the creation of a
national infrastructure system that connects the peripheries to the political center.
In Chapter 3, there was support for this hypothesis where increased levels of two
infrastructure measures were shown to generally decrease conflict risks across time
while high road density was shown to eventually decrease conflict risk after an initial
3See Chapter 2 for more in-depth discussion on each of these conditions and an overall discussion
of IST.
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spike of risk. This condition is also included in the fsQCA to better understand under
what conditions does being cut off from the political core lead to political instability—
reduction in political instability might be the result of a contingent relationship to
other reconstruction conditions.
Individual Capabilities
Power within socio-technical system is not limited to the political elite. In second
order politics, power is delivered to society at large via capability building benefits—
benefits that increase individual capabilities that allow individuals to better them-
selves and their families and thus boost real, sustainable freedom (Sen 1999). Yet, in
creating infrastructure, the central state exposes itself to several risks, especially if
the local population does not see the full potential benefits from the creation of the
infrastructure. This would then risk increasing grievances against the central state.
One broad category of such capability building benefits include the educational and
training programs available during and after infrastructure construction.
Despite an abundance of domestic workers, foreign entities are brought in by aid
organizations and/or governments providing reconstruction support due to contrac-
tual obligations or claims of efficiency. Such decisions are based on short-term goals
and first order politics; the use of local workers is a long-term, second order invest-
ment. Seeing foreign entities benefit from local resources increases resentment and
impotent feelings by the local population willing and able to hold these jobs. More-
over, feelings of deprivation may lead individuals to be recruited into social movements
and political violence against the state as they fight for what they view as rightfully
theirs (Gurr 1970).
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Sustainability
Socio-technical system are in constant flux, which opens the door to a seemingly
stable system rupturing to create political instability at any point. As a result, if
a socio-technical system is to reduce long-term political instability, the system must
both limit political instability risks and be secure overtime itself. Moreover, infras-
tructure’s benefits are not self-reinforcing and the initial investment must be con-
tinuously re-provided in order to maintain infrastructure benefits (Sen 1999). Such
sustainability in socio-technical systems require infrastructure and infrastructure net-
works that pass the test of time by being well built and/or continuously and domesti-
cally maintained. These are difficult to do for a state recovering from a recent conflict.
If the system is at risk of failing due to erosion or the lack of aid as external revenue
sources dry up, those who depend on the system will be unsure about its future and
the risk of political instability increases as grievances grow and any stability created
via the socio-technical system crumbles away.
Following this, poor quality infrastructure—infrastructure that is perceived as
deteriorated enough to prevent maximum use—is just one characteristic of an unsus-
tained infrastructure brought about by the lack of investment and up-keep that puts a
system at risk of failing. In the long term, poor-quality infrastructure erodes beyond
usability and increases political instability risk by increasing system uncertainty.
Methods
Theories based in set theory are not well suited for testing via correlation or
probability analysis (more will be explained on why this is the case below or see:
Ragin 2008; Goertz 2003; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Such frameworks view
set-theoretical relationships as causal statements, treat related membership data as
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‘simple’ nominal-scale measures, and thus limit evaluation to cross-tabulation and
other descriptive analysis (Ragin 2008). Rather than restricting set-theory analysis,
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) incorporates the uniquely valuable charac-
teristics behind set theoretical relationship. This allows for more in-depth analysis by
addressing a couple of hurdles that any investigation into the relationship between in-
frastructure and reconstruction provision and political instability must contend with
and that correlation/probability frameworks are ill-suited to fully incorporate.
First, the causal story between political instability and infrastructure provision
is complicated by the likelihood of endogeneity; political instability decreases the
likelihood a state will provide public goods, yet a lack of public goods provision will
lead to political instability. This, however, is overcome by QCA’s focus on necessary
and sufficient, rather than correlational relationships. Second, IST values complexity
and expects that there are many ways reconstruction may lead to political instability.
QCA allows me to analyze this equifinality. Third, IST argues that the causes of
instability are not the opposite of the causes of stability; the ability to capture such
asymmetry is a major benefit of QCA (Ragin 2008). Fourth, IST does not make
sufficiency claims regarding any particular reconstruction condition. Rather than
pinpoint a single variable that causes political instability in each case, QCA focuses
on the configurations of variables in order to capture the causal story in each case.
(Mahoney and Goertz 2012; Ragin 1987). Finally, war is rare; war large enough
to require post-conflict reconstruction at the national level is rarer. QCA has a
comparative advantage when dealing with the reality of such limited case diversity
while still allowing for causal inferences (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2008).
Adequately evaluating IST when all five hurdles are present at some level becomes
convoluted in a non-set theoretical approach. Table 4.1 summarizes these differences
between set theoretical approaches to correlation and probability approaches while
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also providing useful connections between the terms used in this chapter.
Table 4.1: Key Methodological Comparisons
Correlation/Probability QCA/Set Theoretical
Variables Sets
Measurement Calibration
Dependent Variables Qualitative Outcomes
Given Populations Constructed Population
Correlation Matrix Truth Table
Explain Variation Explain Outcomes
Net Effects Equifinality
Counterfactual Estimation Counterfactual Analysis
Table based on Ragin (2008).
As a medium-N, middle-path method between case and variable based research,
QCA’s advantages are, nonetheless, dependent on theory and case-specific knowl-
edge. There is a constant dialogue between ideas and evidence throughout the QCA
process—meaningful data is an end product and not a starting condition. At the
same time, QCA does require a level of case simplification and assumptions about
calibration (how membership scores are assigned) and counterfactuals (how to address
negative or no case situations) that some might object to (Schneider and Wagemann
2012; Rihoux 2008; Ragin 2008).4 While this concern is valid, the potential risks
from simplification are reduced within QCA by requiring the researcher to loop be-
tween theoretical ideas and evidence while simultaneously examining between- and
within-cases in order to derive the best solution.
Ultimately, the objective in this chapter is to demonstrate how infrastructure and
reconstruction leads to political instability. Doing this does not necessitate model
fitting and testing—QCA is not a theory-testing method. The focus here instead is
4These assumptions are actually quite similar to the ones seen in traditional variable-based ap-
proaches. Both assume a well specified model/causal inputs and both have ways to analyze the role
of omitted variables—as there is no error term in QCA to soak up missing variable’s influences,
counterfactual assumptions must play this role in QCA (Ragin 2008).
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on theory evaluation and see whether “initial theoretical hunches are supported by
the empirical findings” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 304). Such an approach
stresses the importance of using the knowledge learned—whether it confirms with
the theory at hand or not—to refine and improve IST and understand why we see
Chapter 3’s result of different long-term consequences of infrastructure.5 For this
reason, I did not restate here the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 2 (H2, H3 H4).
Nonetheless, with this dissertation’s triangulation approach to evaluate IST, evidence
will incrementally build on top of itself so that these hypotheses can then be ultimately
validated or not.6
Population Selection
Case selection plays a central role in comparative methods and many insights
are available on how best to select cases (see: King, Keohane, and Verba. 1994;
Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004; Mahoney and Goertz 2004; Seawright and
Gerring 2008). To aid in overall comparability of results throughout this dissertation,
I employ the same set of cases used in Chapter 3. I do recognize that this is merely
a sample of post-conflict cases where reconstruction was needed, which might limit
generalizations of QCA results that typically rely on populations. Yet, relying on
populations has similar limitations and generalization outside that population are
hard to make. I argue, though, that steps can be taken to mitigate the cost of this
in this QCA. To begin with, scope conditions must be clearly specified (Ragin 2008;
Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Walker and Cohen 1985). Without this, inferences
from QCA solutions are limited to the set if cases only—the scope conditions for this
5This is a similar process of Bayesian updating where learned information (or priors) is used to
update and find the best fitting model.
6For a discussion of QCA ‘best practices’ that I attempt to follow in this chapter, see: Schneider
and Wagemann (2010b).
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study are discussed in below. Secondly, counterfactuals (non-observed configurations)
must be fully incorporated. If counterfactuals are removed from study, they must
meet a strict set of criteria. More on this will be discussed in the analysis section of
this chapter, but in short, these steps allow for generalization to non-observed cases
as long as they meet the same scope conditions (i.e. future cases). For a list of this
study’s sample, see Table 4.2 or see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3.
Table 4.2: Cases for fsQCA
Location (abbr.) Time Covered Location (abbr.) Time Covered
Afghanistan (AF) 2001—2008 Iraq (IQ3) 2003—2008
Angola (AO) 2002—2008 Israel (IL) 1996—2005
Azerbaijan (AZ) 1994—2003 Liberia (LR) 1995—2004
Bangladesh (BD) 1992—2001 Myanmar (MM) 1992—2001
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA) 1995—2004 Nepal (NP) 2006—2008
Chad (TD) 1994—2003 Peru (PE) 1999—2008
Croatia (HR) 1995—2004 Russia (RU) 1996—2005
Ethiopia (ET1) 1991—2000 Rwanda (RW) 2002—2008
Ethiopia (ET2) 2001—2008 Serbia (RS) 1999—2008
Guatemala(GT) 1995—2004 Somalia (SO) 1986—1995
India (IN1) 1997—2002 Sierra Leone (SL) 2000—2008
India (IN2) 2003—2008 Sri Lanka (LK) 2001—2008
Indonesia (ID1) 1989—1998 Tajikistan (TJ) 1996—2005
Indonesia (ID2) 2005—2008 Uganda (UG) 2007—2008
Iran (IR) 1996—2005 United Kingdom (UK) 1991—2000
Iraq (IQ1) 1991—1995 Yemen (YE) 1994—2003
Iraq (IQ2) 1996—2002
Note: See Table 1 in Chapter 3 for more detailed information about the cases listed here
Time covered is 10 years from the year conflict ended or is cut short to the year before
the next conflict in that case begins or 2008, whichever comes first.
Following the description provided in Chapter 2, the scope conditions of this dis-
sertation are post-conflict cases in the post-1989 period where there was a significant
threat towards existing infrastructure and/or providing new infrastructure project.7
As such, IST can only address intra-state (civil, rebel, an other internal) conflict
during the reconstruction period. Moreover, IST may not adequately address cases
7The broad range of cases examined in this dissertation increases the probability that different
types of conflict destruction is included in the analysis and results.
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where natural disaster destroyed the infrastructure even if in a conflict prone area
(i.e. 2010 Pakistan Floods). Though it might not predict such cases, IST does offer
insight into how these cases can potentially best rebuild to lower future risks.
IST Conditions and Calibration
The following conditions were compiled for this QCA: political instability (out-
come), cut off peripheries, reconstruction aid discrepancies, high unemployment dur-
ing reconstruction, and poor infrastructure quality. At first glance, these conditions
may seem dichotomous: peripheries are either cut off or they are not. Yet, such crisp
set measurement where conditions are measured with either a membership (1) or non-
membership (0) ignores real-world variation. Advances in fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA)
allow for varying degrees of condition membership without losing set theory prop-
erties valued in traditional crisp set QCA. In fsQCA, a condition (x) is assigned a
membership score (mA) ranging from 0/no membership to 1/full membership. Linear,
qualitative, and dichotomous properties remain upheld via fsQCA’s .50 membership
score, which is the threshold between membership and non membership (Seawright
2005ab; Ragin 2008).8
As much of the data used to base fuzzy set membership scores assignment in this
analysis are continuous, it is tempting to calibrate such data based on quantitative,
descriptive statistics (e.g. population mean). This approach, though, diminishes
8Unfortunately, QCA and boolean algebra, as it stands now, is not well suited for to examine
IST’s time element—boolean operators are commutative in nature and time is not commutative.
Yet, steps can be taken to include time characteristics. To begin with, changes across time can
be incorporated into calibration through averaging, differences, and sequencing. More formalized
strategies are available to include: temporal QCA (tQCA) where all logical possible sequence of
events are included in the truth table (see: Caren and Panofsky 2005, two-step QCA (see: Schneider
and Wagemann 2012), and Ragin and Strand 2005), or sequence elaboration and process tracing
(see: Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). This this study employs the latter two by including
temporal sequences into the calibration process and expanding temporal analysis via process tracing
after the initial analysis. This allows me to contextualize the effect of X on Y by elaborating on
sequences and intervening conditions (Z) between X and Y (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b).
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one of the main strengths of QCA in that it eliminates theoretical and case-specific
knowledge (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b). Yet, the alternative method of indi-
rect, end-point assignment comes with a risk of biasing towards one’s own theory
when setting these endpoint anchors. To counter this risk, I based calibration on
quantitative measures with explicit qualitative and quantitative rules on where to
place three anchors—non-membership (0), midpoint (.5) and membership (1). The
linear function shown in Equation 4.1 then takes these thresholds to transform base
data into calibrated membership scores. The listed six qualitative anchors help fur-
ther distinguish relevant variation from random noise from each other (Ragin 2008;
Verkuilen 2005).9
mA(x) : Ξ→ {0, 1} where : (4.1)
• 1 denotes membership in the set
• .8 denotes mostly in the set, but not fully in
• .6 denotes more in the set than outside the set
• .4 denotes more outside the set than in the set
• .2 denotes mostly outside the set, but not fully outside
• 0 denotes no membership in the set at all
Chad, for instance, has a low national road density average (4.49 road segments
per 30 square km) at first glance. This average is forced down in part due to the
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region in the north, which has a road density average
around 1.55. Yet, the BET region is also mostly comprised of the Sahara Desert and
does not have a high population. On the other hand, the southern portion of the state
is quite connected to the capital with the N’Djamena region having an average road
density at 9.26. Chad would be assigned a score of 0 (peripheries not cut off) in crisp
set QCA. However, in fsQCA, Chad was assigned a score of .25 (mostly connected,
9An additional calibration approach, transformational assignment, maps data on unit intervals
using continuous functions (Thiem and Dusa 2012). Theoretical, case-specific knowledge is not use
here though and thus I chose not to employ this method.
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but not fully connected), which better represents reality on the ground.
Theoretical foundations and descriptions of the conditions with relevant calibra-
tion thresholds are provided below. I did not separate based on infrastructure type
like I did in the previous Chapter. Besides for cut-off peripheries, this would have
been nearly and in some cases completely impossible to do for the other conditions.
Rather than disaggregating one condition and not the others, I kept this at a system’s
level analysis. The post-calibrated data and its relationship to instability is plotted in
Figure 4.1 and available in raw form in Appendix B. As these are membership scores,
it can be argued that these are merely arbitrary, and that the following results are
heavily dependent on these arbitrary data.10 However, I take great care below in
maintaining one of QCA’s great strength: looping between theory, case knowledge,
and data to help use the appropriate data and set anchors on which membership
scores are based.
Political Instability (Outcome): Common operationalizations of political instabil-
ity place heavy emphasis on conflict. To capture this “traditional stability” conceptu-
alization, measures of political instability must include data on armed conflict, ethnic
tensions, and social unrest (c.f.: Marshall and Cole (2010); Foltz (1995); Zartman
(1995); Brown (2001)). Yet, political instability measures must also include data on
risks to political legitimacy like regime effectiveness: bureaucratic quality, govern-
mental trust quality of public goods, and efficiency—see below for further discussion
on this. As such, the final political instability measure used here is a combination
of the World Governance indicator for political stability/absence of violence11 and
10Similar critiques and problems are also faced in quantitative analysis and the creation of nominal
or ordinal variables.
11This index measures the risk that a government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means.
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perceived government effectiveness12 from five years after the end of the conflict
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzz 2010).13 A five year time lag was included as it
takes time before second order politics takes hold: policy decisions must be made,
resources must be allocated, and infrastructure must be constructed. I do acknowl-
edge that these two variables are highly correlated (a positive and significant Person’s
correlation test demonstrates this). Nevertheless, I argue that this collinearity is ac-
tually a result of measuring different components of the same latent variable: political
instability. Where the political stability/absence of violence measure captures tradi-
tional notions of security and regime’s military capability, the government effective-
ness measure captures a regime’s internal governing strength and legitimacy (Weaver
and Rockman 1993). The absence of either of these factors will increase political
instability. With a Cronbach’s alpha of .806, I can be confident that a combination of
these two indexes creates a measure that better represents the latent variable of polit-
ical instability. Following this, an average was used to combine these measures with
greater weight given to instability at 3:1. Doing this allows for the role of physical
security to stand out as it has in the literature while also acknowledging the role of
regime effectiveness. In other words, having membership in political instability does
not mean that the central government is at imminent threat of removal (i.e. Russia).
As conceptualized, having membership in political instability means that the central
government s experiencing a threat so that it no longer has full control of its actors
or territory and/or that it is losing its legitimacy to power. The three anchors used
to calibrate this index are: .2, -.8, and -2.14 The membership threshold does not
12This index captures perceptions of the quality of public service, credibility of policies, and
independence of policy decisions from other pressures.
13These two indicators are measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 (positive numbers represent
stability and effective and negative number represent the lack of these).
14This and all anchors listed in this chapter are listed from non-membership, midpoint, member-
ship.
110
continue to the lowest value possible as these extreme values are not substantially
different from each other: a country with an instability score of -2.1 is just as unsta-
ble as -2.5 and a country often fluctuates between these values across the years (e.g.
Iraq). Non-membership is not limited to a score of 0 for the same reasons.
Cut Off Peripheries (PERIPHERIES): When placed in set-theoretic terms, hav-
ing cut off peripheries from the political center is theorized to be a reconstruction
condition for political instability. Comparative developmental theories measure such
separatist mobilization in terms of social, economic, and political differences between
the core and peripheries (Olzak 1983; Wright 1991; Gourevitch 1979). How this sep-
aration occurs physically is essentially overlooked. I ague that one significant cause
of this peripheral break down is the lack of infrastructure connecting peripheries to
the political core. To operationalize cut off peripheries, I use a three step process.
First, using gRoads and GIS, I created a raster dataset15 of road density where each
cell represented 10 square kilometers and a search radius was set at 30 square kilo-
meters.16 This raster was then spatially joined to the GADM database of Global
Administrative Areas (Hijmans et al. 2011), which allowed an average road density
per first administrative level to be calculated.17 These averages were then compared
to the density level of the area around the capital (political core). If a case had over
a third of first administrative road density averages two standard deviations higher
than the road density of the capital area, the case received an automatic 1. If a
case had overall high road density (> 45), then that case got an automatic 0. More-
over, those administrative areas with an average road density one standard deviation
15Briefly, rasters are an array of equally sized cells arraigned in rows and columns with each cell
having a value and a coordinate location.
16These settings were chosen so that each raster cell would represent an average ‘daily life neigh-
borhood’ and the search radius would represent a large trade area. If no major roads are in one’s
trade area, that neighborhood would only be able to trade amongst themselves and thus be isolated.
17Road density was aggregated this level instead of smaller geographic units due to the substantive
political and social meaning behind first level administrative districts.
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smaller than the capital ares were considered as ‘cut off’. A proportion of cut off
administrative areas was calculated and used to assign membership scores using the
thresholds: 20%, 30%, and 40%. These thresholds were intentionally set high to ac-
count for common post-conflict state characteristics: large rural areas and continued
development/industrialization. Nevertheless, these memberships scores only include
roads and are time invariant (geo-coded data about roads across time is not currently
available). As such, I took an additional step and qualitatively adjusted these mem-
bership scores to the six anchors described above to account for infrastructure system
change across time and other types of infrastructure. Maps of infrastructure from five
years after the conflict ended where used in this adjustment—a five-year threshold
was chosen in recognition that infrastructure takes time to build.
Reconstruction Aid Discrepancies (AID): To address whether the local popula-
tion received the capability increasing benefits of reconstruction, I include both a
measure of reconstruction aid and unemployment during reconstruction. Before re-
construction workers can be hired, there needs to be an acknowledgement by the po-
litical elite and international aid community of the need to pay particular attention
to infrastructure in post-conflict situations. After a conflict, an influx of international
aid from many multilateral and unilateral sources is common (Collier and Hoeffler
2004). Yet, each aid program usually comes with it a particular purpose and direc-
tions on how the funds are to be used. This donor-selected purpose opens the door to
some areas of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction to become overfunded at
the expense of other neglected areas. If minimal aid goes to infrastructure, the central
government, itself, must find the resources to rebuild. However, central governments
after a conflict are often weak and preoccupied with solidifying and rebuilding its
power base (Rotberg 2003). Moreover, turning to private funds is not always a possi-
bility; private investment in developing countries for infrastructure has been steadily
112
decreasing since a peak around WWII (Harris 2003). With limited resources, a gov-
ernment might opt not to provide infrastructure or provide it without investing the
additional resources to also build individual capabilities (i.e. use foreign workers in
lieu of local workers). To capture this, I compiled a list of aid programs for each case
during the five years after the conflict’s end using data from AidData.org (Tierney
et al. 2011). From here, a membership score was assigned based on the proportion
of how many of these aid programs went towards infrastructure (as listed by the
purpose code: reconstruction, physical infrastructure, and/or training/education on
infrastructure systems). The three anchors used in this calibration were: 25%, 15%,
5%. Having only 5% of aid delegated towards physical reconstruction, I argue, does
not give the recovering and/or new political regime enough resources or incentive to
rebuild in a way the promote growth of individual capabilities. On the other hand,
having a quarter of post-conflict international aid delegated towards infrastructure
reconstruction theoretically provides the needed financial funds for rebuilding while
still leaving resources for other pertinent areas of post-conflict reconstruction and
stabilization.
High Unemployment During Reconstruction (UNEMPLOYMENT): Building off
the preceding condition and capturing another characteristic of the local population
not receiving reconstruction benefits, I include a measure of unemployment during
infrastructure. In post-conflict situations, states are susceptible to economic shocks
as they transition into the global economy. Federal unemployment programs offer
one way for the state to combat this risk (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004).
Post-conflict reconstruction is an opportunity for the state to provide a social net to
those who lost their formal jobs during a conflict while also investing in its long-term
economy. The lack of such programs should be seen in high unemployment figures
during the reconstruction period. As such, data on unemployment as percent of total
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workforce from at least two years after conflict were complied and used to establish
membership scores of high unemployment during the time reconstruction is/should
be occurring (World Bank 2012)—a two year threshold was used to capture a high-
point of reconstruction projects. The three anchors used for calibration here—10%,
20%, 30%—are pertinent to the population at hand and would not make qualitative
sense in countries not in a post-conflict situation whose population would expect lower
unemployment numbers. In post-conflict situations, local economies are recovering
and national economies are shifting from a war-time to a peace-time economy with
employment numbers falling victim to this transition phase. While it is expected
that unemployment in post-conflict areas be higher than those who had not expe-
rienced conflict, the local population will expect some minimal level of employment
opportunities, however that is perceived locally.
Poor Infrastructure Quality (POORQUALITY): Unsustained infrastructure sys-
tems is theorized to influence political instability. Unsustained infrastructure is de-
fined as infrastructure that is of poor quality and failing to a point that it can no
longer be used to its full potential. Nevertheless, poor quality infrastructure is often
in the eye of the user and there is no universal measure of infrastructure quality. To
capture such a latent concept, I constructed an index (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.876)
using business leader’s opinions of infrastructure quality from the World Economic
Forum18 and measures of improved water and sewage systems access, energy con-
sumption per capita, and paved roads of at least five years after the conflict ended
(Schwab 2012; World Bank 2012). The latter infrastructure measures were added per
the recommendation of Bricen˜o Garmendia, Estache, and Shafik (2004) as business
leaders often discount “general good” infrastructure like water system in favor for
18The exact survey question used here was: How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g.,
transport, telephony, and energy) in your country? This is measure from 1 (extremely underdevel-
oped) to 7 (extensive and efficient by international standards) (Schwab 2012).
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business related infrastructure. The anchors used for each component are: low exec-
utive opinion (5, 3, 1), low access to improved water sources (90%, 80%, 70%), low
access to improved sanitation (80%, 70%, 60%), low proportion of paved roads (70%,
55%, 40%), and low electricity use per capita (4000 kilowatt hours (kWh), 2000kWh,
100kWh). These five membership scores where averaged to achieve a calibrated mem-
bership score of poor quality infrastructure. As with the previous conditions, these
thresholds must not be made in comparison to the infrastructure scores expected in
developed nations. Though achieving the same level of infrastructure quality should
be/often is the goal of many developing states, it would be very difficult for and
disingenuous to expect a post-conflict state to achieve that level of infrastructure in
a short amount of time.
Once compiled, it is tempting to run these membership scores in a statistical
model. As mentioned earlier this chapter, there are inefficiencies when modeling the
calibrated conditions via quantitative approaches. To begin with, IST is not a sym-
metrical theory: an explanation of political instability existence is not an explanation
of political instability nonexistence. Not only do the endpoints matter in these cal-
ibrated condition, but there is a natural 0 that represents a phase shift (Verkuilen
2005; Ragin 2008). A simple logistic model (ordinal or otherwise) of political instabil-
ity assumes symmetry to explain both 0’s and 1’s (Ragin 2008; Mahoney and Goertz
2012). Even if one was to use a continuous distribution (political instability is con-
ceptualized as a continuous latent variable and fuzzy set operationalization partition
this into specific categories), classical regression assumes a linear relationship between
different levels of the dependent variable. Yet, fsQCA membership scores are neither
ordinal nor interval variables as traditionally understood: they are purposefully cali-
brated types. A move from .6 to .8 political instability membership is different from
.4 to .6 membership as the latter includes the threshold between having membership
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Figure 4.1: fsQCA Data
and not having membership.19 As such, the above membership scores were run
through various necessary and sufficiency tests.
Due to the complexity of reconstruction induced political instability, I do not
expect any of these conditions to be necessary and/or sufficient alone. In the final
fsQCA solution, I do expect to see conditions that are not individually necessary nor
sufficient yet necessary for a jointly sufficient configuration (INUS). INUS conditions
come as a result of the interplay of individual conditions that exist in the same
physical space. Grouped INUS conditions connected by logical AND or logical OR
19In addition to these assumption problems, there is also a degree of freedom problem due to the
limited diversity of cases.
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(configurations) will provide the beginnings of a causal story between reconstruction
efforts and political instability. Just as I don’t expect one condition to be sufficient
for political instability due to the concept’s complexity, I do not expect there to be
one jointly sufficient configuration to explain cases of political instability.
Necessity Results
While no unilateral configuration was found to be necessary as expected, two dis-
junctive configurations were found to be necessary with the inclusion cut off set
at .965 and coverage cut off set at .600 so to remove any potentially irrelevant
configurations)—see Table 4.3 for these necessity results.20 The meaning behind
these disjunctive necessary configurations (X1 condition OR X2 condition is neces-
sary for political instability) is not straightforward. As the “or” here is inclusive (A
or B or both), these two necessary results are not mutually exclusive (Schneider and
Wagemann 2010a).21
Table 4.3: Necessity Results
incl PRI cov.r
1 PERIPHERIES+POORQUALITY 0.980 0.976 0.709
2 UNEMPLOYMENT+aid+PERIPHERIES 0.985 0.982 0.687
Note: CAPS represents membership while lowercase represents
non-membership.
+: logical OR incl: inclusion; PRI: proportional reduction in
inconsistency; cov.r: raw coverage.
20To help in reading this table, coverage signals strength and importance while high inclusion
scores describes the amount of outcome explained and signals whether the configuration needs further
investigation. Where I use inclusion, the term consistency is often often used in the literature. The
two terms are interchangeable.
21I would additionally argue both are possible, and thus this is not a exclusive OR. The reason for
this is that it is possible to have peripheries, poor quality infrastructure, high unemployment, and no
aid discrepancies. Foreign workers can be doing most of the work and those planning infrastructure
are focused on project numbers and first order politics.
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Necessity and sufficiency tests are prone to paradoxical results (i.e. a condition
that is necessary for both the outcome and negated outcome), which must be tested
for. The proportional reduction of inconsistency (PRI) provides a quick check for such
contradictions and the high PRIs seen in Table 4.3 implies a large difference between
the inclusion of that configuration in the outcome and negated outcome (Thiem and
Dusa 2012). This result is further confirmed when testing the negated configurations
to the outcome, which resulted with low inclusion scores (< .170) and moderately
low coverage scores (< .737). These results imply that the negated configurations do
not also have membership in political instability. Nevertheless, a test on the negation
of the outcome does counter this with a moderately high inclusion score (>.884) and
quite low converge scores (< .401)—meaning there are a few cases with configuration
membership but no political instability as predicted. In short, I can be relatively
confidents in the validity of these results. The final questionable test result opens the
door to continued analysis into why these cases do not have political instability and
uncovering a missing reconstruction condition.
Independently, having cut off peripheries did not meet the requirements to be a
necessary condition. Yet, when additional conditions were included, the new configu-
ration of conditions does meet the requirements to be necessary for political instability
as it now explains more cases. In other words, cases with political instability are also
likely to have cut off peripheries. This suggests that there is a characteristic of cut off
peripheries that enables politically instability to occur. Yet, this is not the only expla-
nation of political instability. With an instability membership of .52, Peru does not
have membership in periphery (0.2), but still has membership in both of the necessary
configurations (0.71 and 0.60 respectively), as it does have poor quality infrastruc-
ture and high unemployment. In short, there are other reconstruction conditions that
118
leads to political instability other than cut off peripheries.22
Truth Table and Sufficiency Solutions
In contrast to necessity tests, sufficiency tests attempt to find if there is evidence
for the statement: X condition is sufficient to explain Y outcome or X having condi-
tion(s) yields to political instability but there are other conditions that also lead to
political instability (Thiem and Dusa 2012; Mahoney and Goertz 2012; Ragin 2008).
Such tests require the construction of a boolean truth table with the above calibrated
conditions. A boolean truth table includes all logically possible configurations of
conditions with each case only having has membership (>.5) in one row—though
cases often have partial membership in multiple rows. When a configuration has no
observed cases, it is considered a logical remainder.23 The resulting truth table is
shown in Table 4.4.24
22The high PRIs seen in Table 4.3 implies a large difference between the inclusion of that con-
figuration in both the outcome and negated outcome. Nevertheless, a test on the negation of the
outcome does counters this with a moderately high inclusion score (>.884) and quite low converge
scores (< .401)—meaning there are a few cases with configuration membership but no political in-
stability as predicted. In short, I can be relatively confident in the validity of these results, but the
final questionable test result suggests that continued analysis is needed into why these cases do not
have political instability.
23This one case threshold is a common in fsQCAs with small to medium sized populations as the
one here (Ragin 2008).
24Note that even though this truth table merely shows membership/non-membership, related
fuzzy data is hidden behind the 1’s and 0’s in this truth table.
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Before boolean algebra can be used to minimize this truth table into causal con-
figurations, the amount of remainders (marked as ? in Table 4.4) needs to be noted.
Even though there are no observed cases for these logically possible configurations,
remainders provide good opportunities for counterfactual thinking as there might be
a reason no cases were observed in a configuration—the remainder might not be even
realistically possible (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thiem and Dusa 2012).25 Dif-
ferent treatments of these remainders can potentially lead to different solutions and
interpretation. Thus, three different solutions need to be presented and discussed:
the complex solution (no assumptions on remainders and none are included), par-
simonious solutions (simplifying assumption used and most remainders used), and
intermediate solution (directional assumptions made based on easy counterfactuals)
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010b). See Table 4.5 for these three solutions.
FsQCA solutions are often mapped onto a single dimension measuring their sim-
plicity. At one end of the spectrum is the complex solution where no remainders are
included. As can be seen in Table 4.5, no single condition is of itself sufficient for
political instability in the complex solution. Instead, there are three configurations
that are sufficient as a whole for political instability with each theorized condition
appearing as an INUS condition for political instability. Yet, this solution is just like
its name suggests: complex. This complexity is similar to the overfit statistical model
where explaining all variance takes precedence over theoretical clarity.
By addressing remainders and counterfactuals, a more parsimonious solution on
the other end of the simplicity spectrum can be found (Schneider and Wagemann
2010b). Parsimonious solutions use a simplifying assumption (a remainder) to find
25Broadly, remainders come as a result of limited diversity of cases. Specifically, the causes of
limited diversity range from arithmetic remainders (logical configurations expand exponentially as
conditions are added and can surpass the amount of cases available), clustered remainders (social,
political, cultural groups that rule out certain configurations), or impossible remainders (configura-
tions that are not possible in the world as is today) (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b).
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Table 4.5: Fuzzy Set QCA Solutions
Complex Solution
S1: AID*POORQUALITY + UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY + unemployment*aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 AID*POORQUALITY 0.936 0.852 0.481 0.109
Cases: MM; AO, IQ 1, SO, TJ; RW; SL
2 UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY 0.924 0.889 0.470 0.171
Cases: AF, IQ 2, IQ 3, LR, NP; TD; AO, IQ 1, SO, TJ; RW
3 unemployment*aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES 0.932 0.758 0.270 0.098
Cases: RU, LK
S1 0.915 0.838 0.756
Intermediate Solution
S1: AID*POORQUALITY + UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY + aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 AID*POORQUALITY 0.936 0.852 0.481 0.109
Cases: MM; AO, IQ 1, SO, TJ; RW; SL
2 UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY 0.924 0.889 0.470 0.160
Cases: AF, IQ 2, IQ 3, LR, NP; TD; AO, IQ 1, SO, TJ; RW
3 aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES 0.941 0.814 0.313 0.098
Cases: RU, LK
S1 0.915 0.838 0.756
Parsimonious Solution
S1: AID*POORQUALITY + UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY + (aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES)
S2: AID*POORQUALITY + UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY + (unemployment*aid*poorquality)
incl PRI cov.r cov.u (S1a) (S1b)
1 AID*POORQUALITY 0.936 0.852 0.481 0.087 0.109 0.087
Cases: MM; AO, IQ 1,SO, TJ; RW; SL
2 UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY 0.924 0.889 0.470 0.160 0.160 0.17
Cases: AF, IQ 2, IQ 3, LR, NP; TD; AO, IQ 1, SO, TJ; RW
3 aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES 0.941 0.814 0.313 0.000 0.098
Cases: RU, LK
4 unemployment*aid*poorquality 0.877 0.596 0.300 0.008 0.106
Cases: RU, LK
S1 0.915 0.838 0.756
S2 0.892 0.797 0.763
Note: Cases in same configuration are separated by a comma, those from different configurations by a semicolon.
Conditions in CAPS represents membership and non-caps represents non-membership.
+: logical or; *: logical and
incl: inclusion; PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency; cov.r: raw coverage; cov.u: unique coverage26
Parameters-of-fit table displayed below dotted line
Number of multiple-covered cases in all three solutions: 5
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the least complex minimal sum. Two similar minimal sums appear as a part of
the parsimonious solution. The last/unique configuration in each solution uniquely
explains just two cases (Russia and Sri Lanka). Just as complex solutions tend to
be too complex, parsimonious solutions risk being too simplistic, which can lead
to paradoxical solutions. In testing for this, negating the configurations resulted
in configurations with relatively low inclusion scores (< .731). While negating the
outcome did result in the first two configurations of both solutions also having low
inclusion scores (< .585), the last configuration in each had a moderately low to high
inclusion (> .741 and .819 respectively). Thus, the last configuration in each of the
parsimonious solutions also has partial membership in ‘no political instability’ (S2
more than S1). This calls into question the validity of the two minimal sums together
in the parsimonious solution.
Balancing between these two solutions, an intermediate solutions minimizes truth
tables based on theory—or Theory-Guided Enhanced Standard Analysis (TESA)—to
set directional expectations while also addressing remainders (Schneider and Wage-
mann 2012). Key to this process is a simplifying assumption that follows both the
empirical evidence and theoretical expectations. In the intermediate solution, several
difficult counterfactuals—remainders not used as a simplifying assumption—must be
addressed. Configuration 13 (UNEMPLOYMENT * AID * poorquality * periph-
eries), I argue, is an untenable assumption. Misallocation of infrastructure resources,
as seen in poor quality infrastructure and cut off peripheries, theoretically comes as
a result of a lack of and/or selective financial investment. If a case had a large dis-
crepancy in infrastructure aid while also missing these other conditions, the political
elite must then have its own resources to rebuild and/or break past corruptive prac-
tices and avoid the misallocation of infrastructure resources—this has not been the
case in post-conflict states. Thus, this configuration is part of a clustered remainder
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and was removed from the equation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012)—this solution
is shown in Table 4.5. By removing only this unattainable remainder while keeping
other theoretically and logically attainable remainders, generalizations are allowed
beyond the population(i.e. future cases of reconstruction) into cases that still meet
the previously discussed scope conditions. In fact, a logical remainder has the poten-
tial to come an observed case, which will change the inclusion and coverage scores
accordingly without changing the underlining causal story seen in the results.
In testing this intermediate solution, negating the configurations and negating
the outcome resulted in solutions with moderately low inclusion scores (<.708 and
<.741 respectively). Moreover, a similar pattern seen with the parsimonious solu-
tion was seen, where the two configurations seen in all three solution (UNEMPLOY-
MENT*POORQUALITY; AID*POORQUALITY) have better (e.g. lower inclusion)
scores in these tests as compared to the last one (aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES).
The reason that this intermediate solution has only one minimal solution compared to
the parsimonious solution’s two minimal solutions, is due to TESA assumptions. In
short, there are no solutions between the complex and parsimonious solutions when
no directional assumptions are made. It is only when theory guides the minimization
process that a single minimal sum takes precedence over another—the parsimonious
solution with the lowest inclusion score and most questionable test results was re-
moved from the intermediate solution.
There is no agreement in the literature on which of the solutions types should be
deemed ‘correct’ and further explained. With the lack of TESA procedures in ether
the complex or parsimonious solutions and questionable result of the parsimonious
solution, the intermediate solution best fits with the goal of this chapter: theory eval-
uation. Though I will discuss each of the intermediate solution’s configuration below
separately, fsQCA solutions are found based on the interplay between conditions and
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configurations that lead to an outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b). As seen
in Figure 4.2, no one configuration explains all instances of political instability in
the population and six cases have membership in more than one configuration. This
leads to the low unique coverage scores (the percent of coverage separate from other
configurations) seen in Table 4.5. When a causal configuration has a higher unique
coverage score (assuming high consistency scores too), it is a better explainer of post-
conflict political instability (Ragin 2008, pp. 66-68). I acknowledge that none of
these unique coverage scores are relatively high with one configuration explaining at
max 16% to 10% of the population. Yet, neither can these be ignored as together,
they explain 76% of the cases.
Figure 4.2: Intermediate Solution
Note: Outcome condition is shown in darker gray.
Configuration 1: UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY
Configuration 1 explains the effects of the local population not receiving the full,
long-term potential benefits of reconstruction and of a sustained socio-technical sys-
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tem. But, this is not how I expected it would appear—I argued that high unemploy-
ment and aid discrepancies, together, captures the lack of local level reconstruction
benefits. Nevertheless, when the two reconstruction conditions interact in config-
uration 1, there are increased feelings of being deprived something that people or
groups feel they are entitled to—relative deprivation (Walker and Smith 2002; Bay-
ertz 1999; Olson, Herman, and Zanna 1986). This feeling of relative deprivation may
lead individuals to be recruited into social movements and political violence against
the political regime as they fight for what they view as rightfully theirs (Gurr 1970).
Though being deprived of reconstruction and infrastructure benefits does not auto-
matically lead one (group or individual) to mobilize against the state, there were no
observed cases that had membership in this configuration but did not have member-
ship political instability predicted by IST.
While this configuration uniquely describes six cases (Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq 2,
Iraq 3, Liberia, and Nepal), Chad after the Libyan-Chad Conflict offers an illustrative
example of the aforementioned relative deprivation. Ethnic-based infighting within
Chad’s Hisse´ne Habre´ government led to Idriss De´by, a general at the time, to defect to
Darfur and lead a series of attacks against Habre´—the former supported by Zaghawas
and the latter by Goranes. With Libyan assistance, De´by’s forces overturned Habre´’s
government and De´by became President of Chad. The following years were filled with
coup attempts, a failed peace agreement, and continued violence that resulted in a
high number of civilian casualties and large scale infrastructure destruction (Amnesty
International 2001). The violence and destruction only continued after Chad’s first
multi-party presidential election and in De´by’s re-election, which scared foreign in-
vestors away from investing resources into Chad. Without private investment, Chad
was left with few options on how to reconstruct their country.
Nevertheless, the number of paved roads did increase from the pre-war period (19
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miles in 1987) to post war period (163 miles in 1997). Yet, the proportion of paved
roads remained quite low even compared to other developing nations (World Bank
1997a). Moreover, Chad’s economy, which at this time was largely based on cotton,
was dependent on Cameroon’s rail system for both exporting and importing goods
(Chowdhury and Erdenebileg 2006). The prospect of improving its infrastructure
networks and becoming independent from other country’s infrastructure was hindered
by the push to privatize agricultural sectors even as rebel attacks remained a constant
threat preventing private investment into the country. In 2003, a Wold Bank (WB)
funded pipeline was completed and oil production began. A portion of the oil revenue
was to go to development project, but the WB suspended the program when the
Chadian government reduced the amount to go to public programs (Maier 2008).
Moreover, during this post-conflict period (1995 to 1999), De´by turned to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB help under the IMF’s Enhanced Struc-
tural Adjustment Facility. The resulting economic and financial reforms were suc-
cessful during this time with an average GDP growth of 5%. Even as the national
economic situation was slowly improving, little improvement was felt at the local
level as seen in high unemployment rates during ESAF programs. With growth and
progress being made at a crawling pace, the local population was deprived of the
full potential reconstruction benefits because of decisions made by the political elite
and international aid community—the very people and organizations who promised
to help.
Configuration 2: AID*POORQUALITY
Only one case is uniquely explained by configuration 2 (Myanmar) while the six
other cases who have membership in configuration 2 are also explained by Configura-
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tion 1.27 Rather than telling a relative deprivation story though, this configuration
tells an absolute deprivation/neglect story. In response to widespread pro-democracy
protests, Myanmar’s military staged a successful coup d’e´tat in 1988 and formed the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which ruled the country until
2011. After Than Shwe became the Senior General of the SLORC in April 2002,
the SLORC was accused of countless of human rights abuses and Myanmar’s pop-
ulation remained in extreme poverty with little prospect for improvement. During
the post-conflict period, sanctions against Myanmar by the international community
severely limited international aid in general and prevented any aid for infrastructure
projects specifically. These sanctions also hindered the already reduced capability of
the SLORC to provide and maintain high quality infrastructure. In short, Myanmar’s
infrastructure was ignored for years on end and any potential economic, social, or po-
litical benefits of infrastructure in preventing political instability were not accessible.
Unlike the previous 100% political instability rate seen in the first configuration,
configuration 2 does include a case of political instability non-membership while hav-
ing membership in the configuration: Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the infamously
corrupt Joseph Momoh government allowed bureaucratic and physical infrastructure
to deteriorate under his reign. Moreover, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) used
this deterioration to recruit in their struggle to overturn the political regime. After
years of violence, intervention by both the British and United Nations (UN) finally
brought an end to the conflict in 2002 (Gberie 2005). International presence continued
in Sierra Leone as United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’s (UNMISL) mandate was
extended into 2005 and the UN continued to have some degree of representation in the
country as of this research. (Mustapha and Bangura 2010). These international ac-
tors focused their attention on conflict management and stabilization—though there
27The overlap of the cases are: Angola, Ethiopia 2, Iraq 1, Rwanda, Somalia, and Tajikistan.
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was bureaucratic fighting between the UN and IMF concerning projects and related
goals. During this period, infrastructure in Sierra Leone was systematically ignored
in the post-war period in lieu of other post-conflict decisions. Moreover, the IMF
made infrastructure rebuilding difficult due to privatization clauses in their aid com-
mitments. In spite of this, political instability was reduced in part due to continued
international focus on fostering peace in the area. Though feelings of absolute ne-
glect and resentment of not receiving reconstruction benefits remained present after
the conflict, acting upon these feelings was constrained.
Configuration 3: aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES
Even without the aforementioned infrastructure deprivation or neglect, political
instability can still exist as shown in the third configuration. Here, political instability
is explained by the existence of cut off peripheries when there is also no perceived poor
quality infrastructure and no aid discrepancies toward infrastructure/reconstruction.
This uniquely explains the least amount of cases: Russia and Sri Lanka. Though
these two cases are on different geographic scales with Russia being approximately
260 times larger than Sri Lanka, both are cases of ethnic separatists fighting against
the political core for control of their own independent county. Moreover, both ethnic
groups are listed as being at risk by the Minorities at Risk Project due to among
other factors, geographic concentration (Gurr 2009). In short, the story being told
with configuration 3 parallels the peripheral nationalism and broken identity theories
previously described. These cases did not need the additional reconstruction based
grievances to motivate opposition forces as peripheral nationalism grew unchecked.
Furthermore, a relatively good infrastructure system meant that rebel groups were
better able to conduct their attacks against the political elite. This might also help
explain the low unique coverage score of less than 10%. Separatism is rare, violent
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campaigns rarer (Siroky and Cuffe 2014).
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka started fighting for
an an independent state (Tamil Eelam) in 1983 while the Chechen Republic of Ichk-
eria has been fending off Russian forces since declaring themselves independent in
1991. These areas were cut off from the political core in regards infrastructure; the
opposition was able to grow their resistance and/or retreat when blocked as the po-
litical elite could not easily exert their power or control in theres areas. Nevertheless,
both conflicts eventually resulted in the political regime quelling the separatist move-
ment and signing a peace accord/treaty to end the conflict (Stiles 2005; Dunlop 1998;
Kapferer 2011). Yet, there was little improvement in connecting these peripheries to
the political core and absorbing them into the national identity and economy. Thus,
the grievance of losing their autonomy previously and their failure for future auton-
omy could not be diminished (Cuffe 2012). While there was a brief interlude, conflict
reignited in both Chechnya and Sri Lanka not long after.
Yet, not all cases with membership in configuration 3 also have membership in
political instability as predicted by IST: Serbia. Similar to the other two cases in
this configuration, the Kosovo War was ethnically based with the Kosovo Liberation
Army fighting for an independent Kosovo. Unlike the other two cases, Serbia is a case
of eventual secession success (even though Serbia does not officially recognize Kosovo
at the time of writing). I do not argue that secession of peripheries is key to prevent
political instability; secession does not automatically remove all grievances against the
political regime. Serbia (then Yugoslavia) differs from the previous two cases in that
the international community (specifically NATO) acted as a wall between the Kosovo
periphery and Yugoslavian political regime. While Kosovo was under international
protection, Milosˇevic´ fell, Serbia and Montenegro parted ways, and Serbia was able
to stabilize its regime (Stiles 2005; Judah 2002).
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Conclusion
Political instability, as described in Chapter 2, is process that takes time to occur.
Reconstruction-induced political instability is no different and is the result of many
past decisions and conditions. The fsQCA presented here allowed me to evaluate IST,
give support for its causal mechanism hypotheses, provide a better understanding
of just how infrastructure and reconstruction conditions lead to political instability
throughout a country. This Chapter has shown how infrastructure and reconstruc-
tion decisions can play into feelings of deprivation regarding reliable access to both
infrastructure and its benefits. Additionally, these results compliment and provide
more context to Chapter 3’s results regarding the influence of cut off peripheries on
political instability. Appearing as a weak necessary condition and an INUS condition
of a weak significant configuration, evidence seems to be pointing to the role of cut
off peripheries as an enabler or even the cause of political instability. By pinpoint-
ing these connections, it becomes possible to see exactly how reconstruction can be
an extension of political instability. These conditions are not inescapable. As such,
policymakers and the political elite have the ability to shape potential outcomes and
reduce the risk of future failure.
Some have questioned QCA’s utility for policymakers.28 QCA results do not
explain change in the margins or magnitude of effect—i.e. how much will political
instability change based on X change in investment to connect the purifies? However,
that is not what I tried to do here. This fsQCA was concerned with finding common
policy outcomes that are associated with political instability. Evaluating whether my
theory actually matched what has occurred and with the data. Though providing
invaluable insight, fsQCA does not provide all the answers to understanding the how
28For more on this current debate, see Lucas and Szatrowski (2014) and Collier (2014).
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component of IST evaluation. With the solution seen in Figure 4.5 describing differ-
ences and similarities between cases, further in-depth analysis may also uncover addi-
tional conditions that help describe cases of political instability not fully explained by
these configurations: Azerbaijan, Ethiopia (1991-2000), India (1997-2008), Indonesia
(1989-1998), Israel, Peru, Uganda, and Yemen. As will be discussed in the Chapter 5,
the results of this fsQCA and Chapter’s 3 geo-spatial longitudinal study will act as the
bases from which Chapter 5’s case study and process tracing was chosen (Schneider
and Wagemann 2010b). An in-depth analysis of a case studies allows for better insight
into both how the above conditions and configurations influence political instability
by untangling differences and similarities across time.
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Chapter 5
THE NARRATIVE BEHIND A RECONSTRUCTION CASE
In the previous chapters, I have shown the existence of varying long-term conse-
quences of infrastructure and reconstruction to political instability (Chapter 3) and
elaborated on the how political instability is being shaped based on where and how
infrastructure is provided vis-a´-vis excluded populations (Chapter 4). Missing from
these results, though, is an understanding of why these infrastructure and recon-
struction conditions and configurations ultimately influence political instability risks.
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued against taking a deterministic stance in
regards to infrastructure and the results support this. At the some time though,
the hypothesized infrastructure and reconstruction causal mechanisms described in
Chapter 4 do not automatically lead to political instability. To prevent system col-
lapse and reconstruction failure, it is of vital importance to understand why political
instability can occur when these conditions are present. This allows for more precise
and context-driven political strategies and policies so that reconstruction efforts be
reorganized to do better.
This chapter examines the impact of infrastructure on conflict patterns by way of
a case study with process tracing and historical explanation (Bennett 2008; Mahoney
and Rueschemeyer 2003; George and Bennett 2005; Sagen 1993; Zelikow and Allison
1999). Such an analysis provides key insight into the mechanisms behind the varying
consequences of infrastructure and reconstruction.1 Additionally, case studies offer
1Where the benefits of combining quantitative analyses with case studies are well studied, the
same cannot be said with QCA and case studies. Schneider and Rohlfing (2013) offers initial insight
and information on how QCA and process tracing can be used side-by-side to best evaluate theory.
I argue that a triangulation approaches that includes process tracing, QCA, and a quantitative
analysis is the best opportunity to capture the many benefits a mixed methods approach offers.
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useful insight for policymakers by adding context and “real” factors to help guide
future policy decisions (Davis et al. 2009). This chapter contains an in-depth case
study on Ethiopia—see Appendix C for a discussion on how this case was chosen
based on previous results. Though this is just one case, Ethiopia represents both
a deviant case for my theory (IST would have predicted more political instability
than what actually occurred) and a typical case (both the predicted reconstruction
conditions and political instability outcome). This allowed me the unique opportunity
to provide a narrative across time and policy changes in a most-similar situation.
The process tracing into Ethiopia combines qualitative narrative with descriptive
maps. In creating exploratory maps, the goal achieved was to visually and analyti-
cally depict conflict and infrastructure in each case and see in greater detail if their
geographical and temporal relationship described in Chapter 3 can be seen (Paul et al.
2005). The detailed case study provides a narrative on infrastructure planning and
provision, infrastructure use, societal impacts, and resulting effects on political insta-
bility. Additionally, this narrative dives deeper into the conditions and configurations
described in Chapter 4 to better grasp reconstruction’s consequences. Based on the
previous hypotheses and results, I expect the resulting case study to demonstrate:
that conflict surrounding infrastructure morphs as time passes after infrastructure
provision, how conflict moves into disconnected peripheries, and how reconstruction
feeds into existing or creates new grievances and deprivation feelings. Nonetheless, I
must contend here with the fact that one cannot observe the effect of a treatment in
such historical cases; it is impossible to observe the same case in history with different
reconstruction inputs (i.e. what would have happened if a road was or was not built
where or how it was).2 Though limiting the ability to analytically test IST hypothe-
2Forming this narrative, I use Bennett and Checkel (2014) and Sagen (1993) as guides. Bennett
and Checkel provide a template of best practices for making inferences from process tracing (Brady
2008; Mahoney 2012).
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ses, this does not reduce the potential gains in knowledge and theory evaluation for
future reconstruction policy recommendations.
Overview of Ethiopian Infrastructure
Ethiopia, located in the horn of Africa, is one Africa’a largest countries in regards
to both geographic size and population—see Figure 5.1 for a general map of Ethiopia’s
regions, population density (CIESIN - Center for International Earth Science Infor-
mation Network , Columbia University et al. 2011), and major cities. Ethiopia is also
overwhelmingly a rural country with low rural accessibility. Moreover, Ethiopia’s in-
frastructure is isolated from neighboring countries and coastal access when excluding
a functioning road artery and inactive rail line connecting the capital, Addis Ababa,
to the Port of Djibouti. This scattered rural settlement and lack of coastal access
promoted uneven infrastructure provision with high costs and inefficiencies—both
of which are major threats to economic and industry growth (Bloom et al. 1998;
Tybout 2000; Gallup, Sachs, and Millinger 1999). Before delving into Ethiopia’s re-
construction periods themselves, the rest of this section provides a brief early history
and general status of Ethiopia’s infrastructure. Ultimately, Ethiopian aggregated in-
frastructure indicators remain on par with other similarly wealthy African countries
(Foster and Morella 2011); regional infrastructure indicators vary drastically.
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The railway network in Ethiopia is a relic of the early 1890s when the French
founded the Imperial Railway Company of Ethiopia to build and operate a railway
through Ethiopia to the Port of Djibouti—this attempt failed in 1906 with the line
only extending from the Djibouti Port to Harar. The line was eventually extended
to Addis Ababa in 1917 after the Franco-Ethiopian Railway revived the project.
Control of the line exchanged hands many times with the seizure of the line by
Italy during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, restoration Ethiopia control following
WWII, and the independence of Djibouti from France that passed the responsibility
of the railway to the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railways company in 1982. Nonetheless,
the railway was allowed to deteriorate during the early 20th and 21st centuries in
Ethiopia that disconnect the Addis portion of the rail line and passenger services
remained nonexistent during most of period of interest (Marcus 2002). See Figure
5.2 for a map of the operative portion of this rail line.3
Ethiopia’s aviation and aeronautical infrastructure history revolves around Ethiopian
Airlines, which was established in 1945 under the name Ethiopia Air Lines. It be-
came Ethiopian Airlines in 1965 after shifting from a corporation to share company
(Ethiopian Airlines 2014). Though the company is fully owned by the Ethiopian gov-
ernment, the airline has operated with minimal government intervention and under its
own management and business structure (Hiltzik 2014). As will be discussed below,
Ethiopian Airlines has gained a high level of international success compared to other
African carriers, which has also led to a relatively good airport infrastructure net-
work. Yet, this was not always the case—see Figure 5.2 for a map of the aeronautical
infrastructure as seen in 2008. In 1990, there were only about 20,600 domestic and
international takeoffs of air carriers registered in the country (World Bank 2012).4
3Note that this map does not include where areas of the line are inoperative.
4For comparison, South Africa had 84,000 domestic and international takeoffs during the same
year (World Bank 2012).
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Electric power was introduced in Ethiopia under the Minilik regime in 1909 when
the first generator was used to light his palace. It was also under Minilik that the first
hydropower plant was constructed on the Akaki River in 1923, which supplied power
to small factories and public places around the palace in addition to the palace itself.
During the Italian occupation, Coneil, an Italian company, took control of Ethiopia
power generation and focused its attention on Addis Ababa while letting power supply
to towns around Ethiopia deteriorate. After the Italians left in 1941, the Enemy
Property Administration was established and took control of power generation and
distribution—the company later became Shewa Electric Power in 1948. Even being
hindered by limited capacity, Shewa did manage to increase power supply and the
company became the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority in 1955 with
its the board of directors appointed by the government (Ethiopian Electric Power
Corporation 2013). Even with this long history, Ethiopia’s power system is one of
Africa’s most underdeveloped with an installed generation capacity of less than 20
megawatts (MW) per million of population in 2011. Moreover, power consumption
remains low at 33.6 kilowatt-hours (KWh) per person annually (power consumption
on average across low-income countries is 99.5KWh) and access to electricity is at 12%
of the population. Moreover, the access that does exist is not evenly distributed—
Ethiopia’s urban access to electricity is at 86% while rural access remains extremely
low at 2% (Foster and Morella 2011). See Figure 5.3 for a map of Ethiopia’s power
infrastructure in 2008.
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These overall low indictors are surprising given Ethiopia’s high levels of hydropower
potential, which can be used both internally and for export (Foster and Morella 2011).
Especially when available at the levels seen in Ethiopia, hydroelectric power is one
of the cheapest sources of power and an effective way towards development (Solomon
1998). Nonetheless, hydropower development is also highly politicized in Ethiopia,
where colonial-era water use agreements for the Nile Basin are seen by many Ethiopi-
ans to have stymied the country’s right to earlier development of a hydro-based econ-
omy (Hathaway 2008). Before the reconstruction periods in focus here, hydropower
infrastructure faced a lack of maintenance and investment. For instance, the Aba
Samuel plant, located in the Oromia region, has been inoperative since 1970 while
three small hydropower stations around Jimma, Debre Birhan and Dire Dawa were
abandoned during this time due to old age and lack of maintenance (Solomon 1998).
“Roads are the backbone of a country’s infrastructure and they frame of a coun-
try’s economic development” (International Development Associaion 2009). A na-
tional road network provides access to not only international and domestic mar-
kets, but also critical social infrastructure. Although the Ethiopian Roads Author-
ity (ERA) was established in 1951 to address low levels of road infrastructure in
Ethiopia, it did not result in the widespread provision of a good-quality, all-weather
road network. In fact, many of the all-wether roads that existed before the start of
the time period of interest were the result of inefficient policies and road contracts
based on miles rather than on need. Thus, these roads often do not follow a logical
path and unnecessarily twisted throughout the countryside. A 120 kilometer (km)
distance between Debark and Aksum was a 10 hour slow trip by bus due to such
construction—this road, though, was all that the local population had to rely on
(Barraclough 2000).
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Before the Ethiopian Civil War, 15% of Ethiopian roads were paved and there was
a total classified road length of only 18,611km: 4,109km of asphalt roads 9,270km of
gravel roads, 5,232km of rural road, and 13,379km of urban roads. This results in
a road density of only about 0.9km per 1,000 people or 31km per 1,000 square-km
(Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011). With no coastal access, Ethiopia is economically
dependent on the Port of Djibouti to handle its imports and exports. At the same
time, there is only one major road that connected the Addis to this power. This meant
that the strategic and economic value of this single road increased in conjunction with
economic growth. As will be discussed below, this value was recognized by both the
government and ethnic groups. See Figure 5.4 for a map of Ethiopia’s 2008 road
network.
In summary, Ethiopian infrastructure’s roots go back to the late 19th century and
have been shaped by many political regimes. Basic maps of Ethiopia’s infrastructure
at 2008 paint a picture of the consequences of this long history in regards to just how
connected or disjointed regions are to each other and to the political core—Addis
Ababa. As seen in Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, the southern portion of Ethiopia has less
formal infrastructure as compared to the northern regions. Yet, this division and its
consequences cannot be fully understood until more context is given.
Ethiopia experienced two back to back reconstruction periods during the time:
following the Civil War from 1991 to 2001 and following the Ethiopian-Eritrean War
from 2001 to 2008. I proceed for each reconstruction period by describing the conflict
itself that resulted in the need for reconstruction and post-war political and economic
environment. From here, I then delve into the resulting infrastructure reconstruction
policies and connect these to the conditions and configurations discussed in Chapters
2 and 4.
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Ethiopian Civil War
Ethiopian economic development and state investment (to include infrastructure
provision) in the 1950s had a bias towards the coffee producing regions in south-
west and sugar and cotton providing regions in the eastern lowland—the Abyssinian
provinces in the north were largely ignored, which continued throughout Emperor
Haile Selassie’s reign (1930-1974) (Stavenhagen 1996). The potential consequences
of this uneven development to groups on the ground were not recognized. Instead,
Selassie reinforced a myth during his tenure that Ethiopia was mostly a unitary
nation-state even though it was also multiethnic (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). In
actuality, Ethiopia has about 80 to 100 distinct ethnic groups with over 70 languages.
The largest ethnic groups being the Oromo at 32% of the population and Amhara at
30%. The eventual success of the Marxist Derg’s coup d’e´tat was not just a function
of corruption, but also the failure of the government to pay close enough attention to
ethnic cleavages (Roeder and Rothchild 2005).
Life in Ethiopia under this military junta and Mengistu, though, was not any
easier and was filled with land redistribution, mismanagement, and corruption by
the political elite and a large drought and famine in the 1980s. On top of this,
the Derg still had to contend with the previously ignored ethnic inequalities and
tensions that threatened political stability (Keller 1991). The Derg attempted to
quiet separatist movements in the north (Eritrea and Tigray) by using military force
and the eventual expulsion of foreign aid workers in the north. Yet, Ethiopia’s poor
infrastructure inhibited the Derg’s attempts to control these rural territories; local
rebel groups were able to control rural areas, turn devastating social dislocation and
economic privatization towards their own benefit, mobilize support, and consolidate
their activity (Prendergast and Duffield 1999).
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During this time, Tigray was the poorest area in the Abyssinian province (and
in Ethiopia) and essentially isolated from the rest of Ethiopia due to the lack of
infrastructure (Stavenhagen 1996). Food aid entering the area, a lifeline for many
locals, needed to go through the Sudanese border and often faced a barrage of attacks
from nomadic bandits and government jets (Henry 1990). Northern Ethiopia (to
include Tigray) was also primarily pastor land, and between 1945 and 1974, no public
projects (including infrastructure) were funded or built in Tigray. Local rebel leaders
used this used this marginalization and pastoralism to claim that this continued
policy of neglect and repression was purposeful and intended to keep the province
underdeveloped, which played well with the the local narrative of Tigrayian subjection
in general. Ultimately, a local rebel group, the Tigrayian People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF) gained support by use of selective benefits to include parallel systems of
governance and provision of public goods like infrastructure and security (Young
1998; Stavenhagen 1996; Henry 1990, p. 172).
During the following Civil War, infrastructure played a key role in TPLF strate-
gies. Fighting closed principal supply roads between Addis Ababa and the northern
port of Massawa in present-day Eritrea, roads which were controlled by the regime
but went through rebel controlled areas. Relief vehicles carrying grain and medical
supplies were forced to travel from the Port of Sudan to Kassala and Gedaref before
crossing the border at night in order to evade aid strike attacks. This was a six-night
drive to get aid and supplies Eritrea and the Tigrean town of Adigrat across treach-
erous mountain roads—roads that were built by the Tigrean rebels themselves (Giles
1989; Biles 1989).
Outside of Tigray, rebel factions made use of Ethiopia’s existing infrastructure
networks in their strategy to starve out the regime and gain control of the capital.
Rebels put increased pressure on the Derg by attempting to cut the vital road link
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between Addis Ababa and the Red Sea port of Assab, thus threatening one of the
last supply roads to Addis Ababa. At one point, according to the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF), the EPLF and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF), which was
based in eastern Ethiopia near the Djibouti border, destroyed nine military aircraft
and 120 military vehicles along the road. Such attacks led to the evacuations of towns
along the Asmara to Addis Ababa road and further increased the susceptibility of the
regime (Brittain and Rose 1989; Giles 1989; Biles 1989).
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) formed in
1989 when the TPLF and Ethiopians Peoples Democratic Movement merged as a
coalition—additional groups later joined to include: the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic
Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement, and the South
Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front. When the Derg was further weakened after
the fall of the USSR and communism in Europe, it was the EPRDF that ultimately
overthrew the Derg in 1991 (with US diplomatic intervention). Over 1.4 million were
left dead and Derg officials were found guilty of genocide in 2006.
The swiftness of Mengistu’s overthrow and lack of central state structure meant
that political mobilization did not/could not occur before the EPRDF began creat-
ing the new state structure and establishing a transitional government under their
control. Early in the process, the EPRDF promised democratic elections, which
some questioned due to the TPLF’s self described Marxist ideology (Prendergast and
Duffield 1999; Stavenhagen 1996; Shaw 1995). This fear never materialized and the
resulting 1994 Ethiopian Constitution formed the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia with nine regional state and two self-governing, multiethnic cities (Addis
Ababa and Dire Dawa). Five states (Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, and Tigray)
are dominated by one ethnic group while four (Benishangul-Gumuz, Harar, Gam-
bela, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR)) are
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multiethnic. Eritrea, now under the EPLF, also received de facto independence and
Assab was designated as a free Ethiopian port (Stavenhagen 1996). Each region is
further divided into zones and then woredas (districts); kebeles (towns) makes up the
smallest unit of local government. Ethiopia’s first election took place in May 1995
with a landslide victory for the EPRDF with Meles Zenawi elected as Prime Minister
and Negasso Gidada elected as President (Prendergast and Duffield 1999).
Initially, Ethiopia’s federal system appeared from a desire to preserve a united
country (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Riker 1964). Yet, it was also believed that any
form of liberalization in Ethiopia required breaking away from the central control of
the past. The EPRDF focused not on stopping potential nationalism of ethnic groups,
but instead empowered certain ethnic groups while devolving certain powers to ethnic
based authorities (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Prendergast and Duffield 1999). These
region states have separate parliaments and government in accordances with their
local ethnic groups and have the right to “self-determination up to and including
secession” (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995, Article 39). Additionally,
the EPRDF created surrogate parties, People’s Democratic Organizations, to foster
a perceived multiethnic federal state. The transition to a federalist system was not a
smooth though. Regions, such as Tigray, were accustomed to de-facto independence
and now had to integrate themselves into a central political structure with calculated
autonomy (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Ultimately, the EPRDF became entrenched
in the federal system while the TPLF and other powerful ethnic groups grew resilient
and entrenched in their respective regions. Ethnic federalism here was a means rather
than an end to prevent a single dominate economic class or ethnic group overpowering
a poor majority (Prendergast and Duffield 1999, p. 49).
Drawing boundaries along ethnic lines did become problematic as families were
forced out of their generational land, long standing ethnic frictions were highlighted,
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and ethnicity became politicized through the promotion of exclusionary policies.
Such actions led to: limited ethnic cleansing from 1991 to 1993; battles between
the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia,
and Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization; and, the hostilities between Ethiopian
Somali Democratic League and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The cen-
tral government was dragged into these conflicts and EPRDF forces waged counter-
insurgency operations against OLF and ONLF’s military factions (Prendergast and
Duffield 1999). As time passed and ethnic-based conflict continued, Ethiopia’s fed-
eral system was imposed from the top down, as the central government began a
‘national integration’ campaign with assimilationist policies to remove cultural dif-
ferences (often from the perspective of the single party) (Stavenhagen 1996; Roeder
and Rothchild 2005; Prendergast and Duffield 1999).
Economic recovery following the Civil War was slow and faced a decline in GDP
per capita, which was only exacerbated by new famine conditions in 1994 (Collier
1999).5 Yet, any economic growth is only possible with adequate infrastructure,
which was lacking due to the previous regime’s mixed-market policies and war dam-
age (Solomon 1998; Mwase 2003). While regions did focus on productivity related
infrastructure programs, it varied across regions—the expenditure shares of infras-
tructure ranged from 18% for SNNPR to 38% for Oromia (World Bank 2008b). To
combat against its failing national infrastructure networks while also promoting eco-
nomic growth, Ethiopia initiated a hybrid system of revue sharing where the central
government shared tax and other revenue down to the regional states (often in the
5As argued in Collier (1999), the decline of GDP per capital following a civil war relative to if no
civil war had occurred is the result of both a drop in production and the loss of capital stock due to
destruction (here, with infrastructure destruction). Thus, areas of the economy dependent on capital
(manufacturing and construction) contracts relative to GDP while substance agriculture (which has
opposite characteristics) expands relative to GDP. Nonetheless, peace does not autonomically reverse
this GDP loss (Collier 1999).
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form of block grants). The amount allotted was based on a formula using inputs
such as population share, relative development level, and relative projected revenue
generation ability, whose goal was to account for the disparities between regions (Fos-
ter and Morella 2011). This was done to help states efficiently develop themselves
while preventing uneven development across regions (Roeder and Rothchild 2005;
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) 1992).
Yet, such a structure ultimately resulted in regional dependency on the federal
level in addition to uneven revenue sharing between the money received and money
spent. Though regions had power over their development and spending plans on
paper, state spending was (and remains) heavily guided by national Five Year Pro-
grams (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). These plans do not necessarily match all needs
across all regions. Moreover, while any public investment is channeled almost entirely
through the national government, operating expenditure was channeled almost en-
tirely through state-owned enterprises. Yet, profit generating infrastructure, such as
power and water utilities, did not report any significant investment using their own
resources (Foster and Morella 2011). Breaking away from this dependency is nearly
impossible, as donor assistance is also still heavily controlled by the federal govern-
ment and the amount is then often subtracted from future revenue. This discrepancy
between nationally controlled investment and private operation created funding gaps
and hindered potential investment programs. Nonetheless, reconstruction slowly be-
gan on war damaged infrastructure, construction broke ground, and private/local
investment appeared.
In summary, ethnicity has long been politicized and un-politicized. After years
of being disregarded, Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups were both empowered in their
regional state and relegated beneath the federal government in Addis Ababa by the
Ethiopian Constitution. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian Civil War hurt an already weak
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Ethiopian economy were liberalization policies had begun to take hold. It was in
this transitional environment coupled with a population boom in rural areas that
Ethiopia’s first reconstruction period occurred. Where infrastructure played a piv-
otal role in rebel mobilization and combat strategies during the Civil War, uneven
and unsustainable infrastructure policy later became a symptom of the federalist
structure.
First Ethiopian Case Reconstruction Period (1991-2001)
Within this political and economic context, Ethiopia’s first period of reconstruc-
tion policies occurred, which ran from 1991 to 2002, and set in motion future successes
and failures. Ethiopia’s various reconstruction policies and progress during this time
are described in detail below and are broken down by infrastructure type.6
Railways
Rehabilitation of railways within Ethiopia remained low to nonexistent during this
reconstruction period. National transport sector deregulation, which began in 1990
and continued after the Civil War, helped both the Ethio-Djibouti Railway and Road
Transport Authority change tariff policies. As discussed below, the latter remained
partially regulated and private sector transport fleets were nursed into growth. With
more power to increase rates according to the market, deregulation offered the oppor-
tunity for the transport sector to become self-reliant, profitable, and invest in itself.
Yet, fixed charges for road and rail services did not increase even as vehicle and fuel
6After the fall of the Derg in 1991, the UN Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group
(EPPG), who coordinated international famine relief delivery to drought affected highlands, helped
create a program to assist post-war recovery and the reintegration of soldiers/fighters. In 1994, the
EPPG became the UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (UNDP-EUE) and it’s mission shifted
to supporting humanitarian and interagency coordination for the UN (UN Emergencies Unit for
Ethiopia 2002). The UNDP-EUE faced first hand much of effects of Ethiopia’s poor infrastructure
in their delivery of humanitarian aid and provided updated reports on post-conflict reconstruction—
reports that much of this section are based.
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costs did during this reconstruction period. Thus, the Ethiopian Freight Transport
Corporation (EFTC) and Public Transport Corporation often had cash flow prob-
lems and relied on government subsidies as profits were rare (Mwase 2003). This lack
of investment incentives hindered any potential rehabilitation and future growth for
the railway—passenger serves were nonexistent during this reconstruction period As
such, railway infrastructure continued to fall prone to inadequate maintenance and
poor quality technology—rainy season often temporarily suspended railway freight
service due the mere to a threat of flooding over the tracks (UNDP Emergencies Unit
for Ethiopia 1999a).
Airports
In contrast to the railways, Ethiopian Airlines is one of the top African carriers
and Addis Ababa’s Bole International airport was and remains a major regional hub
for Africa. This success has allowed the airline to operate relatively independently
from the government and grow to new levels (Foster and Morella 2011). During
this reconstruction period, Ethiopia’s aeronautical infrastructure followed the airline’s
success and continued to expand with the Lalibela Airport (North Welo Zone of
Amhara) going into operation in mid-August 1997 at a construction cost of Ethiopian
Birr (ETB) 53 million. This airport not only connected the central highland more
directly to the political core/Addis Ababa, but it also helped grow the local tourism
industry—the famed rock-hewn churches of Lalibela lay nearby—and brought new
service jobs and tourism money (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1997). Not
long after, Ethiopia made a large step in becoming an international aviation hub with
the start of flights to the US from Addis Ababa in 1998—Ethiopian Airlines received
an FAA Category 1 certification and passed audit without remark (Ethiopian Airlines
2014). By 2001, the number of domestic and international takeoffs of air carriers
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registered in the country mirrored this success with an increase of 37% to 28,128
flights (World Bank 2012).
Power Plants
The agency responsible for electric power in Ethiopia during this reconstruction
period was the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority, which was later re-
named the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) in 1997. The EEPCO
was established as a public enterprise owned by the government and was responsible
for the investigation, development, and forming of power policies in addition to the
transmission and distribution of electrical energy itself. In 1998, the EEPCO had
distributed electrical power to over 365 towns and provided about 92% of the total
energy produced in Ethiopia (Solomon 1998; Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation
2013).
Nonetheless, access to and use of electric power in Ethiopia during the 1990s
remained low (8% of the total population with per capita energy consumption at
20 kilowatts) (Environmental Protection Authority 2012). Compounding these low
indicators was the fact that power shortages and resulting power rationing occurred
frequently during Ethiopia’s first reconstruction period. This did not come as a
complete surprise; a 1993 forecast predicted the possibility that there would be acute
power and energy shortages by 1995 (Solomon 1998). Partially responsible for these
shortages was the fact that Ethiopia did not exploit its high potential for hydropower,
even though this was a priority in national development plans. Out of about 15,000-
30,000MW of potential energy, only about 360MW (less than 2%) had been exploited
by 1997 (Environmental Protection Authority 2012).
Ethiopia’s plan to overcome this electric power supply deficiency during this re-
construction period focused on Medium Scale Hydropower Development (MSHD)—
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hydropower plants with a capacity between 40MW to 60MW—throughout the major
river basins. One such hydropower plant, Tis Abay II on Lake Tana, was completed
in 2001 with a final capacity of 73MW(Environmental Protection Authority 2012).
Relying on larger hydropower plants would have required large amounts of investment
with longer construction periods—both of which went against the reconstruction goal
of meeting the varying demands in all regions within the shortest time period possible.
With this stated national plan, the Gilgel Gibe hydropower plant (180MW capacity)
on the Gilgel Gibe Reservoir, whose construction began in 1986, was long delayed
during this reconstruction period—this plant was eventually completed in 2004 with
a final capacity of 183MW. The expansion of the transmission grid brought promises
of more consumers and increase in total energy demand. Yet, the EEPCO did not
charge more as consumption increased during this reconstruction period as a way to
incentivize the population to convert to electric power (Solomon 1998; Environmen-
tal Protection Authority 2012). Such underpricing along with the already low power
tariffs meant that the EEPCO only recovered about 46% of the cost to produce the
power (equal to 1.3% of the GDP) (Foster and Morella 2011). Moreover, relying on
hydropower (whether medium or large scale) in Ethiopia does come with its risks as
Ethiopian history is filled with back-to-back droughts. This lack of rain meant that
existing dams fail to fill and prevents hydropower production—such a drought pushed
back the completion of the aforementioned Tis Abay II plant (Gadaa 2010).
Construction of new hydropower plants or associated damns would often take
place in an already inhabited area, which led to the displacement of entire villages.
A resettlement plan was designed to address the adverse social impacts linked to the
Gilgel Gibe reservoir project in the Oromia Region. Though this was not the first dam
to displace people in Ethiopia, it was the first official recognition by the Ethiopian
government of its responsibility to address displacement in the development of such a
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project. The project was completed under a 1997 World Bank project at a final cost
of $331.4 million (compared to the 1997 estimate of $281.9 million). Both the Fed-
eral Government and the Regional Government of Oromia regarded this resettlement
project, which was to include the construction of social infrastructure, schools, and
health clinics, as a development opportunity. In total, 706 households (more than
5,000 people) were relocated. Beyond this initial move though, the government did
not address all problems caused by resettlement. Years later, those displaced by the
dam continued to suffer the effects of a poor resettlement program: livestock wealth
and crop productivity declined, project infrastructure was not maintained, and re-
source conflicts between the host and resettled communities continued (World Bank
1999; Hathaway 2008).
Roads
In the early 1990s, there were only about 23,000km of classified roads in Ethiopia
and 75% of this network was rated in poor condition (Environmental Protection Au-
thority 2012). In fact, nearly 75% of farms were more than a half day walk from
an all-weather road (World Bank 1997b). This lack of all-weather roads meant that
rain made remote (often rural) areas inaccessible and prevented access to relief food
aid and regional/international markets (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1999b).
For instance, during a period of extreme rainfall in early September 1999, a bridge col-
lapsed at Mersa along the north-south road connecting Addis Ababa to Tigray. This
closed the road in both directions to anything but light traffic and prevented essential
internally displaced people (IDP) relief operations and aid. (UNDP Emergencies Unit
for Ethiopia 1999a). Given that a significant portion of Ethiopia’s population lives
in rural areas, economic growth and overall development depends on the ability of
the country’s transport system to effectively integrate these areas year round (World
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Bank 1997b). Moreover, Ethiopia’s low road density was a significant obstacle to-
wards it’s agricultural based economic strategy during this first reconstruction period
(UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1998b).
Two executing agencies, the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) and the Regional
State Rural Roads Organizations (RROs), were charged with addressing this failing
road network.7 Beginning in 1993, the ERA substantially increased its contracting-
out of road works and supervision services (World Bank 1997c). Also during this
reconstruction period, Ethiopia formed a 10-year Road Sector Development Program
(RSDP), which covered the years from 1997 to 2007. The RSDP was a two phase
package of investments, sectoral reforms, and institutional reorganization—Phase 1
occurred in this reconstruction and went from 1997 to 2002 (International Develop-
ment Associaion 2009). The RSDP was intended to reestablish fair to good operating
conditions over a majority of the 23,812km of existing trunk and rural feeder roads,
while also expanding the road network by 18,344km of new feeder roads.
Phase 1 of the RSDP had a budget of ETB 9,823.9 million (ETB 7,384.4 million
distributed) with funds coming from loans and grants from donor nations, interna-
tional organizations, and Ethiopia’s own budget (International Development Associ-
aion 2009; Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011; UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
1998a). The goals of this first phase specifically were the rehabilitation, strength-
ening, and upgrading of priority trunk and major link Roads (with an approximate
total length of 1,200km) to be selected from: (a) Modjo-Awash-Mille (463km in Oro-
mia and Afar); (b) Woldiya-Adigrat-Zalambessa (412km in Amhara and Tigray);
(c) Debremarkos-Gondar (439km in Amhara); (d) Awash-Kulubi-Dire Dawa-Harar
(320km in Afar, Oromia, Dira-Dawa, and Hara); and (e) Alemgena-Hosaina-Sodo
(328km in Oromia and SNNP) (World Bank 1997c). To help with RSDP implemen-
7The latter being previously known as the Regional Government Rural Roads Organizations
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tation, the WB approved the Road Sector Development Program Support Project
(RSDPSP), which included IDA credit of $309.2 million and ran from 1998 to 2003.
The RSDPSP also supported the reestablishment to the ERA as an autonomous in-
stitution, rather than just an implementing agency, with its management accountable
to a board (International Development Associaion 2009).
By the start of the RSDP in 1997, Ethiopia had a total road network of about
22,500km: 3,500km of those were paved, 8,000km were gravel main roads, and
11,000km were gravel or earth rural roads (World Bank 1997c). Few of these roads
were in good condition: only 17% of asphalt roads, 21% of rural roads, and 22% of
roads overall were rated in good condition. In fact, over 79% of land areas in Ethiopia
were more than 5km from an all weather—the average distance to an all weather road
was 21km (Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011). During this initial RSDP phase, there
was success in regards to expansion—the road network increased by an average of
about 4.2% annually (Environmental Protection Authority 2012). Ultimately, these
investments increased road density by 80% from the initial lows of 21km of road
per 1,000 square km and 0.43km of road per 1,000 people—which was still below
the mean for Sub-Saharan African (10km and .61 respectively) (World Bank 1997cb;
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1999c). Moreover, over 8,709km of roads were
constructed or rehabilitated during this time (International Development Associaion
2009; Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011; UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1998a).
Reconstruction policymakers recognized the severe infrastructural constraints faced
by many in Ethiopia and road investments were expected to improve access to mar-
kets and the quality of services available to the rural population. Proponents of the
RSDSP claimed the policy a success by improving trunk and regional rural road access
to meet agricultural and economic development needs, building institutional capacity
in public and private sectors for sustainable road development and maintenance, and
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providing economic opportunities for the rural poor via employment and affordable
transport services (International Development Associaion 2009; World Bank 1997c).
Other direct benefits were seen through the reduction of vehicle operating costs that
resulted from improved road conditions. As the roads selected for rehabilitation were
located in zones of good agricultural potential or served as major import-export cor-
ridors, most of the savings accrued directly to truck operators providing trade and/or
agricultural-related transport services. Indirect benefits were seen to have come from
the increased involvement of the private sector, liberalizing of transport charges, and
reforms in transport sector as a whole. It was argued that such benefits would then
contribute over time to fostering economic growth and poverty alleviation country-
wide through market integration/accessibility and the reduction in food marketing
costs, especially for remote communities and the disadvantage poor that had been
cut off from both regional market and relief services (World Bank 1997b).
Using the results from Chapter 3, I would expect conflict during this reconstruc-
tion period to begin in areas connected to Addis Ababa by infrastructure networks.
As time continued though, I would also expect that conflict would then decrease in
numbers and shift away from Addis Ababa and to the areas with low infrastructure
density— the south and north regions of Ethiopia. In Figure 5.5, conflict events
during this period are mapped in two year increments (Sundber, Lindgren, and Pad-
skocimaite 2010; Sundberg and Melander 2013). The trend is indeed seen with conflict
initially centered around the capital and the rift valley, which runs south from the
capital. There is a decline in conflict events during the middle years of this period
and conflict events start shifting towards the Somali and Tigray regions. There is
an unexpected spike of conflict events during the final two years. While much of
this conflict is where IST predicts—the disconnected areas in the south—there is still
a number of conflict events in around the capital and in high infrastructure den-
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Figure 5.5: Conflict Events From 1991-2000
Note: Panels go in time in order from left to right and moving down.
Each panel covers a two year period.
Conflict data comes from Sundberg et al. (2010) and Sundberg and Melander (2013).
sity areas. This conflict pattern is driven by another conflict (Ethiopian-Eritrean
War) during the final years of this period. What is interesting is that even though
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the Ethiopian-Eritrean War centered around the border to the north, many conflict
events during this period occurred in the Somali region, which had low infrastructure
density measures. This is also seen Chapter’s 3 model miss predicts rate for this case
at 33% of grid-years overall and the miss predicting (false-negatives) conflict rate at
10% of grid-years (predicts no conflict when there was conflict).
Reconstruction Success and Failures According to IST
Reconstruction success during this period was measured by project numbers (miles
of road built or rehabilitated, MW of power produced, and number roof airports built
or put on-line)..8 By such measures, reconstruction would be seen as a success. In
fact, Ethiopia’s primary development objective during this reconstruction period was
poverty reduction in addition to sustained GDP growth at a target of 7-8% annually
(World Bank 1997b). Yet, I have argued throughout this dissertation that these
are first order measures as they only capture success in the short term as seen by
funding agencies and the political elite. By focusing the technological output, these
indicators cannot capture any potential long-term consequences of these changes on
political instability.
For example, the road from Debark to Jan Amora in Amhara, which was built
in 1999 and made Jan Amora accessible for the first time by car, would be rated as
successful if measured by the above indicators and did ultimately help with economic
development and service delivery. Briefly, this new road increased NGO presence
(from one to seven NGOs) and started a cascade of social improvements for the small
village. Two new schools were constructed and student numbers increased from 4,000
to 10,000 (an increase in the schooling rate from 13 to 22%). This new road also
8For the ERA specifically, performance and success measures included: traffic flow, journey times,
pavement roughness, maintenance expenditure, pavement loading, and road freight prices—similar
measures were used in regards to other infrastructure types
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meant that teachers no longer had to walk two days from Debark. Government
service increased in general and became more reliable, with the number of public
employees increasing from 200 to 300. A satellite telephone station for public use was
built for the first time; households using family planning went from zero to 6% within
two years; businesses improved and revenue from sales tax increased. This success
though drew others from poorer areas in lowland areas—women and girls who came
often resorted to prostitution to survive due to the lack of jobs, which ignited the
spread of HIV in the area. Capacity building never followed the building of infras-
tructure; the new administrators were young and lacked experience—all seven new
health centers financed by the WB and built by the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation
and Development Fund were operated by inexperienced locals below 25 years of age.9
On top of this, the new road also divided the Simien Mountains and thus threat-
ened endangered wildlife–the nearby national park is a vital main economic drivers
for the area and brought in tourism money and jobs. With greater access to the park,
human population inside the park increased with more than 11,000 living there in
2002, and deforestation and illegal farming became rampant—old and depleted farm-
ing in the surrounding lowland areas made this virgin land more appealing. There
were plans to reroute a 11.8km section of road around the park, but the needed ETB
17 million could not be found (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002c). Some
might ask why a road was built through such a vulnerable area: it was the quickest
path from Point A to Point B.
Such lack of sustainability and long-term consequences would not be captured
by previous perspectives of infrastructure reconstruction nor first order politics. As
9I do not wish to state here that one should not use local resources in their reconstruction policies.
I have argued the exact opposite throughout this dissertation. Yet, it is not enough to just build new
infrastructure, let new service increase, and then leave. Long-term sustainability must be considered
if the investment is going to grow in return, which requires training and capacity building.
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described in Chapter 2, IST offers a unique and useful perspective to understand
the consequences of infrastructure reconstruction policies and their future role in
shaping political instability. In second order politics, success would not be tied to
technological output. Successful infrastructure and reconstruction policies would be
measured by long-term benefits and consequences to both individuals and the nation:
growth national unity and cohesiveness, increased individual capabilities to better
themselves, and strengthen infrastructure sustainability for years to come. As stated
in Chapter 2, these are hard to capture as infrastructure and reconstruction have
both direct and indirect effects on political instability. It is hard to conceptualize just
how a project’s job training actually effected political instability let alone the size of
this influence. Though hard to measure, one can qualitatively see the effect, as seen
below.
National Unity
In designing their post-Civil War reconstruction policies, IST-informed policies
would require Ethiopia’s political elite to comprehensively plan infrastructure provi-
sion to ensure that all regions in Ethiopia received the necessary public goods (first
order measures) and that infrastructure projects were having positive long-term ben-
efits (second order measures). Yet, Ethiopia’s version of top-down ethnic-federalism
inhibited such such national plans even though they had the power to act nation-
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ally.10
The ERA was responsible for about 16,000km of federal roads while eight RROs
were responsible for about 17,000km of rural roads (Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011).
Though their responsibilities were essentially evenly split, the federal government still
had a majority say. Money from the government’s Road Fund were earmarked for
specific, government selected, infrastructure programs—grant blocks came with no
strings attached in principle, but still faced federal pressure. Moreover, when coordi-
nation was needed with neighboring regions, the federal level was in charge (Roeder
and Rothchild 2005). Such a federal supremacy could be seen in Amhara in 1998.
A particular zone wanted to shift more of their budget to road infrastructure over
education, health, and agriculture programs while another wanted to build a sports
stadium. In the end, they were ‘persuaded’ to change plans to match federal plans
and guidelines (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1999d). Furthermore, addi-
tional funds coming from international organizations (like the WB) also had to be
channeled through the national government, who then decided how and where the
funds were to be used—these decisions tended to be biased towards providing pro-
portionally more funds to the regions EPRDF leadership resided in the north (UNDP
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1998b). Though this top-down decision structure might
have helped prevent unnecessary projects and local corruption, the federal govern-
ment maintained a rigid, project focus ‘plan’ for reconstruction at the cost of focusing
10Note, I do not wish to state here that all federalist systems inhibit such national plans. As
described by Hale (2008), ethnicity is a heuristic to help individuals/groups reduce uncertainty and
find those individuals/groups more likely to cooperate due to similar goals and shared histories. In
short, ethnicity a mechanism that shapes threat perceptions. On the other hand, ethnic politics
(thus Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism) is a way to organize collective action to help in collective good
delivery. Such an outcome was the intent behind Ethiopia’s government structure. The preferred
equilibrium between the political elite and the ethnic group is corporation, especially when economic
benefits are present or the costs too great. Conflict can emerge in such situations when the political
core is perceived by a group to be using exploitative strategies or a lacking in military capacity.
In Ethiopia, the ethnic-based regions, being neglected by the political core and missing out on
reconstruction benefits, saw their position fall and perceived the political core as trying to override
their ethnicity—actions that their heuristic saw as threatening to their group.
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on long-term consequences. This inflexibility to local needs and desires can create un-
expected results, especially in ethnic empowered regions. Ultimately, the Ethiopian
political elite did not have a comprehensive national plan even though they were
attempting to increase their role and influence.
An example of this dichotomy between national plans and goals with local par-
ticularities and self-interest can be seen in the Afar region, which was (and still it
is) one of the poorest and least developed regions in Ethiopia after years of neglect.
Only at the end of this reconstruction period did infrastructure projects such as roads
and administrative buildings really begin take hold. Afar’s regional economy is po-
larized by the transit road connecting Addis Ababa to the Djibouti port, which cuts
through the region. After its construction, this road created a ‘truck-stop economy’
in settlements such as Decioto, Logiya, Mille, Adaitou, Gewane, and Gadamaitou.
Water facilities, commerce, and services are quasi-exclusively related to truck driver
needs and not to the needs of the population, which need roads to schools and power
access to their homes (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002b). In short, the
desire by the political elite to connect the port to the capital overshadowed the need
for national unity at the cost of ignoring Afar’s particular needs. It is now the pop-
ulation within the Afar region, a region with high political grievances, who face the
long-term consequences of this changed socio-technical system.11
Also overlooked during this reconstruction period was urban transport—the lack
of productive infrastructure and maintenance that constrained urban growth (World
Bank 2008a; Alonso 1968). While urbanization levels are generally low in Ethiopia,
the urban growth rate seen in Ethiopia and Africa is high, which is only expected
to grow following large future migrations to the cities from geographically disadvan-
taged regions (Becker, Hamer, and Morrison 1994; Gallup, Sachs, and Millinger 1999).
11See discussion of Ethiopia’s second reconstruction period for more on the Afar region.
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While only a minority of the Ethiopian population lived in urban centers, urban-based
strategies do have their advantages, as areas with higher population densities and/or
rapid population growth increase in value in conjunction with economic growth. In-
frastructure provision in these areas is less costly with more concentrated benefits
and increased returns are seen relative to urban size (Gallup, Sachs, and Millinger
1999; Bloom et al. 1998; Alonso 1968). Nonetheless, Ethiopian urban infrastruc-
ture, especially in Addis Ababa, lagged behind rural areas where the ERA focused.
Such infrastructure fell into disrepair due to neglect, tax/funding policies, and weak
political will power (Becker, Hamer, and Morrison 1994; World Bank 2008a).
Yet, the focus of international organizations and structural adjustment programs
during the 1990s was on rural development and the rural poor—economic and “na-
tional” development translated into policy to mean rural development. In other words,
the pendulum had swung the opposite direction in trying to avoid previous urban bias
that had deprived rural areas. African cities were essentially ignored. Though one
goal of these programs, especially in regards to import and export infrastructure,
was to push back foreign capital in leu of local contracts, they actually resulted in
exacerbating spatial development imbalances (Becker, Hamer, and Morrison 1994).
This is not to overshadow the reconstruction successes seen regionally and nation-
ally in regards to integration. In the SNNPR, a new road (166km) was constructed
that connected Soddo and Chida at a cost of ETB 255 million ($35 million). This
road was heralded as both an economic investment and a means to integrate the state.
Before this road, these were no major connections between Awassa (the regional cap-
ital) to the Bench Maji zone near the Sudanese border—one needed to travel through
Addis Ababa and Jimma first (an 800km trip). This project involved the construction
of 6 bridges—the Bailey Bridge, itself, is an 80 meter (m) bridge over the Omo river
(UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1999d).
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Individual Capabilities
As described earlier, the economic situation following the Civil War was dire.
The reconstruction and infrastructure policies described above offered Ethiopia an
opportunity to improve the economy directly and indirectly through local employ-
ment programs. In creating their plans, the Ethiopian government recognized this
opportunity and highlighted how their infrastructure projects would increase local
resources through the development and employment of local consultants and contrac-
tors and the promotion of joint ventures with international contractors. As a part
of its planning, the ERA incorporated into its contracts for rural road improvements
international and local design consultants, local contractors, and the increased use
of labor-based technology for construction and maintenance (World Bank 1997c).
Ultimately though, during its third party congress in January 1998, the EPRDF
confirmed new polices on the participation of foreign investors in the telecommuni-
cations, hydroelectric power, and defense industry sectors (UNDP Emergencies Unit
for Ethiopia 1998b).
Following this, a significant portion of reconstruction jobs created went to in-
ternational contractors. The ERA provided employment for about 9,448 people in
2001 to 2002—2,373 of these being skilled jobs, 4,335 were local labor, and 5,113
were international contractors (only approximately 695 of these jobs went to women).
When local jobs did appear with dam and road construction, the incentives swayed
towards smaller commercial agriculture investment that only helped a minority of
those in need. (World Bank 1997b). During the implementation of the RSDP in
this first reconstruction period specifically, the use of international contractors was
seen as a necessity due to a perceived low level of local capacity and experience.
Thus, international contractors ended up being the major implementors of federal
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road rehabilitation, upgrading, and construction projects and comprised 70% of total
contracts—local contractors had 20% of the contracts and 10% were undertaken by
force accounts (World Bank 2008a).
In the perspective of first order politics and measures, these international contracts
were successful. In 1998, the Dawunt-Lalibela road provisionally opened after being
handed over to the ERA by international contractors (the project was run by Berta
Construction under the supervision of Roughton International). Out of 120.5km,
84km, 21 large to medium bridges, and 21 small bridges had been completed before
the handover (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 1998a). Having had a smaller
presence under the Derg, Chinese companies started earning many of these inter-
national contracts during this reconstruction period. In 1998, a $65 million, three
year contract was signed by a Chinese company (Road and Bridge Corporation) to
construct the Addis Ababa ring-road project. This same company built the 100km
road between Woreta and Weldiya in Amhara (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
1998a). The China Road and Bridge Corporation and Korean Keangenan Enterprise
Ltd. won an international bidding competition to construct a 221km highway from
Awash to Harar via Dire Dawa and rehabilitate a 91km section of the same road
between Hiran and Kulubi—this road is the main link between Addis Ababa to Dire
Dawa and thus to the Djibouti port. This project was financed by an$76.7 million
International Development Association loan (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
1999c).
During this reconstruction period, these first-order successes (increases in the
road network) seemingly outweighed second order costs (the loss of employment
opportunities). Many of those around and available to work on these reconstruc-
tion projects were outside the traditional labor force and/or making the transition
into such employment—feelings of deprivation or grievances where not fully ignited.
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Nonetheless, long-term, second order consequences of this international, specially
Chinese, presence would come into play in the next reconstruction phase.
Sustainability
These reconstruction policies resulted in a substantial expansion and upgrade of
Ethiopia’s infrastructure network. This also required an expansion of maintenance
and a focus on sustainability and infrastructure maintenance, which would allow for
the initial investment to continue providing its technological and system benefits over
time. In the RSDSP, two complementary dimensions of project sustainability were
emphasized: investment sustainability and policy reforms. The first dimension re-
quired mobilizing and allocating resources effectively towards proper road network
maintenance of both existing roads and those roads rehabilitated/built during the
RSDP. The latter dimension was a recognition of needed institutional reforms and
capacity building initiatives during project preparation and performance in order to
maintain future capacity and maintenance policies once RSDP ended. Both of these
sustainability dimensions also required sustaining government commitment to sector
reforms, itself, and the involvement of all stakeholders. As such, the RSDSP was
to include, with international assistance, technical assistance to all key planning and
implementing entities and ultimately support project implementation and capacity
building for sustainability. A multi-annual maintenance plan reflected this commit-
ment (World Bank 1997c).12 These programs did help improve both the planning
for and actual sustainability of road infrastructure.
Sustainability though requires more than a focus on infrastructure (i.e. the road
network) and related government departments (i.e. the Ethiopian Transportation
12Yet, mechanized and manual routine maintenance works were also regularly contracted out to
international entities (World Bank 1997c).
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Agency). Supporting systems (economic, social, political, and environmental) must
also support the socio-technical system as they are also required of he infrastructure
pass the test of time. The Ethiopian Transportation Agency (ETA) was in charge
of setting freight rates, which included the Addis Ababa-Assab route that was vital
to the coffee-based economy. Yet, return loads freight rates depended on volume
and type. With the shortage of export goods and the Ethiopian Freight Transport
Corporation transportation monopoly, private trucks had travel empty from Addis
to Assab even though there was coffee to be transported in Addis (Mwase 2003).
Such economic policies reduced economic growth while hindering future investment.
Additionally, the reconstruction policies during this period often did not consider
environment sustainability. While new infrastructure in previously inaccessible areas
made more land available to cultivate at a higher yield, they also often had adverse
environmental effects (World Bank 1997c). In regards to power production, over 90%
of the energy consumed in Ethiopia in 1998 came from biomass fuels and was primarily
used for cooking, which resulted in massive deforestation and soil erosion (Solomon
1998). The focus on hydropower plants during this reconstruction period did not
fully address how power was being used at the local level—low price incentives could
not change a long social history of how households prepared food (Environmental
Protection Authority 2012). This meant that investments took longer to be returned
and that the potential benefits of national unity and capacity building could not fully
take hold to combat political instability risks.
Table 5.1: fsQCA Solution Membership Scores for First Ethiopian Case
AID*POORQUALITY UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES Political Instability
0.40 0.00 0.06 0.64
Note: CAPS represents membership while lowercase represents non-membership.
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In regards to Chapter 4’s fsQCA results, this first case of Ethiopian reconstruction
is consistently a most deviant case for coverage across all three solution configurations
(listed in Table 5.1). Though Ethiopia during this time had membership in politi-
cal instability, none of the predicted condition configurations are present. Ethiopia’s
membership score for the first configuration (AID*POORQUALITY), which was the
closest to having membership, was driven by the existence of other aid focuses during
this reconstruction period—specifically on continued drought conditions and famine
relief, as Ethiopia was still recovering from a 1983-1985 famine.13 This necessary
aid divergence meant that less aid was available for infrastructure reconstruction and
longterm investments. Less available funds meant that projects faced pressure to
reduce their costs, which increased incentives to use international contractors. In re-
gards to the second configuration (UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY), Ethiopia
actually had a low reported unemployment number during this reconstruction pe-
riod (low compared to other developing nations). Much of the population were pas-
toralists and/or subsistence farmers and outside the traditional labour force being
measured by this statistic. This fact became an issue later, as the country be-
gan liberalizing, arable land shrank, and these very same people began turning to
the formal economy (see next reconstruction period). This low reported unemploy-
ment membership also masked Ethiopia’s high membership in poor infrastructure
quality. Thirdly, although there was this regional dichotomy in regards to infras-
tructure levels , Ethiopia is not explained by the third configuration (unemploy-
ment*aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES). Ethiopia not only had cut off peripheries,
it also had other reconstruction conditions shown to be affiliated with political in-
13A recent report found that much of the relief aid during this famine went through the government,
became part of Mengistu’s counter-insurgency plans, and ultimately prolonged his reign. Moreover,
a good portion of this aid that was supposed to go towards emergency food allocation actually went
straight to the TPLF to buy weapons in their fights against the Derg (Plaut 2010).
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stability: high unemployment, poor quality infrastructure, and reconstruction aid
discrepancies. In other words, reconstruction induced political instability was not
just a factor of peripheral and broken identities.
What would have IST-informed reconstruction policies looked like in Ethiopia
during this reconstruction period? In regards to hydropower infrastructure, a large
portion of Ethiopia’s water resources are found in rural areas and small power plants
(less than 40MW) rather than the government large power plants are best suited to
harness this power and provide affordable energy for the development of rural areas.
The construction of such smaller power plants do a lot more than just increase the
number of power plants and access to power. These smaller power plants spread out
throughout rural Ethiopia would encourage the establishment of government offices
and associated services in remote areas and provide employment opportunities in
rural areas from from the power plant construction/operation, itself, and from the
new industries that would rise around the plants. This would then help absorb those
transiting into the modern labor force though training and employment in addition
to being better suited to help households transition to formal power sources (Solomon
1998)—that is if the local population were used as the workforce to build the infras-
tructure. Yet, such plans require a significant level of government energy and cost
for relatively little electric power gain and maintaining these plants in remote areas
discourage their construction.
Ethiopian-Eritrea War
During the Ethiopian Civil War, a common enemy united future foes: the EPRDF
and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).14 The EPLF and EPRDF received
14The EPLF was founded when the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) split— the ELF itself was
founded in the 1960s by Muslims in reaction to fears of Ethiopian annexation. The EPLF platform
resolved around nationalism, independence, and socialism.
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support and supplies from Sudan during their uprising. In return, the groups also
turned a blind eye or even actively supported groups in Sudan through their shared
border (Prendergast and Duffield 1999). After the Civil War and Eritrea’s de-facto
independence, the EPLF was to set up an autonomous transitional government in Er-
itrea. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s young democracy status made the county more vulnera-
ble to civil violence as ethnic groups fight for national self-determinism and weak in-
stitutions were unable to constructively transform grievances—both self-determinism
goals and political grievances were present in the Eritrean territory. Nonetheless, the
border between Ethiopia and Eritrea was a not a major sources of grievance up to
this point.
This all changed though when the Eritrean people voted for independence in a
1993 UN-supported referendum. Not long after, Eritrea declared its independence
and gained international recognition. With disagreement occurring over where the
border should lay, a border committee was set up in November 1997. The main areas
of tension along the Ethiopian side of the 1,000km boarder included: 1) Badme and
Shiraro, in the western boarder area between the Tekeze and Mereb rivers (Western
Zone of Tigray Region), 2) Tsarona, Zalambessa and Alitena in the central boarder
section (Eastern Zone of Tigray Region) near the main road leading to the Eritrean
capital of Asmara; and 3) Bure in the eastern boarder section (Zone I of the Afar
region) on the main road to the Red Sea Port of Assab (Mussa 2003).
In part due to the lack of a border agreement, President Isaias Afeweki of Eritrea
politically calculated that Badme could be annexed. Yet, Badme was also part of
Tigray, which many in the ruling regime in Addis called home. Pressure from the
public and within the political elite led to Ethiopia responding militarily to Eritrea’s
actions and igniting war. The resulting Ethiopian-Eritrean war, which ran from May
1998 to June 2000, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and both sides being
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accused of human rights abuses.
During the conflict though, infrastructure played a key role in how the war pro-
gressed and was fought. The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict has been called Africa’s
first high-tech war, as the two nations employed jet aircraft, artillery, and armor—
Ethiopia often used these jets to attack airport infrastructure in Asmara as a form of
retaliation. Such a description though does not paint a complete picture of conflict
on the ground with waves of foot solders attempting to win a few miles of disputed
land at a time. Infrastructure conditions along the borders regions were poor leading
up to the war and the military was not immune to these conditions. As such, ground
conflict would essentially stop during some months, as rainy season turned trenches
and supply roads into mud, which prolonged the devastating war (Maykuth 1999).
The Algiers Agreement ended the war and created a 25km wide Temporary Secu-
rity Zone (TSZ) within Eritrea, which was to be patrolled by the UN. A meeting of
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which was established under the Algiers
Agreement, did eventually agree in April 2002 on where the border should be—
concessions were made on both sides. In the end, this commission decided that the
disputed territory of Badme, which originally sparked the war, does belong to Eritrea
and the Hague later found that Eritrea had broken international law by invading
Ethiopia. Though dissatisfied with the commission’s results, Ethiopia did eventually
accepted the ruling in principle. Yet, Ethiopia did not fully retreat and occupied a
significant portion of Eritrean territory. Some Ethiopian troops were withdrawn in
December 2005 along with the UN withdrawing its peacekeepers. This hint of peace
though was broken when both boycotted a November 2006 meeting of the border
commission and remobilized troops along the border. The border remains contested
and grew to include the Eritrean-Djibouti border in 2008. As of the writing of this
dissertation, this area is still under Ethiopian occupation.
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When the war ended, hundreds of thousands were displaced. The most war-
affected regions with the highest percentage of Internally Displaced People (IDPs)
located in Tigray and Afar, while some deportees from Eritrea also went to reside in
urban areas of Amhara. While the rehabilitation of deportees after the war did include
household assistance, humanitarian mine clearance, and rehabilitation/maintenance
of road infrastructure, it did not include employment or other longer-term capability
building programs (Mussa 2003). Nonetheless, IDPs from the war started returning
home in stages starting around June 2000 with most having returned by 2002. Those
that did return home faced a significant threat from mines used during the war in ad-
dition to lost/damaged property and decline in land production (UNDP Emergencies
Unit for Ethiopia 2002a).
Notwithstanding, there were already high numbers of IDPs in Ethiopia before the
war. Drought conditions in the North in 1999/2000 led to increased numbers of IDPs
and humanitarian assistance as entire families left their villages and food insecurity
grew. In April 1999, there were over 315,936 IDPs from 8 wordas in Tigray itself (not
including the 1,000 people from Zala Ambessa who gathered around Bahti, a valley
northeast of Adigrat). These IDPs from rural areas, whether from drought or war,
left with limited personal belongings and lost their means of livelihood. IDPs from
urban centers, who were often self-employed private/government employees, fared no
better as they too lost their houses and other livelihood means (UNDP Emergencies
Unit for Ethiopia 2002a).
Assistance to IDPs went though the World Bank (WB) financed Ethiopian Re-
covery Program (ERP), where over ETB 157.8 million ($18.6 million) was allocated
for social rehabilitation and reconstruction work, excluding work in Zala Ambessa
(UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002a). Yet, delivery of this aid was not sim-
ple funds were not used to its full potential. In North and South Gondar, most of the
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population faced high levels of food insecurity—many, if not most, were dependent
on food aid. Exacerbating this was an uncontrolled population growth of both hu-
mans and cattle, which forced residents to move higher into the mountains and into
nature. Food aid in Gondar was hindered, though, by the fact that areas were often
inaccessible by truck or by even foot when rivers are swollen and roads destroyed by
rain and landslides during the rainy season. Although donkeys transported much of
the load, many carried the heavy sacks of aid on their shoulders. People without pack
animals had to pay over 50% of their grain load to owners of donkeys for transport,
which deprived the most vulnerable of their food rations (UNDP Emergencies Unit
for Ethiopia 2002c).
Though the war did initially hurt the Ethiopian economy, it strengthened those
in power. Between 2004 to 2009, Ethiopia had one of the quickest growing economies
in the world with an average annual economic growth rate of 4.8% in the 2000s as
compared to .5% in the previous decade and reconstruction period. Nonetheless, GDP
per capita remained one of the lowest in the world (Foster and Morella 2011; UNDP
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002a). Lost business due to the loss of the Eritrean
trade market (especially for livestock and petty trade), high transport costs of regional
trade, and poor road networks became major challenges in the north and hindered
economic prospects following the war. The Sudanese economy and Port of Sudan were
the best options to improve trade, yet few commercial market opportunities could be
created in Sudan. Fixing such economic hurdles would require road rehabilitation to
help open markets and facilitate purchase and transport to areas in the north, which
were in chronic need of the goods and trade. The road connecting Humera to Shiraro
helped with this once it was updated, but did not solve all infrastructure related
problems in the area (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002a).
Regardless, Ethiopian-Eritrean War was not the only conflict occurring during
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this time. During the war, Eritrea supported the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and
ONLF in Ethiopia who were fighting for independence of Oromia and Ogaden respec-
tively. Residents in these areas generally saw money being spent on new jet fighters
and weaponry from Russia rather than being spent on neglected infrastructure in
their regions, which still had low levels of good quality infrastructure as compared
to the rest of Ethiopia (Keneally 2000). These disputed regions in the south were
awarded to Ethiopia by the British in 1954 and has since been the cause of two wars
between Ethiopia and neighboring Somalia.15 This support did not go unnoticed
and Ethiopia retaliated by supporting groups in Eritrea (specifically the Eritrean Is-
lamic Jihad) and Sudan (the Eritrean Islamic Salvation) who then attacked along
the Eritrea-Sudan border. A report by Ethiopia’s National Intelligence and Security
Service and the Federal Police Anti-terror Task Force described how Eritrean’s terror
network’s plan of action and strategies were targeted at wreaking havoc via orches-
trated terror attacks on hotels, main roads, government officials, and institutions in
Addis Ababa and throughout Ethiopia. Eritrea, the report claimed, used as instru-
ments of its plans he OLF, ONLF, Ethiopian Patriotic Front, and other Coalition
for Unity and Democracy groups (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2007a). The ONLF
were also involved in fighting between Eritrean-backed Islamists in Somalia who are
fighting against the Ethiopian-backed interim government (Penketh and Bloomfield
2007).
Conflict also occurred in the north (Afar region) during this reconstruction period.
Drought conditions and scarce sources worsened relations between Afar and Issa pas-
toralists who fought in early 2002 and were motivated by territorial claims—the Issa
15The ONLF was formed after Ethiopia crushed Somali troops trying to regain areas populated
by nomadic ethnic Somalis in 1977 to 1978 and they have been fighting Ethiopia for independence
since 1984. The Ethiopian government accuses it of being associated with al-Qaida, but the ONLF
denies this claim.
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wanted control over the Awash-Logiya road and gain access to Awash River along
with wanting revenge over the Boromodaitou battle that pushed them to the east
of the road behind the hills (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002b). Clashes
and conflict surrounding natural and infrastructure resources continued between sev-
eral tribes and ethnic groups in and around Afar Region, which further hampered a
critical drought emergency situation. These conflict and security threats led to the
closure for UN personnel (and thus aid) of the main road from the Djibouti Port
to Addis Ababa that crossed through the Afar region in 2003 (UNDP Emergencies
Unit for Ethiopia 2003c). The closure of this single road posed a threat to both the
political elite in Addis and the rest of Ethiopia as neither aid nor goods could make it
to and from the port. In 2007, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union (ARDUF)
rebels were said to be responsible for the kidnapping of five Europeans and eight lo-
cal guides. The rebels eventually surrendered and reportedly told a Sudanese agency
that, “[They] were hired by Eritrean government to make attacks on Ethiopian forces,
people, and infrastructures, since the Ethiopia-Eritrea war broke out” (BBC World-
wide Monitoring 2007c). In other words, dissidents recognized that they can include
attacks on infrastructure to their strategic plans as a way to achieve their long-term
goal (here: secession). By attacking infrastructure, they would diminish the ability
of the central state to control them and violently remove a symbol of federal power.
This goes against the role of infrastructure in first-order conflict where infrastructure
increases dissidents’ capability by helping with the mobilization of resources and sup-
port. Though mobilization would help with short-term goals (winning battles), more
is needed to achieve a group’s long-term goals.
In summary, Ethiopia’s federal government was pulled in many directions: pro-
tecting itself from an international threat that laid across the border, attempting to
quell a regional separatist conflict, and addressing the surge of IDPs all while trying
176
to develop its infrastructure networks and economy. This resulted in spreading thin
the government’s capacity to create new or alter existing infrastructure policies based
on experiences in the previous reconstruction period.
Second Ethiopian Case Reconstruction Policies (2002-2008)
The reconstruction period following the Ethiopian-Eritrean War included many
war-specific reconstruction programs. The WB approved two credits totaling $400.6
million to assist the Ethiopian government’s post-war ERP. In addition to helping
address the immediate needs of about 620,000 war-affected people, parts of the ERP
were allocated to go towards the reconstruction/rehabilitation of road and power
supply infrastructure in conflict-affected areas that were destroyed during the war to
help restart the economy. (World Bank 2000; UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
2002a; Mussa 2003). Yet, not all war affected areas were met with immediate as-
sistance. Reconstruction of Zala Ambessa, which lays on the Ethiopian border, and
surrounding area near the border did not start right away, as such reconstruction
depended on the outcome of the border commission. In fact, it was in doubt in 2002
whether administrative structures (to include the woreda administration buildings
and high school) would be reconstructed here in favor of moving the administrative
center further south away from the disputed border (UNDP Emergencies Unit for
Ethiopia 2002a).
Such reconstruction policies occurred congruently with other infrastructure poli-
cies, many of which were continued from the previous reconstruction period. In fact,
between 2003 to 2008, about 52% of Agricultural and Rural Development’s total ex-
penditure was directed towards infrastructure and productivity programs. Ultimately,
infrastructure spending, which progressively became more a federal responsibility, in-
creased every year during this second reconstruction period (World Bank 2008b).
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Railways
The Ethiopian Railway Corporation was established in November 2007 as a sub-
sidiary of the Ministry of Transport & Communications. With profits nonexistent,
the ERC was entirely dependent on external assistance, which also made it prone
to a stream of international contractors. Nevertheless, railway rehabilitation pro-
grams were rare during this reconstruction period. In 2003, a grant for EUR 40
million, which was later increased to EUR 50 million in 2006 to reflect higher fuel
and steel prices, was prepared by the European Commission for the rehabilitation of
the Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway—work funded by this program was still in progress in
2009 after delayed concession talks (Railway Gazette 2007 2009). In 2006, an Ethiopia
and South African company signed an agreement to work on sections of the line that
deteriorated during the Ogaden War from 1977 to 1978. Though it was supposed to
start in 2007, work had not been executed by 2008 (Hadera 2006). Operating trains
were few in number, carrying fruit and vegetables, coffee and livestock for export,
and returning with construction materials. (Railway Gazette 2009).
Airports
The number of domestic and international takeoffs of air carriers registered in the
country in 2009 more than doubled from 1990 to 44,154 flights (World Bank 2012).
With Ethiopian Airlines’ success, the Ethiopian Airports Enterprise (EAE) was es-
tablished early in this reconstruction period in 2003. EAE objectives included the
construction, maintenance, and administering of good quality airports (Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia 2003). It was the first independent, legal entity to run the
delivery of Ethiopian airport service. Even though the EAE acts independently with
it’s own CEO, it is also under the jurisdiction of the federal government—thus, air-
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port infrastructure management falls under the Ministry of Transport (New African
2011). This is in light of Ethiopian Airlines’ independence from the government.
In conjunction with these mixed market-based policies for public Ethiopian airport
infrastructure, the government was also focusing on building it’s own airports to sup-
port their military operations against rebels rather than using civilian infrastructure
that would disrupt services, which is also seen a common military necessity in conflict
zones. In 2007, the government frantically built a new military airfield in Gewane
(in the Afar region), which is about 50km off the road to Addis Ababa and was well
positioned to help with conflict along the Eritrean border and rebel activity in the
south-east regions (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2007b). Though this divergent policy
limited potential funds for public airport infrastructure, this also ensured that the
funds used were directed towards the public needs and not the military’s need.
Power Plants
The aim of the ERP in regards to power infrastructure was to rehabilitate and
reconstruct damaged power supply facilities in towns within the war affected areas,
specifically in Zalambessa, Adigrat, Bure, and Mekel’le. This involved the recon-
struction and rehabilitation of 65km of 15 kilovolts (kV) line, 27km of 0.4kV line,
and 6km of street lights in addition to replacing 29 pieces of 50 kilo volte-amprey
(kVA) and 63kVA transformers, two pieces of 450 kilowatt (KW) diesel generators,
and 550 single phase customer connections. The power rehabilitation work at Adigrat,
Bure, and Mekel’le was completed by 2003. Nonetheless, these power rehabilitation
projects involved only the replacement of power poles and distribution lines along
the existing transmission routes (Mussa 2003). Other power plant construction sites
were disrupted during the war, but these restarted once the conflict ended, including
the aforementioned Tis Abay II power station (Environmental Protection Authority
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2012). Not to long after the war’s end though, Ethiopia suffered a severe drought in
2003, which reduced reservoir levels and forced sudden and severe power rationing in
Addis Ababa and the surrounding area that lasted for six months.
Access to power, in general, remained a significant problem in Ethiopia—21.5% of
Ethiopian firms in 2006 identified electricity as a major hinderance to their business
as compared to 48.1% of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa overall (International Finance
Corporation 2006). There were an average of 5.1 power outages in a typical month,
which resulted in a drop of .9% in sales. During this reconstruction period, the
EEPCO undertook an aggressive five-year plan, the Universal Electrification Access
Program (UEAP), to bring electricity to 50% of the population by extending the grid
to a total of 6,000 rural towns and villages by 2010. The UEAP was supported by two
WB loans, $133.4 million was approved in June 2006 and $130 was million approved
in July 2007. At the start of the program in 2005, EEPCO had 700,000 customers in
470 towns. EEPCO reported that by 2007 it had electrified an additional 758 towns
and villages and that access rates increased from 15% to 22%. Access though here
refers to having power infrastructure nearby and not necessarily getting the electricity
service to one’s residence (Hathaway 2008).
Four hydropower plants were under construction during this time: Tekeze (20MW
capacity and completed in 2009), Gilgel Gibe II (420MW capacity and completed in
2010), Tana-Beles (460 MW capacity and completed in 2010), and Fincha-Amerti
Nesh (97MW and completed in 2012)—all four were large-scale hydro projects as
compared to the MSHD focus in the previous reconstruction period (Environmental
Protection Authority 2012). These construction projects though faced many delays
and setbacks. For instance, the Gilgel Gibe I plant, which began construction in
2005, was supposed to be completed by 2007, but construction was slowed after
engineering problems occurred due to inadequate studies during the planning phase.
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The final stages were then rushed for a 2010 completion date—right before the May
2010 election. Two weeks after opening, a tunnel collapsed and further hampered
power services (Gadaa 2010).
Even with the aforementioned shortages, a large portion of new power supply
was earmarked for surplus and regional export under the claim that there was a lack
of capacity by the domestic market to absorb the new supply. By the end of this
reconstruction period, access to electricity remained low—only 2% of rural residents
had access as compared to 86% of urban residents. Moreover, with the energy sector
85% hydropower and growing, Ethiopia remained extremely vulnerable to drought
(Hathaway 2008).
Roads
The ERP also included a program to rapidly rehabilitate and restore destroyed or
damaged road infrastructure in war affected areas, rehabilitate critical road sections
and bridges that suffered serious damage due to an increase in heavy traffic and/or
due to the diversion of traffic from the original import/export route to new routes,
rehabilitate roads to ensure operational efficiency in the implementation of relief pro-
gram activities and in the flow of imported humanitarian cargo in selected chronically
affected drought areas, and carry out emergency heavy maintenance of priority roads
whose improvement was slowed down by the war leading to further deterioration of
large sections (Mussa 2003). Just like with power infrastructure, the key here is that
the ERP only addressed existing road infrastructure.
The Ethiopian-Eritrean War also hampered the implementation of the RSDP,
itself, and caused costs to overrun due to mobilization problems, higher fuel costs,
and the closure of Addis-Assab freight route that resulted in Ethiopia shifting its
primary trade port from Assab to Djibouti (Mwase 2003). For instance, construction
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on the Modjo-Awash-Arba road faced quantity underestimation amounting to 17%
of the contract. Rapid deterioration in sections of the road between design overlay
and actual construction led to changes in road design. Nonetheless, a WB Project
Appraisal rated the outcome of the RSDP through 2007 as satisfactory in regards
to creating a good foundation for future phases and programs; rates of return were
higher than anticipated by about 26-35%; and, the risk to development outcome was
rated low to negligible based on the measured performance and continued support
of many development partners—the weighted average percentage of works completed
(in financial terms) was 94.3% (World Bank 2008a).
During this second reconstruction period, there were two more RSDP phases:
RSDP II (2003-2007) and RSDP III (2007-2010). These additional road development
programs were needed even after success of the first phase—11.8% of firms in Ethiopia
still identified transportation as a major hurdle to their business in 2006 as compared
to 23.9% of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa (International Finance Corporation 2006).
RSDP II had a budget of ETB 15,985.8 million (with ETB 18,112.8 distributed) and
planned for 8,486km of work (12,006km were carried out). In 2007, 64% of asphalt
roads were rated in good condition as compared to 46% of rural roads were (49% of
roads overall were in good condition). 68% of areas in Ethiopia were still more than
5km from an all weather road with an average distance to an all weather road being
13km. With good condition federal and regional roads outweighing the proportion of
fair and poor condition roads, the rural population did have better access to resources
and opportunities in the form of markets, health services, lighter transport burdens,
and more employment opportunities (Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011; International
Development Associaion 2009).
In the latter few years of this reconstruction period, Ethiopia allocated about 3%
of its GDP to road investments. Though this is one of the highest rates in Africa,
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absolute values of this investment ($5 per capita annually) was remained comparable
to other east African counties and most of this investment went towards rehabilitating
and updating existing trunk roads and not necessarily expanding access the network
(Foster and Morella 2011). At the end of 2006, the overall road network comprised of
39,477km of roads—19,313km of which were federal roads. Despite the strong road
policy efforts, Ethiopia still had one of the lowest road densities in Africa (36 km
per 1,000 square km in 2006, compared to the African average of 60 km per 1,000
km) (World Bank 2008a). With other transport infrastructure (like railways) in poor
conditions, about 95% of Ethiopia’s passenger and freight traffic depended the road
system and private sector transport fleets accounting for over 74% of commercial
vehicles in 2003. Most importantly, Ethiopia’s road network was commonly the only
means of access to rural communities (Mwase 2003).
Looking at the conflict events during this reconstruction period seen in Figure
5.6, the expected pattern of conflict is not seen.16 Seen instead, conflict numbers
and location remains relatively constant—centered around the Somali, Gambela, and
South Oromia regions with a few conflict events around the capital and well-connected
areas. Nonetheless, the overall miss-prediction rate of Chapter 3’s model improves
as compared to the previous case with a miss-prediction rate of 10% while never
miss-predicting conflict. This over-prediction of conflict appears in the early years in
regards to the high number of existing conflict events in the disconnected south. This
pattern could be the result of this second reconstruction period following consecutively
after the first reconstruction period. In other words, conflict events could not shift to-
wards to disconnected areas, because the conflict was already there. Nonetheless, this
reconstruction period reenforced the conflict zone, which then hardened grievances in
16See Chapter 3 for an explanation on why this second Ethiopian reconstruction case is truncated
at 2008 and does not cover all ten post-conflict years.
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Figure 5.6: Conflict Events From 2001-2008
Note: Panels go in time in order from left to right and moving down.
Each panel covers a two year period.
Conflict data comes from Sundberg et al. (2010) and Sundberg and Melander (2013).
the area and decreased the capability/incentive to construct infrastructure in the low
infrastructure density southern regions.
Reconstruction Success and Failures According to IST
The consequences seen during the second reconstruction period were often the re-
sults of previous decisions and reenforced throughout this later reconstruction period.
As described below, there were instances of learning, but recognition does not auto-
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matically lead to changed or improved policy with differing outcomes. Nonetheless,
the dire urgency for this reconstruction was evident early in the second reconstruc-
tion period. In 2003, there was a critical food shortage and nutritional situation
in SNNPR and Omo River Valley as crop fields dried up, water ran short, malaria
outbreaks occurred, and severe cattle diseases spread throughout these regions. Yet,
the most affected kebeles were also inaccessible by road. Aid providers, like Doctors
Without Borders, needed to build their own feeder roads to access the worst affected
populations, which slowed aid delivery and was not always an available option (UNDP
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2003a).
National Unity
During this reconstruction period, infrastructure spending increasingly and steadily
became a federal responsibility—the federal share reached 72% on average in the last
five years of this reconstruction period as compared to only 45% per year in the pre-
ceding reconstruction period. Federal investment in infrastructure during this time
focused on large scale projects seen as containing national significance (e.g., construc-
tion of major roads and hydropower plants), whereas regional governments financed
small-scale infrastructure (e.g. rural roads, rural water supply and small-scale irriga-
tion). Though the federal government was in charge of building the infrastructure, it
then transferred this new infrastructure to the regions for management and operations
(World Bank 2008b).
There was reconstruction success regionally with this top down approach, which
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helped reduce political instability risks in regards to increasing national unity.17
During the start of this reconstruction period, many active primary road rehabili-
tation/construction projects existed in the Somali region and on the main arteries to
SNNP. The ERA (with WB help) worked on the road between Harar and Shilable
while work on a road between Dire Dawa and Harar was given to a Chinese company.
This steady improvement of road access and the opportunities such reconstruction
brought to the development of SNNP was seen in a positive light. Before this, poten-
tial development had been seen here in futuristic terms and something that happened
in other areas. This road policy brought with it the promise of future government
investment to an historically ignored area (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
2001).
This regionally-driven development also occurred in ONLF controlled regions in
the south and east. By the end of the reconstruction period, federal block grants
distributed down to local level administrations and woredas sharply increased devel-
opment in this area. For example, the Gursum woreda in the Oromia Region had
built ten basic alternative schools, three junior and primary school, two veterinary
clinics, a health post and a farmer’s training centre, and 45km of roads while also
electrifying two towns and providing wireless telephone services to 14 rural kebeles.
Moreover, in the Somali Region capital, Jijiga, the airport has been tarmacked and
a university built (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2008). Nonetheless, this development
did not reduce regionally-based ethnic grievances. The ONLF still saw Ethiopian re-
construction as continuing their plight against the Ethiopian government and fought
17By 2009 and the end of this reconstruction period, existing classified regional rural roads to-
taled by region: Tigray (1,404km), Afar (1,053km), Amhara (2,996km), Oromia (8,123 km), Somali
(2,097km), SNNP (7,343 km), Benishangul-Gumz (1,590km) Gambela (846km), and Dire Dawa
(188km). Existing of community roads (administered by Woreda offices) totaled by region: Tigray
(6,083km), Afar (3,193km), Amhara (22,480km), Oromia (32,215km), Somali (1,351km), SNNP
(15,628km), Benishangul-Gumz (3,948km) Gambela (489km), and Dire Dawa (380km) (Ethiopian
Roads Authority 2011).
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against any federal attempts to incorporate them. In other words, their support could
not be bought through infrastructure provision and they already viewed themselves as
different enough as not to be incorporated into Ethiopian society, which they viewed
as foreign.
It was not enough though to be more connected with the political core, which
is not a sufficient condition for political instability as seen in Chapter 4. ONLF’s
grievances and separate identity were reenforced especially in regards to how these
reconstruction projects were completed. The China Petroleum & Chemical Corp.
(Sinopec) was operating in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, which was the scene
of a protracted civil war between the government and secessionist ethnic Somalis.
Chinese companies were seen as willing to go to places where nobody else would
go for political or stability reasons (Knowlton 2007). A condition, though, of many
Chinese conducted reconstitution projects was access to Ethiopian oil fields, and the
oil they extracted went straight back to China and not on domestic market (or even
international market) where local need was high. In other words, Ethiopia and oil
rich areas in the south and east lost potential profit and financial resources due to
hess infrastructure and reconstruction contracts.
The presence of these international workers alongside national attempts to inte-
grate the regions led to continued conflict. A 2007 attack on an Abole oil exploration
site in southeastern Ethiopia killed 74 Chinese and Ethiopia workers. The ONLF
claimed responsibility for the attack, saying the dead Chinese workers were caught
in the crossfire during their assault on Ethiopian soldiers guarding the facility. In
addition to this well publicized attack, there have been other attacks on oil and
telecommunication workers. Separatist Somalis have told the Ethiopian government
not to invest in the area and warned foreign oil and gas companies to stay out of the
region as long as the Ogaden people are “denied their rights to self-determination”
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(Penketh and Bloomfield 2007; Knowlton 2007).18
Following this, the ONLF has assassinated or attempted assassination on gov-
ernment officials and clan elders who opposed them, attacked commercial vehicles,
placed land mines on roads, destroyed civilian vehicles, burned villages, and perpe-
trated other attempts to dispute development in the region. The Ethiopian govern-
ment attempted to explain away these attacks by claiming that the Ogaden only
constitute a third of the Somali Regional State’s population (BBC Worldwide Moni-
toring 2008). Moreover, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has also stated that, “Such an
outrage, the cold-blooded murder of people who were building roads and engaged in
other development activities, is a measure of the level of barbarity involved” (Knowl-
ton 2007). Following substantial security operations in early 2008, ONLF activities
dropped dramatically, but still had the capacity for small-scale attacks on civilians
and villages.
Individual Capabilities
International actors rated as satisfactory the achievement of the RSDP’s goal
to provide economic opportunity to the rural poor through increased employment
in rural road works and more affordable means of transport and services.Yet, only
about 7,400 additional people were employed during an average period of 40 months
spread over ten contracts in the early part of this reconstruction period—of these
jobs, approximately 40% were skilled. Moreover, the number of women employed
(14) was still low (UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002a).
The use of international workers during this reconstruction period was explained
18This phenomena is not limited to Ethiopia. Chinese companies have invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in projects across Africa (to include Angola, Kenya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) and
have built or committed themselves to build railroads, roads, refineries, hospitals and communication
networks (Knowlton 2007). While many African leaders are willing to take Chinese money, the
population in these ares are often resentful and accuse China of being modern colonialists (Penketh
and Bloomfield 2007).
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away again by pointing to the lack of training and experience. Yet, the strategy
for rural reconstruction did include government, private sector and donors joining
together and working with the local communities to build rural infrastructure and
provide basic socio-economic services. This was recognized as creating an enabling
environment with empowerment and capacity-building at the local level (Ethiopian
Roads Authority 2011). From 1995 to 2010, a wide range of training programs for sec-
tor professionals were created by ERA training centers in Alemgena (7,244 trainees)
and Ginchi and Chancho (8,387 trainees) (Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011). Though
data on employment and construction was widely collected and those collecting this
data recognized that such employment might have multiplier effects on the local econ-
omy, no attempt was made to measure potential secondary benefits resulting from
greater income, skills earned, and improved service access on national unity (UNDP
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia 2002a).
Nonetheless, these employment and training indicators could have been much
higher. Chinese workers were still being imported to build roads, pipelines, and other
infrastructure projects at the expense of the local workforce—as seen in the previous
section (Penketh and Bloomfield 2007). These workers often worked and lived sepa-
rately from the Ethiopian people, which further exacerbated negative feelings towards
them and the perception that outsiders were taking away Ethiopian jobs.
Sustainability
Development objectives for infrastructure programs were broad—this was true
even after objectives were tightened up in the later phases based on the experiences
in the previous reconstruction period. For example, specific mention is made in RSDP
II of environmental and social sustainability and more focus placed on developing the
capacity and increasing the participation of domestic consultants and contractors in
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addition to addressing development issues down to the woreda and community level
(World Bank 2008a). Yet, much of this remained on paper only with no changes to
improve sustainability seen on the ground in this later reconstruction period.
Ethiopia’s power infrastructure particularly faced a lack of sustainability planning.
Hydropower policies made during this time continued to ignore the most pressing
energy concerns of the population—for example, the need for alternative cooking
fuel and lighting in rural areas. Money was diverted from solving these issues to
building new dams. Traditional biomass, which accounts for 95% of Ethiopia’s energy
consumption also hurt the Ethiopian environment—only 7% of Ethiopia’s original
forestland remains and the country loses an estimated one billion tons of topsoil
every year. Much of the deforestation was due to expansion of crop and grazing
lands in addition to the wood-based energy consumption—approximately 85% of the
population participates in the agricultural sector in the form of rural, small-scale
farms, which accounts for nearly half of Ethiopia’s GDP and 90% of its exports. The
results of this deforestation has been rapid soil degradation, massive erosion, and
sedimentation that have reduced water levels in rivers, underground aquifers, and
dams. All of which lead to reduced power hydropower production (Hathaway 2008).
Such lack of sustainability in infrastructure networks remained a problem through-
out this second reconstruction period. In regards to road infrastructure, funds for road
safety from the Road Fund overwhelmingly focused on road maintenance and not to
altering social conditions that threaten sustainability—only 1.14% was allocated to-
wards road safety, which remains a critical issue in Ethiopia and requires investment
in road control technology and surface technology. Power cuts, which averaged about
15 hours twice a week, were estimated to cost the economy 15% of the daily GDP or
$200 million in annual productivity, due mostly to reduced outputs of industries by
up to 40%. Moreover, new hydropower plants were at increased risks of lost produc-
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tion due to continued drought conditions and lost revenue from increased hydropower
exports (Hathaway 2008).
To combat negative consequences of their policies or other extreme situations,
Ethiopia has a history of resorting to resettlement programs. Programs that were
unsustainable over time. Communities negatively affected by dams (both host com-
munities and downstream users) were often not consulted, given little consideration,
and typically did not receive adequate compensation or resettlement packages (Hath-
away 2008).
Early in 2003, the government and the Ministry of Rural Development Amhara
Region created a voluntary resettlement program to deal with food insecurity by relo-
cating people from all zones of the Amhara region (except West Gojam) to the North
Gondar Zone woredas of Metamme, Quara, and Tach Armacheho.19 Integration
packages in the form of food aid and agricultural tools, to include an ox and three
hectares of land per family, were to be provided to the settlers. These settlers though
faced inadequate infrastructure and social services at the new resettlement sites. In
one site, there was only one primary school, few inadequate water sources, and no
health care centers. Between Gondar and Sudan, there was a relatively good road
with 30 kilometers of this road—from Shehedi (Metemma town) to a junction—being
all-weather. But, the road from the junction to resettlement villages (about 10km)
was a only dry-weather only road, which means the resettlement village was cut off
from aid, economy, and services during the rainy season (UNDP Emergencies Unit
19From January 28 to 30. 2011, a few weeks before the new resettlement program was to be-
gin, a joint workshop was organized by the Ethiopian Society of Sociologists, Social Workers and
Anthropologists and the United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, entitled: ‘Settlement and
Resettlement in Ethiopia: Population Displacement, Pastoralist Sedentarisation and Peace Mak-
ing.’ The workshop presented the findings of a wide range of complex socio-economic, cultural,
environmental, institutional and political implications of resettlement carried out in the 1980s. The
findings indicating that if successful resettlement are to be carried out in the future, they should
be based on careful, gradual planning with voluntary participation (UNDP Emergencies Unit for
Ethiopia 2003b). As such, Ethiopia was aware of the potential consequence and necessary investment
required for their policies.
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for Ethiopia 2003b). The UN recognized that the Ethiopian government did not have
capability to fulfill infrastructure needs in resettlement sites.
Table 5.2: fsQCA Solution Membership Scores for Second Ethiopian Case
AID*POORQUALITY UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES Political Instability
0.50 0.66 0.06 0.78
Note: CAPS represents membership while lowercase represents non-membership.
With the second reconstruction period, Ethiopia went from the most deviant
case to a mixed case: two conditions showed Ethiopia as a typical case with the
predicted reconstruction conditions and resulting political instability and one con-
figuration showed Ethiopia as a most deviant case for overage by lacking certain
conditions while still having political instability—see Table 5.2 for these membership
scores. This latter configuration (unemployment*aid*poorquality*PERIPHERIES)
remained at the same membership score from the previous reconstruction period. In
short, regions in Ethiopia remained disconnected from the political core, while still
having other reconstruction conditions that led to increased grievances. Secondly,
Ethiopia’s unemployment numbers began effecting Ethiopia’s instability levels—as
seen in the second configuration (UNEMPLOYMENT*POORQUALITY). This in-
creased membership in high unemployment does not mean, in Ethiopia’s case, that
many people lost their jobs—more people had entered into the traditional workforce
as their means of livelihood ended (due to drought and reduced of arable and fertile
land) and more perceived opportunities existed in part due liberalization and recon-
struction projects. Yet, this was only a perception as reconstruction jobs often went
to international contractors and liberalization did not bring the promised economic
growth in labor intensive areas. This higher membership score also unmasked the
effect of Ethiopia’s poor quality membership score. Finally, continued drought and
192
famine conditions increased the number of people effected and the discrepancy in the
type of post-conflict aid received, as seen in the increased membership in the first
configuration (AID*POORQUALITY). Nevertheless, short-term relief came at the
cost of long-term investment into reducing future political instability risks.
This second reconstruction period was filled with unfulfilled recognition of needed
policies. After failed resettlement programs, Ethiopia stablished in 2005 the Produc-
tive Safety Net Program (PSNP) that included a public works program to employ
affected populations during difficult times in the building of roads and other infras-
tructure in exchange for cash payments.20 The PSNP attempted to fundamen-
tally alter the in-kind transfers scheme financed through emergency-based appeals to
more predictable cash transfer schemes in exchange for small-scale productive pub-
lic works. The longterm goals of the PSNP was to improve access to agricultural
land through voluntary resettlement, rebuild eroded assets, raising the productiv-
ity of traditional agricultural activities, and promotion income diversification among
food-insecure households (World Bank 2008b).
The Ethiopian Rural Travel and Transport Program (ERTTP), a component of the
RSDP, was launched in 2001 and was driven by rural communities at the grass-roots
level. The ERTTP focused on developing and implementing policies to improve access
to social and economic centers. Solutions embodied in the ERTTP strategy included
both transport and non-transport interventions: the improvement of access through
the development of road infrastructure and improvement of mobility by increasing
the availability of affordable transport. This was to be done though an emphasis on
constructing low cost roads, footpaths, trails, and providing other infrastructure that
would reduce the burden of travel and transport. A pilot program was conducted in
20The program also distributed free food to orphans, the elderly, the disabled, and others who
cannot work.
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eight woredas; key lessons learned from this program included: the technology choice
for implementation (predominantly labour-based operations), maintenance arrange-
ments for the completed roads, and capacity building assistance to both the regional
Road Authorities and Woreda road desks. The pilot program was later expanded
to include preparation of over 130 Woreda Integrated Development Plans and the
construction of a series of trail bridges (Ethiopian Roads Authority 2011).
Such programs offered the opportunity to address many of the reconstruction
failures mentioned during this and the previous reconstruction period. Yet, these
were the exception rather than the norm and implementing them at a national level
seemed to be outside the capacity of the Ethiopian government.
Conclusion
To prevent system collapse and reconstruction failure, it is of vital importance
to understand why infrastructure and reconstruction induced political instability can
occur. This chapter attempted do just this by addressing why infrastructure and
reconstruction conditions have lead to political instability previously. Ethiopia’s po-
litical elite held a deterministic viewpoint of infrastructure and did not fully appreciate
how their reconstruction could be strategically used to support their long-term goals.
I show in this Chapter just how various infrastructure and reconstruction decisions
in Ethiopia eventually added up to promote political instability and far spread con-
sequences in the future. This case study is not perfect. I relied heavily on United
Nation and World Banks program reports, the text of the policies themselves, and
news articles about events during that time period. Missing here is the perspectives
from the actual contractors or others constructing the infrastructure and the popu-
lation at large when they received infrastructure goods. Nonetheless, this case study
provided a unique perspective into this portion of Ethiopian history.
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Nonetheless, conflict in Ethiopia qualitatively followed the hypothesized pattern.
As time passed, conflict moved into the region with the least amount of infrastruc-
ture and thus cut off from the political center. Where and how infrastructure and
reconstruction was provided in Ethiopia has bolstered a physical and socially learned
psychological separation between the Somali region and the central state. Viewing
Ethiopia as an occupying force, secessionist rebel groups continue to fight for an inde-
pendent state in the east and south (Marcus 2002; Hagmann and Korf 2012). Rebels
adapted their policies to deny public good allocation, which prevents a unified system
and identity while increasing political instability. This tactical choice is the result of
learning how to manipulate public good provision.21 At the same time though,
the Ethiopian government also prevented aid organizations from having free access
to the region claiming they are supporting rebel groups in the area (Hagmann and
Korf 2012). Even without such intervention, development projects face difficulties
providing services to the Somali region due to poor infrastructure (Abdullahi 2007).
Ultimately though, the urgent need of a formalized overall transport master plan
was recognized during this reconstruction period. A 1995 Bank Transport Sector
Memorandum, which was a major component of the RSDP, covered the expansion
of the international airport, the rehabilitation of the Addis-Djibouti railway, and
the need for inland container depots. Yet, the linkages between such initiatives were
lacking and thus the consequences of such reconstruction as a whole remained unclear
(World Bank 2008a).
From 2000 to 2011, infrastructure contributed .6% to Ethiopia’s annual per capita
GDP growth. In fact, if Ethiopia increased its infrastructure endowment level on
par with other middle-income African countries, annual growth can be increased by
another 3% points. Yet as of 2006, there was a $3.5 billion gap annually between
21See Cunnhingham and Weidmann (2007, p. 9-11) for more discussion on this topic.
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available funds and what was actually needed. Moreover, Ethiopia’s infrastructure
system is relatively inefficient—an estimated $.5 billion (or 3.4% of GDP) is lost
annually by various inefficiencies in infrastructure operations or spending—the single
largest cause of this loss relates to under-maintenance of infrastructure assets. In
2011, about 26% of Ethiopia’s infrastructure were in need of rehabilitation. For
road infrastructure, under-maintenance leads to additional capital spending of $263
million (2.1% of GDP). Timely maintenance can prevent rapid deterioration of assets
while reducing the massive rehabilitation backlogs. Additionally, inefficiencies in the
power sector itself total 0.66% of GDP and under-collection of revenue (particularly
with regard to power tariffs and fuel levies) accounts for $44 million per year, while
distribution losses (mainly in the power sector) contribute a further $33 million per
year (Foster and Morella 2011).
By 2020, Ethiopia will need to double its 2011 road capacity (Foster and Morella
2011). Only 20% of Ethiopia’s rural population lived within 2km of an all-weather
road by 2011 (with 76% of Ethiopia’s population living in rural areas). Yet, con-
necting this disperse population via an all-weather road network within 2km would
require tripling the road network (Foster and Morella 2011). Nevertheless, mainte-
nance and pricing policies would not fully eliminate the funding gap. To move out of
this current infrastructure deficit, an annual expenditure of $5.1 billion over a decade
is needed, which is beyond Ethiopia’s capacity and more than 40% of its GDP. Addi-
tionally, this figures does not include the possible increased cost of provision that IST
recommends as needed (job training and continued maintenance). Some argue that
the focus on infrastructure has led to failing in other areas, specially education and
health (Environmental Protection Authority 2012). Thus, agreeing on and/or receiv-
ing necessary funds would be difficult and require convincing others of infrastructure’s
role in improving other development sectors—a task IST can help with.
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Nevertheless, in the creation of national infrastructure plans in Ethiopia and
around the world, there is a focus on how policymakers must decide between at-
tempting to equalize investment and benefits across regions and sectors to how much
growth in national product would be surrendered for a given amount of equity (Alonso
1968). Such a prospective though is limited within first order thinking and does not
address the impact of society’s use of and dependency on infrastructure networks, the
consequences of which transcend measures of economic growth. Thus, the potential
cost of these technical configurations failing (especially in regards to political crises
and social upheaval) cannot be considered in such a mindset. Consequently, recon-
struction policy that is an extension of political strategy must appreciate society’s
dependency on infrastructure networks and the pervasive consequences of failure,
which requires a long-term, second order perspective.
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Chapter 6
NO MORE AD-HOCRACIES: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
In light of recent post-conflict reconstruction policy failures, this dissertation has
attempted to answer two broad questions. Why are current reconstruction efforts
failing to reduce political instability or even, in some cases, increasing it? And, how
can reconstruction efforts be organized to do better? Existing literature could pro-
vide limited answers. As described in Chapter 1, they have failed to see the unique
complexities behind infrastructure as a public good: they view infrastructure as a ca-
pability rather than part of a ever-changing system that shapes political stability and
instability; agency is limited to be linear and in the short term while learning (direct
and indirect) is outside its scope; and their prescribed solutions revolve around pre-
venting structural misallocation of public goods rather than incorporating normative
ideals such as political stability. A new theory was needed that incorporated infras-
tructure’s long-term qualities and role in shaping society along side the normative
goal of political stability.
I developed such a theoretical framework, Infrastructure Stability Theory (IST),
in Chapter 2. I argued that there are two types of infrastructure politics: first and
second order politics. In first order politics, infrastructure is a material capability,
where actors and politics are concerned with immediate intent and adaptation and
conflict is driven by short-term goals and retaliation. With many actors acting within
this short-term perspective, overstatements on the power of infrastructure (in terms
of technological fixes and jumps) are unsurprising. In second order politics though,
the focus shifts to a long-term perspective on the politics surrounding infrastructure
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and its socio-technical system. In these systems, the interaction of infrastructure,
power structures, and the public over time leads to political instability, and conflict
is driven by long-standing grievances and group identity. In short, agency is given
to society (and thus politics) while acknowledging technology’s push in specific di-
rections (Fritsch 2011). This long-term conceptualization and system-level model of
infrastructure’s role in political instability has been missing from previous theories,
which focuses on the short-term and, I argue, first order politics.
Briefly put, first order politics and exiting literature largely predicts that con-
flict risks will spike after infrastructure provision and the initial phases of recon-
struction. Such conflict occurs in subnational/local areas where there was already
a history of conflict between groups, there was high political distrust in the central
government, and/or there was a latent dissident group. When infrastructure is newly
provided in these areas, new conflict can be sparked based on: the intermingling of
groups with a violent history, dissidents reacting defensively to perceived repression,
and groups taking advantage of their increased capacity to mobilize support and re-
sources. Nonetheless, I argue that second order politics offers the potential for a drop
in conflict. Infrastructure can connect areas physically to the political core, national
economy, and national identity in these socio-technical systems. If national infras-
tructure is dispersed throughout the country, distant areas from the political core
are no longer distant, the influence of the political core will not decay across large
territories, and the risk of conflict driven by second-order politics drops. As such,
accounting for second-order politics in reconstruction policies will create an inverted-
U shape of conflict risks. With this inverted-U conflict risk, conflict is inevitable.
However, if policymakers acknowledge and plan for the initial conflict outburst and
forecasts are accounted for during the planning process, conflict risks will fall over
time.
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Yet, second order politics can trigger conflict coming as a result of the clash be-
tween the long-term goals of the state with the long-term goals of a group. Given that
states recovering from conflict are also commonly composed of a diverse set of people
(ethnically and religiously) across a large area, the risk of political grievance and/or
potential separatist feelings remain high if left unattended (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
This is especially true when such diversity is geographically reinforced. If peripheries
are cut off from the political core by a lack of infrastructure, the control and influence
of the political elite will decay in these areas. Such cut off peripheries are prone
to having feelings of psychological separation, which increase grievances, resentment,
and mobilization against the political core (Olzak 1983). Moreover, active rebels
would have a place to hide (Fearon and Laitin 2003). As such, the aforementioned
inverted U relationship, where conflict risks eventually drops, will not occur.
To illustrate the need for IST and the existence of IST’s novel second order pol-
itics and varying long-term consequences of infrastructure, in Chapter 3 I presented
a geospatial-temporal study on a sample set of 33 post conflict cases where recon-
struction was needed. The unit of analysis for this study was not the case but rather
the PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012). By doing this, I was able
to set this analysis out by accounting for varying levels of infrastructure access at
the subnational level. This required creating density and presence measures for four
types of national infrastructure: roads, railroads, airports, and power plants. This
longitudinal model allowed me: to connect place, time, and attributes (Paul et al.
2005), see how levels of different types of infrastructure influences political stability,
and test the existence of IST’s novel second order politics. Supporting these results
of the longitudinal analysis were vignettes on Chad and Sri Lanka.
The results of the GLMM in Chapter 3 show that merely having infrastructure
is not enough to eliminate conflict risks associated with having infrastructure over
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time. In short, infrastructure’s long-term influence after a conflict cannot not be
overlooked. Taking account of this influences requires the incorporation of a long-term
perspective and infrastructure’s role in shaping a population. With infrastructure’s
inverted U relationship to conflict and general drop of conflict risks with infrastructure
access as time passes, policymakers must then convince constituents and funding
agencies to continue investing in infrastructure throughout turbulent times and initial
spikes of conflict. At the same time though, different types of national infrastructure
have different influences on conflict risks during post-conflict reconstruction. While
each infrastructure type has its own effects based on how it is used, its history, and
where the infrastructure is typically built, each is necessary and all are components of
reconstruction policy as a whole. When considered together, one can truly begin to
appreciate the role of infrastructure post-conflict and the difficulties faced in creating
good and comprehensive reconstruction policy.
Nevertheless, it was not enough to show the existence of second order politics;
also needed was an understanding of just how second order politics leads to political
instability. Chapter 4 did just this by analyzing IST’s necessary and sufficient condi-
tions by way of a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Schneider and
Wagemann 2012; Rihoux 2008; Ragin 2008). The focus here was theory evaluation
and see whether the hypothesized causal mechanisms were supported by case knowl-
edge and data (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In other words, finding common
policy outcomes that are associated with political instability.
As described in Chapters 2 and 4, the socio-technical system surrounding infras-
tructure must also give capability-building benefits to the local population and be
sustainable across time—in addition to directly connecting peripheries to the polit-
ical core and national identity via infrastructure. In second order politics, power is
delivered to society at large via capability building benefits—benefits that increase
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individual capabilities that allow individuals to better themselves and their families
and thus boost real, sustainable freedom (Sen 1999). If the local population does
not see the full potential benefits from the creation of the infrastructure, grievances
against the state and those doing the reconstruction would then increase. At the
same time, infrastructure’s benefits are not self-reinforcing and the initial investment
must be continuously re-provided in order to maintain infrastructure benefits (Sen
1999). Poor quality infrastructure is just one characteristic of an unsustained infras-
tructure brought about by the lack of investment and up-keep that puts a system at
risk of failing. In the long-term, poor-quality infrastructure erodes beyond usability
and increases political instability risk by increasing system uncertainty.
Following this, I describe in this chapter how four reconstruction conditions (cut off
peripheries, reconstruction aid discrepancies, high unemployment during reconstruc-
tion, and poor infrastructure quality) explain political instability as an outcome—or
how infrastructure and reconstruction lead to political instability. Independently,
having cut off peripheries did not meet the requirements to be a necessary condition
of political instability, though it is part of two disjunctive sufficient configurations. In
other words, cases with political instability are also likely to have cut off peripheries.
Nonetheless, this condition also appeared in the final solution for political instabil-
ity sufficiency: no aid discrepancies and no poor quality infrastructure and cut off
peripheries. The cases explained by this configuration did not need additional re-
construction based grievances to motivate opposition forces as peripheral nationalism
grew unchecked. In fact, there was evidence that the political elite in these case have
attempted to provided infrastructure in a comprehensive and sustainable manner.
Yet, this relatively good infrastructure system meant that rebel groups were better
able to conduct their attacks against the political elite. This result matches what was
seen in Chapter 3 where the model marginally fits better in areas with no preexisting
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political grievances. In both, costs of having high grievances can be mitigated by
having access national infrastructure.1
The two other configurations in Chapter 4’s results demonstrated how recon-
struction conditions can feed into feelings of deprivation, both relative and absolute.
With the first configuration (high unemployment and poor quality infrastructure),
both high unemployment and poor quality infrastructure feed into feelings that an
individual and/or group is not receiving all the potential benefits of infrastructure
reconstruction in regards to capability-building and long-term sustainability. In com-
parison, the second configuration (aid discrepancies and poor quality infrastructure)
demonstrated how reconstruction can also feed into feelings of absolute deprivation
where little if any new infrastructure provision was being done and the infrastructure
that did exist was of bad quality. These feelings of deprivation lead individuals to be
recruited into social movements and political violence against the political regime as
they fight for what they view as rightfully theirs (Gurr 1970).
Projecting policy outcomes requires information about why things (infrastructure,
politics, conflict, society, etc.) look and work the way they do on the ground in an
actual case. This called for a case study approach(Fritsch 2011). As such, Chapter
5 included a qualitative case study into IST’s causal mechanisms via process tracing
in Ethiopia—this case was chosen based on the results of the previous two chapters.
Ethiopia experienced two back to back reconstruction periods during during this time:
following the Civil War from 1991 to 2001 and following the Ethiopian-Eritrean War
from 2001 to 2008. I cover both reconstruction periods in Chapter 5, which allowed
1This result holds true for major roads when considering different infrastructure types. But,
the opposite is seen with power proximity where high levels of power proximity in areas of high
grievances actually experience higher conflict risks. As explained in Chapter 3, the divergent result
of power plants are a result of where this infrastructure is being placed and how power is being used.
With high grievances, these power plants become bigger symbols and targets of political power. At
the ams time, power plants give both potential and active rebels increase capability to act on their
grievances.
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to be track policy changes and resulting consequences in a most-similar situation.
During the first reconstruction period, infrastructure and reconstruction respon-
sibilities were essentially evenly split between the federal government and regions,
but the federal government still had a majority say. Though this top-down decision
structure might have helped prevent unnecessary projects and local corruption, this
inflexibility to local needs and desires also opened the door to unexpected results
and infrastructure miss-provision, especially in ethnicly empowered regions. As time
passed into the second reconstruction period, infrastructure spending increasingly and
steadily became a federal responsibility. Just because reconstruction and infrastruc-
ture were federal responsibilities does not mean that they operated with a national
plan that considered both the big, national picture and the small, local pictures. Fed-
eral investment in infrastructure during this period focused on large scale projects
the contained perceived national significance (e.g., construction of major roads and
hydropower plants), which meant that regional governments financed small-scale in-
frastructure (e.g. rural roads, rural water supply and small-scale irrigation). This
project level focus ultimately resulted in uneven reconstruction. Ethiopia’s version
of top-down ethnic-federalism inhibited national plans required for an infrastructure
network that connects all area together and to the political core.
The use of international contractors was seen as a necessity during the first recon-
struction period due to a perceived low level of local capacity and experience. First
order successes seen in increased project numbers and budget/aid allocation seem-
ingly outweighed second order costs (the loss of employment opportunities). Many
of those around and available to work on reconstruction projects were outside the
traditional labor force and/or making the transition into such employment—feelings
of deprivation or grievances where not fully ignited. Nonetheless, these long-term,
second order risks in the form of lost employment and capability-building opportuni-
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ties would eventually effect Ethiopia’s political instability. During Ethiopia’s second
reconstruction period, international contractors (especially those from Chinese com-
panies) remained the major implementors of federal rehabilitation, upgrading, and
construction projects even as large numbers of able and willing locals were available
(World Bank 2008a). The presence of these international workers alongside national
attempts to integrate the regions led to increased political instability, especially in
the southern portion of Ethiopia which was essentially cut off from political core and
national identity due to a lack of infrastructure.
In both reconstruction periods, Ethiopia’s infrastructure network was of general
poor quality—though large strides had been made in the various reconstruction pro-
grams. Sustainability requires more then a focus on infrastructure; the system around
infrastructure must also support long-term sustainability. Though the federal gov-
ernment was in charge of building the infrastructure, it then transferred this new
infrastructure to the regions for management and operation (World Bank 2008b).
Profit-generating infrastructures never had a profit during this time and relied on gov-
ernment funds and aid, both of which were not sustainable. On top of this, Ethiopia
has a history of resorting to resettlement programs when infrastructure projects had
large negative effects the population—programs that were unsustainable over time.
This lack of sustainability planning meant that investments took longer to be returned
and that the potential benefits of national unity and capacity building could not fully
take hold in order to combat political instability risks.
Conflict in Ethiopia generally follows the hypothesized pattern. As time passed,
conflict moved into the regions with the least amount of infrastructure and thus
cut off from the political center. Where and how infrastructure and reconstruction
was provided in Ethiopia has bolstered a physical and socially learned psychological
separation between the southern areas and the central state. Viewing Ethiopia as an
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occupying force, secessionist rebel groups continue to fight for an independent state
in the east and south (Marcus 2002; Hagmann and Korf 2012).
To sum up, this dissertation has shown through these three separate but comple-
mentary methods that infrastructure’s role in society over time cannot be overlooked
as it has previously. Infrastructure is more than just a technology. It is part of a
dynamic system where infrastructure, power structures, and the public continuously
interact and become dependent on each other. Infrastructure failure in this system
results in in political crises and social upheaval that spread far beyond the infras-
tructure networks themselves. By incorporating a long-term perspective, IST allows
for existing research to be updated to better capture the consequences of infrastruc-
ture and reconstruction and new theories become possible using IST as a foundation.
Ultimately though, IST provides key insight into how reconstruction can become an
extension of political strategy to achieve long-term goals.
Iraq Reconstruction Success and Failures
The ultimate goal of this dissertation was to provide policy recommendations for
future stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs). These operations provide
a combination of security, reconstruction, relief, and development services to unsta-
ble, fragile, or failing states—such operations commonly follow a major and/or drawn
out conflict (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
The new theory on the relationship between infrastructure and political instability
presented and evaluated here provides useful input into the redesign of reconstruction
policies that unintentionally increase political instability risks. As discussed in Chap-
ters 1 and 2, Iraqi reconstruction failures highlight the importance of this dissertation
and related research when creating improved post-conflict reconstruction policies.
The remaining portion of this final chapter brings together the results discussed
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above to form such policy recommendations. To ensure my policy recommendations
match what occurred in Iraq and are placed within current policy debates and predica-
ments, I interviewed the Special Inspector for Iraqi Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, Jr.
During this in-person interview, we discussed the policy implications of my results
and lessons learned (some of which were not in any of SIGIR reports) and potential
plans, policies, and institutions for future post-conflict SROs.
Although I have been describing Iraqi reconstruction as a policy failure, the suc-
cess stories in Iraq should should not be overlooked. After Hussain’s removal from
power, the US and others did make large gains in rehabilitating and building new
infrastructure, which was in general disrepair and collapse. During the 1980s, the av-
erage electricity produced from Iraq’s power plants increased from about 1,200MW to
3,100MW and generally kept pace with the population’s rising demand. Yet, airstrikes
during the 1991 Gulf War damaged Iraq’s power infrastructure and caused a drop in
production to under 2,200MW. Repairs did eventually boost average production to
more than 3,600MW by 2002, but this was still not enough to meet the country’s de-
mand. The 2003 invasion, postwar looting, and insurgent sabotage drove production
levels down to a new low of 711MW produced in mid-April 2003. In July 2003, the
CPA set a goal to increase generating capacity to 4,000MW by October 2003 (this
benchmark was later increased to 4,400), 5,000MW by January 2004, 7,000MW by
2005, and to 14,000MW by 2009. Thermal plants provided most of Iraq’s electric-
ity pre-invasion, but US investment focused on providing combustion-turbine power,
which was seen as more technologically advanced and easier to construct—this new
source was the main power producer by 2008. Although power infrastructure did
expand production and access, a promised level of 6,000MW was not sustainably
reached until 2009. Although total electricity supply more than doubled from 2004
to 2012, demand increased at an even faster pace mainly due to the modernization of
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infrastructure across the board, a flood of energy-consuming products following the
removal of sanctions, and ineffective enforcement of electricity fees. Power outages
were common (7.6 hours on average per a day) and most households (9 out of 10)
supplemented their power supplies with backyard or neighborhood generators instead
of relying on the public grid. This was more than just an inconvenience. When high
temperatures hit in June 2010 in southern Iraq, shortages of electricity and potable
water spurred violent protest and forced the Minister of Electricity to resign (Office
of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009, 2013).
During the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq’s political elite invested heavily in its transporta-
tion infrastructure. Before the 1991 Gulf War invasion, Iraq had two international
and three domestic airports, more than 40,000 km of roads, and almost 2,500km of
rail lines. Nonetheless, much of this was damaged and left under-maintained due to
the Gulf War, neglect, international sanctions, 2003 invasion, and post-war looting.
The UN and WB estimated that transportation and communication sectors would
require over $3.38 billion of investment to bring back to needed levels. For instance,
UN sanctions prevented Iraqi Airways from resuming commercial service between
1991 to 2000. When the coalition invaded, no Iraqi airport could support commer-
cial air operations due to the lack of support systems—airports were primarily used
by coalition forces during the reconstruction period. Commercial flights with Iraqi
Airlines did eventually start up again in limited areas by August 2004. In regards
to rail infrastructure, the US spent about $200 million to provide railroad equipment
and rehabilitate more than 200 rail stations (Office of the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction 2013). Ultimately though, nearly 40% of all transportation
funding went to improve Iraq’s network of roads and bridges in over 1,500 projects
(Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009 2013).
These project numbers, though, do not and can not tell the full story of Iraqi
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reconstruction policy as long-term, second order successes or failures are not captured.
This is epitomized in how different actors viewed infrastructure policy success in Iraq.
According to General Petraeus, there were colossal benefits to Iraq—as seen in the
above description. Yet, Iraqis themselves saw limited positive or even tangible effects
of the overall rebuilding effort when compared to the amount spent. This is not
surprising. Compared to a bridge over the Euphrates River in Fallujah that remained
a symbol of the British program in 1920, a water treatment plant by US in the same
area serves less people and was more expensive—not a good symbol for a successful
American program.
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, there was no coherent, unified goal for Iraqi
reconstruction. One of the earliest pre-war planning documents came from the Office
for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was established two
months before the Iraq invasion in 2003 and directed by a retired Army Lieutenant
General.2 ORHA’s A Unified Mission Plan for Post-Hostilities Iraq defined the
desired end state in Iraq as “a stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact, and a
broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use, and no longer
supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors.” How infrastructure was addressed
in this early phase is telling: infrastructure was assumed to be “damaged but not
completely destroyed. Sufficient infrastructure [would] exist at the end of hostilities—
buildings, roads, transportation, communications—to support initial reconstruction
and humanitarian activities” (Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
2003; Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
In subsequent Iraq planning documents, the status of infrastructure became more
realistic, but the focus remained on the technology itself. USAID’s 2003 Vision for
Post-Conflict Iraq did not set a desired end state or overarching goal beyond the
2ORHA was the precursor for the CPA.
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claim that reconstruction should restore facilitates back to improved pre-war levels
and that returning to pre-Iran-Iraq War infrastructure levels would take years. Each
sector (health, water and sanitation, electricity, transportation, telecommunication,
and agriculture/rural development) had its own goal based on services provided and
a series of milestones ranging from 60 days to 18 months after the fall of Saddam (US
Agnecy for International Development 2003; Office of the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction 2013). These though were based merely on project numbers
and services provided. They did not address the connections between infrastructure
to potential long-term effects separate from the technology (i.e job training).
In comparison, a CPA’s 2003 working document, Achieving the Vision, defined the
desired end state as a “unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and
representative government for the Iraqi people, is underpinned by new and protected
freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses
a threat to its neighbors or international security.” The strategies to achieve this goal
focused on security, essential serves , economy, and governance (Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013; Coalition Provisional Authority 2003,
pg. 5-6). Rebuilding this infrastructure, the CPA recognized, would help revive the
economy, energize the infrastructure, improve well-being, and garner local support
for the Coalition. Same as before, CPA’s strategies and reconstruction policy focused
on restoring infrastructure services only and infrastructure was viewed merely as a
technological fix rather than part of a larger Iraqi system.
This translated in early reconstruction phases into an emphasis on large capital
projects. Almost $1.64 billion (66%) of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)
appropriation was spent on large projects: $1.1 billion spent by USAID and $518
million spent by Defense. In mid 2004, a worsening security situation led the new US
Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, to determined that $3 billion of reconstruction
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funds should be reprogrammed to address the worsening security specifically. Fol-
lowing this, the CPA’s large civic infrastructure strategy shifted towards improving
military forces under the belief that rule-of-law needed the immediate and substantial
aid over large reconstruction projects. Yet, US policy could not ignore the terrible
infrastructure condition in Iraq. Thus, the role of the Commander’s Emergency Re-
sponse Program (CERP)3 morphed from a tool for tactical commander to finance
quick-impact projects into a program that funded larger projects—transforming the
military into ‘USAID in uniform’ (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction 2013).
Taken together, the rationale behind US post-invasion assistance focused on se-
curing and stabilizing a new democracy in Iraq and helping their economy grow—
rehabilitating and providing infrastructure was deemed necessary but separate from
US’ main strategic goals. A senior official was reported to have said that the “inva-
sion seemed to have occurred just as the condition of the entire infrastructure teetered
on the edge of the cliff of disaster” (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction 2013, p. 75). This problem was fixed by way of first-order solutions:
money and technology—as seen above. Coupled with a laissez-faire attitude toward
the spending of US tax dollars in Iraq, occurrences of waste and fraud were common.
For instance, after $10,000 was requested for a small school refurbishment project, US
authorities insisted on giving the project $70,000, which only resulted in waste and
the promotion of local corruptive practices. This limited and short-sighted perspec-
tive becomes apparent when looking at the status of the reconstruction conditions
discussed and examined in this dissertation.
3CERP funds came from the DOD budget and was set aside for military commanders to use in
conducting rebuilding and reconstruction during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.
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National Unity
Iraq’s borders are a relic of WWI. Within Iraq’s borders lay geographically con-
centrated ethnic groups—the Kurds in the north, Shi’ite in the south, and Sunni in
the middle. The history between these three runs deep and is filled with grievances
and conflict. This history increases the need to have infrastructure’s socio-technical
system to incorporate all areas together and to Baghdad. Nonetheless, the US looked
at reconstruction as if they were occurring in a vacuum according to an Iraqi offi-
cial. The Kurdistan region received less than 3% of all reconstruction dollars spent
in Iraq—Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region, was little more than a transit
point between Baghdad and Turkey. Moreover, the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) was not included in any high-level meetings during reconstruction planning.
Yet, the KRG was able to do what other regions were not and direct and completed
their own infrastructure projects. Audits showed Kurdish-directed projects were of-
ten in good order and used local resources. After considering the fact that the north
was more secure than other areas in Iraq, this divergence of project outcome demon-
strates the difference between using money to fix a problem and involving local input,
which will be discussed more below (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction 2009 2013).
Local Benefits
When planning the reconstruction program, the US failed to sufficiently consult
with Iraqi authorities. Without the knowledge of what Iraq needed, US officials turned
to shell companies or international contractors. Though shell companies would use lo-
cal subcontractors, these contractors were often ill-informed themselves or received a
project based on corruptive/patronage practices—practices which would only county
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through the life of the project (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Re-
construction 2013). On the international side, the USAID was primary construction
manager of US and Iraqi funded construction projects. Yet, USAID did not exist
then as it did in the 1990s; it had become more a contracting agency (Bowen 2014).
Much focus has been placed on contract problems in Iraq. A few of these included:
poor quality-control programs, ineffective quality-assurance programs, and a lack of
sufficient in-country contracting officer representatives (Office of the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013). Besides such regulation problems, there were
high turnover rates within these contracts that pushed back completion dates and
increased budgets. State Department and USAID employees did not sign up to go
to conflict zone and they were able to say no and/or leave when things went wrong,
which happened often.
It did not go unnoticed that projects worked when Iraqis were included. From
May 2003 through September 2012, the US obligated $2.45 billion and spent $2.27 bil-
lion to increase Iraq’s capacity for governance through targeted capacity-development
programs and projects (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruc-
tion 2013). In May 2006, USAID collaborated with the US military to establish
a 4-year Community Stabilization Program (CSP) to support the military’s coun-
terinsurgency in strategic cities by creating initiatives that would reduce incentives
for violence by at-risk youth. generate employment, rehabilitate infrastructure, and
stimulate local businesses. Operating in 17 insurgency-affected cities, CSP directly
employed more than 47,000 on a long-term bases, provided vocational training to
more than 41,000, helped place more than 9,900 vocational training graduates into
apprenticeship programs, approved a total of $77.4 million in grants to more than
10,250 business owners, and enrolled nearly 339,000 Iraqi youth in soccer, arts, and
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life skills programs.4 Yet, when SIGIR audited the CSP, it was unable to find direct
links between CSP and reductions in violence in the cities they operated in and could
not substantiate CSP’s claims regarding employment generated by the program. At
the same time, SIGIR’s reported on evidence to the fact that potentially millions of
dollars in CSP fund had been diverted to insurgents (Office of the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
The CPA eventually moved away from its previous infrastructure heavy plans to
Iraqi-driven ones focused on increasing self capacity through trail and error(Office of
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009). In 2006, a spike in insur-
gent attacks began to directly effect and target local citizens. In what was termed the
“Anbar Awakening,” some Sunni leaders sought out cooperation with coalition forces.
Multi-National Corps-Iraq began to award CERP contracts to employ Sunnies—one
of the best perceived of these programs was the Sons of Iraq Project. The Sons of Iraq
program used $370 million in CERP funds to employ about 10,000 Sunni insurgents
and some Shia militia, to effectively remove them from the battle ground. Even with
its success, SIGIR’s final report described this program as being far from transparent
(Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
Sustainability
One of the key differences between the Marshall Plan and Iraq reconstruction
was that the former was loan-based while the latter was more grant based. It was
President Bush who insisted on a no strings attached approach towards the funding
of Iraqi reconstruction over loans. A large justification behind this decision was a
4The CSP was not the only type of program that attempted to incorporate the local population.
Military commanders used CERP funds to support a renewed ‘clear, hold, and build’ program and
promote quick-impact, high-visibility projects aimed at reducing the high level of unemployment
among young, non-skilled Iraqis and improve local perception of the Coalition. At the same time,
these Iraqi-oriented reconstruction programs would also help increase the economic potential of local
towns and villages (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
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pre-war assumption that revenues from the sale of Iraq’s high petroleum riches would
finance the country’s reconstruction. To ensure this, US reconstruction policymakers
prioritized as critical the rapid post-invasion restoration of Iraq’s oil sector in order
to achieve the Coalition’s strategic goals. Yet, this was not an easy task. Between
2003 to 2007, there were more than 400 attacks on pipelines, refineries, and workers
in addition to both the perceived and actual mismanagement of oil wealth created by
corruption, smuggling, and diversion. This was not unique to oil-sector reconstruc-
tion; corruption and poor security impeded reconstruction progress across the board.
Infrastructure security activities, themselves, totaled almost $670 million with 55%
of this supporting the Sons of Iraq program. Looking back, some have argued that
US reconstruction policies unintentionally fostered a ‘triangle of political patronage’
with political parties, government officials, and sectarian groups (Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
The lack of financial planning and corruption along with a heavy initial focus
on larger project hurt not only project numbers (first order measure), but also sus-
tainability (second order measure). While there were success stories in regards to
reconstruction project numbers, Iraqi, and some US, reconstruction actors pointed
to unwanted projects and equipment that was too sophisticated for the Iraqis or
of very poor quality. Moreover, audits found inadequately designed projects, which
were poorly constructed and unsustainable. For example on October 6, 2003, Iraq
surpassed its goal and produced more than 4,500MW of electricity, but the grid was
fragile and could not handle this increase in electricity, which resulted in more power
failures. It was not just about technical in sustainability. Iraq had neither technical
knowledge nor motivation to carry out maintenance required after US left in 2011.
Yet, SIGIR’s primary auditing questions did not address this aspect of projects. Ini-
tial questions asked included: was the project properly designed, was an adequate
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quality-control program in place, and was sustainability considered and planned for?
It was only later that an additional question was added on whether the completed
project was operating as intended and the Iraqis were sustaining it through effective
operations and maintenance. This lack of sustainability planning was blamed on a
perceived launch a large number of programs across wide areas and sectors rather
than devote resources to a finite number of worthy and well-focused projects (Office
of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
As has been shown here, Iraq reconstruction contains both success and failure
stories. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which first operated in Afghanistan
and included military officers, diplomats, and other reconstruction experts. PRTs are
perceived as the most innovative reconstruction actors on the ground. There were
relatively small units with large political and economic goals. PRTs’ missions included
increasing governmental capacity to deliver essential services, extending the control
of the Iraqi government to all areas within their borders, and increasing stability
before the coalition left. These units worked with Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction
Development Councils, which were groups of local officials and community leaders
in the 15 southern provinces whom were empowered to make decisions about local
reconstruction projects.
Successful PRTs approached problems in a holistic manner, requiring military
and civilian members to integrate strategies and cultures, which helped PRTs achieve
leverage with local leaders and increase the probability of success for their projects.
Besides helping provide critical infrastructure, PRT-led projects served as training
grounds in program and project management for local government officials for both
governance and capacity (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruc-
tion 2013). Yet, PRT success in Iraq depended on the accident of who the person
picked to lead the team—often this person had little to no experience.
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Lesson Learned
As Bowen himself stated, “We want to reduce chance and control outcomes better”
(Bowen 2014). Using its experience and knowledge, SIGIR provided seven final lesson
learned from Iraq—see Table 6.1 (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction 2013). These lessons were to elicit policy change and be the basis on
which future reconstruction policies would be made.
Table 6.1: SIGIR’s Lessons Learned
1.
Create an integrated civilian military office to plan, execute, and be account-
able for contingency rebuilding actives during stabilization and reconstruction
operations.
2.
Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus first on
small programs and projects.
3.
Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, secur-
ing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and agreements to
sustain completed projects after their transfer.
4.
Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management sys-
tems that all SRO participants use.
5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s inception.
6.
Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander’s Emer-
gency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team program,
that produced success when used judiciously.
7.
Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have
backup plans ready to go.
Evident in these seven lessons is the need to ensure comprehensive and deep un-
derstanding of the host-country in regards to society, culture, governance, and insti-
tutions. In short, reconstruction actors should know how not to alienate populations.
This requires planning, balancing between US national security interests and the in-
terest of the host nation, and engagement. All three of which were weak within Iraqi
reconstruction policies—a symptom of the shift of strategy in 2003 from liberate and
leave to occupy and rebuild. Deferring to and fully engaging with host authorities
was then seen as a way to prevent unwanted or unneeded projects from being con-
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structed while also proving local buy-in to increase sustainability and decrease waste.
Moreover, in reaction to seeing projects fall into disrepair after handover, there was a
feeling that reconstruction should not build above a country’s capacity (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
Yet, some questioned the ability to incorporate these lessons at a large scale and
argue that a modest approach with local projects, rather than a national approach
with large projects, is best. Through small and medium projects, self-esteem could
be regained, basic needs would still have been met, and national stability created—all
while potentially reducing fraud, waste, and abuse as compared to large projects. As
the same time, the security situation should play a larger role in shaping reconstruc-
tion decision: the more unstable the situation, the smaller the project should be.
Though limited projects during unstable times can have counterinsurgency effects,
they must be sized to the situation and targeted to meet local needs (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
A common thread in the reasoning behind these lessons was the prevention of
waste, fraud, and abuse. Waste was seen as the result of poor planning, security,
constant rotation of US personnel, and weak controls; in short, abuse is bad manage-
ment (Bowen 2014). Ultimately, the US does not know all of what we built. Yet, this
focus on waste limited resulting recommendations to be concerned with are reforming
the reconstruction provision only—how to manage contractors, how to plan unified
reconstruction efforts, and how to prevent waste and fraud (see: Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2006ab 2007 2009 2011 2013).
United States Office of Contingency Operations
A lesson is not learned until incorporated into policies, practices, and regula-
tions/laws. Bowen and others have been advocating for the creation of an integrated
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civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding
actives during SROs: the United States Office of Contingency Operations (USOCO).
USOCO was designed to provide unity and clarity about who would be ultimately
responsible during reconstruction operations. Yet, USOCO is essentially an agency of
managers; the planning ultimately is about working with contractors who are going
to be the execution (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
2013). USOCO would work with contractors and say: if X, you will be doing Y. The
money to do this is guaranteed if/when USOCO is deployed, but you, the contractor,
will need to do your own planning beforehand. A key aspect of USOCO is that fact
it would be its own agency. “By putting it in one of the three most effected agen-
cies, then you buy the biases of that agency” (Bowen 2014).5 As an independent
agency, these contractors and officials would be signed up under USOCO specifically
and would know beforehand what they have signed up for and what the job entailed
(Bowen 2014).6
USOCO directly addresses the first lesson provided by SIGIR (Figure 6.1) that
focuses on line of command and clarity about who is responsible for planning recon-
struction operations. According to Bowen, one of the core weakness of US reconstruc-
tion policy for both Iraq and future operations is that no one is in charge of planning
in how to engage in these situations. “You built the airplane in flight. We developed
the organization from scratch after the mission began. And that is impossible, be-
cause you haven’t addressed contacting issues for example or oversight issues or IT
or personnel issues—all which made the CPA’s mission impossible” (Bowen 2014).
The trifecta of involved bureaucracies (DOD, USAID, State) meant that no one gov-
5Yet, not all are in agreement that this should be an independent agency. Some think it should
be in the State Department while other think it should be placed under DOD.
6In Iraq, it was common to see contractors and other reconstruction actors leave or refuse to go.
They never took an oath to give their life to their country and many did not want to take the risk.
USOCO would stay in places even after local embassies closed.
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ernment office had enough authority in Iraq to lead reconstruction and planning by
adhocracy, which led to constant personnel turnover and waste (Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013).
As described by Bowen, FEMA makes a good parallel for OSOCO—foreign, frag-
ile, and failed states are infrequent international disaster zones. How does the US
respond to infrequent domestic disaster zones domestically? US policy is to plan in
advance with a civil-military mindset across jurisdictions. Not only does this promote
planning, but such a structure also creates is a line of command—we know who is
responsible and who to reprimand when things go bad (Mike Brown was duly re-
lieved after the disastrous Katrina response). With such plan, there would already
be a contingency reconstruction plan and fund, contractors would have already been
engaged with, and responsibilities assigned (Bowen 2014).
USOCO has been introduced twice, but has failed both times—the political en-
vironment has not been conducive to such a large change as USOCO. Essentially,
nothing has really changed in regards to SROs and the US is back to having parallel
paths of planning and eventual paths of operations—the same situation that brought
waste, shortfall, and missed goals in Iraq. “We are the best house builder in the
world, but we don’t have the tools or the training, resources, planning, the blueprint
to build that house. So it doesn’t get built well and it falls down” (Bowen 2014).
Policy Recommendations
Table 6.2: Policy Recommendations
1. Set a whole-of-reconstruction goal early.
2. Dedicate diverse resources.
3. Do not discount future benefits in reaction to immediate costs.
4. View infrastructure as both a technology and part of a system.
5. Plan nationally; execute locally.
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Progress has ben made in regards to reconstruction policy, but in small incremental
steps (Szayna et al. 2009). The largest step, creation of USOCO, would be essential
in improved reconstruction policy. Yet, I argue that current policy changes and
even USOCO justifications are limited within a first order perspective. The focus
remains on the prevention of waste/fraud and using infrastructure as a technical fix
for problems rather than addressing how reconstruction and infrastructure can be
used as a tool to achieve strategic goals. Using the results from the previous chapters
and the reframing of Iraqi reconstruction, I provide some key policy recommendations
for future reconstruction policies—see Table 6.2.
It would have been easy to state here instead that reconstruction must connect
all areas, use local resources, and plan for sustainability. As shown in Ethiopia and
Iraq though, these conditions were being thought about at varying levels of govern-
ment. Often though, they were placed within first order contexts and their long-term
(second order) benefits restricted. Moreover, such recommendations risk assuming
deterministic outcomes from infrastructure. Infrastructure and reconstruction con-
ditions have both independent effects on political instability and contingent effects
where these conditions interact with historical, social, political, and local conditions
that also effect political instability. By following the recommendations listed here, a
second order perspective and resulting choices would not be forced. They’d be ap-
pearing naturally, remain flexible to local contexts, and by comprehensive.
Set a whole-of-reconstruction goal for early: Before plans are made, policy-
makers (both international and domestic) need to identify what their goal is across
sectors and actors. Is the goal political stability? Is the goal the building of emergency
infrastructure? Is the goal merely economic? This is imperative as infrastructure con-
structed with the goal of lower conflict risks will look and be built differently than
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infrastructure based of economics/aid. The former will be in places that might in-
crease costs and would not necessarily use the“lowest bid contractor,” which would
be impressive for the latter goal. This whole-of-reconstruction goal complements
current whole-of-government policy approaches in civil-military debates. A whole-of-
government goal would then help the included agencies and actors create short and
long-term metrics and benchmarks to ensure progress is occurring before it is too late.
This is not always easy as misunderstandings are frequent between military and civil-
ian agencies (Szayna et al. 2009). In this dissertation, I have argued for a goal of lower
political instability risks, as such a stability-focused goal also allows for growth and
success in many different areas. Less political instability would allow the government
to repair itself to become stable, functioning legitimate, and accountable by freeing
up valuable resources and providing a safer environment for all concerned (Davis et al.
2009). Though not the ultimate focus, the economy would also indirectly and directly
benefit: highways, bridges, communication systems, and other infrastructure are es-
sential to the profitable and efficient private sector production and distribution of
goods and services (Akramov 2006). The best economics post-conflict is heavily po-
litical and social—all of which reconstruction policies are a part of (Davis et al. 2009).
Dedicate diverse resources: As stated by Bowen, “Money won’t do it alone.. That
simply flooding the zone with cash not only doesn’t solve it but it makes things worse”
(Bowen 2014). I would amend this though: neither money or technological fixes will
do it alone. As shown throughout this dissertation, merely having infrastructure does
not guarantee reduced political instability. Reconstruction policies should contain
diverse and deep strategies and tools. Yet, no one organization has all the skills and
knowledge needed. The military might have the logistical and security resources, but
they lack the skill depth seen on the civilian side—diverse actors offer complemen-
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tary capability and supplementary capacity (Szayna et al. 2009). This means having
a wide range of actors: contractors, engineers, policymakers, local leaders and rep-
resentatives, economists, and military officials. At the same time, local actors will
provide the needed politics, social, and historical contexts at both the subnational
and national level. This ensures that would was being built was actually needed and
who would or would not benefit from different types of policy. Yes, this would reduce
waste. But most importantly, this will provide the buy-in many US policymakers are
calling for in regards to time and knowledge invested. Such diverse actors will also
help free up the military to do their mission, which will results in increased security
for more reconstruction projects to occur. Reconstruction is ultimately an incredi-
bly diversified ‘untraditional tool’ to shape soft issues and ultimate military/political
goals (Szayna et al. 2009).
Do not discount future benefits in reaction to immediate costs: This disser-
tation has shown that infrastructure provision and reconstruction might inevitably
lead to an increase of short-term conflict. Initial violence around infrastructure pro-
vision should not dictate reconstruction nor should it deter aid and reconstruction
actors. International reconstruction does not happen within a non-failed state (Office
of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2013; Bowen 2014; Szayna
et al. 2009). Reconstruction should not be limited to ‘green zones’ only; the areas
with the highest infrastructure areas (the periphery) are also commonly the area
with higher conflict. These are also areas that have the most to gain when receiving
infrastructure provision. If infrastructure’s long-term effects and the socio-technical
system are accounted for during the planning and implementation process, then the
very same infrastructure could also lead to lower future conflict and (financial, po-
litical, and social) investment returns. At the same time, immediate benefits should
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not outweigh long-term costs. Research has shown that the quality of governance
will not only impact the selection of new infrastructure projects, but will also affect
the rate of return that a country gets from its infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi
1998). This requires a parallel focus on good governance programs. In fact, recon-
struction projects can service as training grounds for such governance programs—as
seen in Iraqi PRTs. Removing first-order blinders and maintaining such a long-term
perspective will not be easy. Nevertheless, keeping the blinders on and being overly
ignorant of the long-term consequences of infrastructure and reconstruction policies
will only doom future operations.
View infrastructure as both a technology and part of a system: Infrastruc-
ture are essential national technologies. Moreover, when there is sufficient infrastruc-
ture, focus can shift from expansion and playing catch-up to upkeep and renovation
(Ecola et al. 2014). With it’s technological focus, first-order politics and metrics are
important in future reconstruction policies in order to build up infrastructure net-
works. When thinking about infrastructure as a technology, the focus is on direct
effects and technological advances. Nonetheless, reconstruction policymakers should
not assume that a certain level of infrastructure will directly lead to economic ben-
efits and thus lower conflict risks over time. With it’s system-level focus, second
order politics and metrics are necessary and helpful to help create virtuous, reinforc-
ing against political instability, which often do not occur automatically (Davis et al.
2009). When thinking about infrastructure as part of a system, the focus is on the
connections between infrastructure, power, and society over time and infrastructure
becomes an available tool to shape long-term goals and outcomes. This ultimately
requires shifting during reconstruction projects from measuring success by project
numbers and money spent to metrics that capture changes in achieving long-term
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goals. In other words, a project’s significance should be measured by more than
just services rendered, but also the long-term effects on capabilities, stability, conflict
risks, and the economy just to name a few.
Plan nationally; execute locally: Infrastructure is incredibly local in its construc-
tion and use. Policymakers and reconstruction actors must understand the attitudes,
beliefs, and moods of local population to prepare for short-term consequence and plan
for long-term benefits (Larson et al. 2001). At the same time, this local focus will in-
crease essential degree of trust and cooperation while shaping out group vs. in group
perceptions (Davis et al. 2009). Nonetheless, what is local is inherently national. Fu-
ture reconstruction operations cannot ignore context-driven national plans. Without
a national plan that is specific to that country, patronage decisions are likely to come
into play that would result in disconnected peripheries and feelings of deprivation.
National plans would consider all parts of the state’s geography and society. Not only
will this provide capability building benefits, this would provide a type of buy-in. By
building their own local infrastructure, the local population will be more likely to have
positive perceptions of the provider and be interested in its long-term sustainability.
Ultimately, one cannot just assume that their efforts are being received as expected
without an understanding of local and national contexts and engagement of both.
This must come with a recognition that direct connections between local projects to
national instability and national projects to local conflict can be hard if not nearly
impossible in the present. This should not be the metric that such programs are rated
as successful. Such policy evaluations need to broaden their scope and timeframe to
fully capture the connections between infrastructure and reconstruction to long-term
political instability.
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Conclusion
Populations around the world are not just dependent on infrastructure networks
and systems, they are embedded and structure around infrastructure’s technical con-
figurations. When these networks and systems collapse or are destroyed, like they
did in Iraq, the consequences spread beyond the infrastructure and into all corners of
society. As such, policymakers must be prepared to both prevent such collapse and
have a political strategy ready when such collapse does occur. By pinpointing the
conditions that increase political instability, it becomes possible to see exactly how
reconstruction can be an extension of political strategy. These conditions are not
inescapable. As such, policymakers and the political elite have the ability to shape
potential outcomes and reduce the risk of future failure.
Changes in reconstruction policy face significant hurdles; policymakers often claim
that we are never going to do that (reconstruction of a another’s infrastructure) again,
that policies infringe on jurisdictions, and/or that it is a waste of money because why
should we fund people that are never going to be deployed? At the same time, it is
not hard to admit that what happened in Iraq should not be repeated. Yet, reacting
to this by not planning dooms the US to do it again; SROs have been going on since
the 1980s.7 “Willful amnesia is almost criminal, because that is what that is. You
didn’t forget it by accident. You forgot it by desire and intent and that is strategically
short sighted” (Bowen 2014). There is too much at stake to improvise and current
US reconstruction policy is not that much more advanced than where it was during
Iraq.
Today’s policymakers need to recognize that they are setting the stage (liter-
ally) for future reconstruction operations. As these operations occur during chaotic
7These operations have just been smaller...if one can call the SRO in the Balkans small.
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periods, between the end of a full blown conflict and the implementation of devel-
opment, policymakers should want to create a virtuous cycle between reconstruction
and political stability (Davis et al. 2009)—something that this dissertation helps with.
“[Reconstruction] is not a Marshall Strategy. It is not a diplomat strategy. And it
is not a development strategy. It is a political strategy. And it requires defense,
development, and diplomacy. But, it also requires planning” (Bowen 2014)—this has
been the ‘Hard Lesson’ to learn. The world views the US with a limiting perspective:
that of self-interested military power. To change this, US foreign policy in regards
to engagement needs to evolve. Reconstruction and infrastructure can be improved
to become a part of US strategy and USOCO is a vital step in improved reconstruc-
tion policy. But, it needs to be more than just a managing agency—it needs to set
goals and policy. This dissertation sets the stage for addressing how this can be done
and how US post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction policy can begin to create the
desired end state: peace and prosperity.
227
REFERENCES
Abadie, Alberto. 2006. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.”
The American Economic Review 96(2): 50–56.
Abdullahi, Abdi M. 2007. “The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF):
The Dilemma of Its Struggle in Ethiopia.” Review of African Political Economy
34(113): 556–562.
Agnew, John, and Nicholas Entrikin, eds. 2004. The Marshall Plan Today: Model
and Metaphor. New York: Routledge.
Akramov, Kamiljon T. 2006. Governance and Foreign Aid Allocation. Masters thesis,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Pardee Rand Graduate School.
Alatout, Samer. 2006. “Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: Territory, pop-
ulation, and environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel.” Political Geography
25(6): 601–621.
Alatout, Samer. 2009. “Constructing a Zionist Network of Water Abundance, Immi-
gration, and Colonization.” Social Studies of Science 39(3): 363–394.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir Baqir, and William Easterly. 1999. “Public Goods and
Ethnic Divisions.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4): 1243–1284.
Allan, John A., and Tony A. Allan. 2002. The Middle East Water Question: Hy-
dropolitics and the Global Economy. Vol. 2 of International Library of Human
Geography New York: Ib Tauris.
Allison, Paul David. 2009. Fixed Effects Regression Models. Los Angeles: Sage.
Alonso, William. 1968. “Urban and Regional Imbalanes in Economic Development.”
Economic Development and Culural Change 17(1): 1–14.
American Society of Civil Engineers. 2013. “Journal of Infrastructure Systems.”
Retrieved from http://www.ascelibrary.org/journal/jitse4.
Amnesty International. 2001. Chad: The Habre Legacy.
London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR20/004/2001/en.
Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso Books.
Arendt, Hannah. 1970. On Violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
ASCE Critical Infrastructure Guidance Task Committee. 2009. Guiding Principles
for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure. Reston, VA: ASCE Publications.
228
Azimi, Nassrine, Matt Fuller, and Hiroko Nakayama, eds. 2003. Post-conflict Re-
construction in Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, East Timor and
Afghanistan: Proceedings of an International Conference Hiroshima, November
2002. Vol. 1 New York: United Nations Publications.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. 1994. “The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Learning Conflict Resolu-
tion.” Journal of Peace Research 31(1): 75–92.
Barnett, Michael, and Duvall, eds. 2005. Power in Global Governance. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Barraclough, Colin. 2000. “African Highlands: Horses, mules and sturdy hiking boots
provide the only reliable transport in Ethiopia’s Simien Mountains.” The Gazette
(Montreal, Quebec) .
Basedau, Matthias, and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2014. “How Ethnicity Conditions the
Effect of Oil and Gas on Civil Conflict: A spatial analysis of Africa from 1990 to
2010.” Political Geography 38: 1–11.
Bayertz, Kurt. 1999. Solidarity. Vol. 5 of Philosophical Studies in Contemporary
Culture New York: Springer.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2007a. BBC Monitoring Africa . LexisNexis Academic.
Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2007b. “Ethiopia: Oromo rebels claim US military
trainers arrive at army base.” BBC Monitoring Africa . LexisNexis Academic.
Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2007c. “Twenty-eight Afar Rebels Surrender to
Ethiopian Authorities.” BBC Monitoring Africa . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date
Accessed: 2014/07/01.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2008. “Ethiopia slams Al-Jazeera serial on troubled
Ogaden Region.” BBC Monitoring Africa . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Ac-
cessed: 2014/07/01.
Beardsley, Kyle, and Brian McQuinn. 2009. “Rebel Groups as Predatory Organiza-
tions: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.” The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): 624–645.
Becker, Charles M., Andrew Marshall Hamer, and Andrew R. Morrison. 1994. Beyond
Urban Bias in Africa: Urbanization in an era of structural adjustment. Social
History of Africa Series Heinemann.
Benedict, Ruth. 1967. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese
Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Bennett, Andrew. 2008. “Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective.” In The Ox-
ford Handbook of Political Methodology, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E.
Brady, and David Collier. Oxford University Press.
229
Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. 2014. “Process Tracing: From Philosophical
Roots to Best Practices.” In Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, eds.
Andrew Bennett, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.
Berman, Eli, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. 2011. “Can Hearts and Minds
be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” Journal of Political
Economy 119(4): 766–819.
Biles, Peter. 1989. “Addis Troops Abandon City as Rebels Advance.” The Guardian
(London) . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
Bloom, David E, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Paul Collier, and Christopher Udry. 1998. “Geogra-
phy, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa.” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 1998(2): 207–295.
Bock, Richard Darrell. 1975. Multivariate statistical methods in behavioral research.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Bowen, Stuart W. 2014. Personal Interview by Emily Molfino.
Bozeman, Barry. 2002. “Public-value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do.”
Public Administration Review 62(2): 145–161.
Brady, Henry E. 2008. “Causation and Explanation in Social Sciences.” In The Ox-
ford Handbook of Political Methodology, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E.
Brady, and David Collier. Oxford University Press.
Bricen˜o Garmendia, Cecilia, Antonio Estache, and Nemat Shafik. 2004. “Policy Re-
search Working Papers. Infrastructure Services in Developing Countries: Access,
Quality, Costs and Policy Reform.” Unpublished paper, World Bank Policy Re-
search Paper 3468.
Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 2005. “Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-
Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes.” Public Administra-
tion and Development 25(1): 3–14.
Brittain, Victoria, and David Rose. 1989. “Rebel victory in Tigre.” The Guardian
(London) . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
Bronner, Ethan. 2008. “Barred From Main Road, Palestinians Fear Two-Tiered Sys-
tem.” New York Times , A.1.
Brown, Mark B. 2009. Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Represen-
tation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brown, Michael E. 2001. “The Causes of Internal Conflict: And overview.” In Na-
tionalism and Ethnic Conflict, eds. Michael E. Brown, Owen F. Cote´, Sean Lynne-
Lones, and Steve E. Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2–25.
230
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D.
Morrow. 2005. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George W. Down. 2005. “Development and Democ-
racy.” Foreign Affairs 84(5): 77–86.
Buhaug, Halvard. 2006. “Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War.”
Journal of Peace Research 43(6): 691–708.
Buhaug, Halvard, and Jan Ketil Rød. 2006. “Local Determinants of African Civil
Wars, 1970-2001.” Political Geography 25(3): 315–335.
Caldwell, Dan. 2011. Vortex of Conflict: U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Iraq. Standford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Campante, Filipe R., and Quoc-Anh Do. 2009. “A Centered Index of Spatial Con-
centration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital
Cities.” Unpublished paper, HKS Faculty Research Working Papers RWP09-005.
Caren, Neal, and Aaron Panofsky. 2005. “TQCA: A Technique for Adding Tem-
porality to Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Sociological Methods and Research
34(2): 147–172.
Carey, Roane. 2001. The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid. London: Verso.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. “Why do Ethnic
Groups Rebel? New data and analysis.” World Politics 62(1): 87–119.
Chowdhury, Anwarul K., and Sandagdorj Erdenebileg. 2006. Geography Against De-
velopment: A case for landlocked developing countries. Vol. 6 New York: United
Nations.
CIESIN - Center for International Earth Science Information Network , Columbia
University, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), World Bank,
and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT). 2011. Global Rural-Urban
Mapping Project, Version 1 (GRUMPv1): Population Density Grid. Palisades, NY:
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC), Columbia University. Re-
trieved from http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/dataset/grump-v1-population-
density.
CIESIN - Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia
University; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT). 2005. Grid-
ded Population of the World Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Grids. Palisades,
NY: Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC), Columbia University.
Retrieved from http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/.
Coakley, John. 2003. “Introduction and Conclusion.” In The Territorial Management
of Ethnic Conflict, ed. John Coakley. Second ed. Vol. 9 of International Affairs
Human Rights Series Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
231
Coalition Provisional Authority. 2003. Achieving the Vision to Restore
Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People. Baghdad, Iraq: . Retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003 hr/03-10-
08strategicplan.pdf.
Cohen, Craig. 2009. Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction. Sta-
bilization and Reconstruction Series Washington D.C.: United States Institue of
Peace.
Collier, David (ed.). 2014. “Symposium on “The Set-Theoretic Comparative Method
(STCM): Critical Assessment and the Search for Alternatives”.” Qualitative &
Multi-Method Research 21(1): 1–51.
Collier, David, James Mahoney, and Jason Seawright. 2004. “Claiming Too Much:
Warnings About Selection Bias.” In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools,
Shared Standards, eds. Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. Lanham:: Rowman
and Littlefield , 85–102.
Collier, Paul. 1999. “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War.” Oxford economic
papers 51(1): 168–183.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict
Societies.” European Economic Review 48(5): 1115–1145.
Collingridge, David. 1980. The Social Control of Technology. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Cuffe, John an Siroky, David. 2012. “Paradise Lost: Autonomy and Separatism.” In
To Have a State of One’s Own: Separatism in Europe and Asia, eds. J.P. Casteban,
and A. Pavkovic. New York; Routledge.
Cunnhingham, Kathleen Gallagher, and Nils B. Weidmann. 2007. “Shared Space:
Ethnic Groups, State Accommodation and Localized Conflict.” International Stud-
ies Quarterly 54(5): 1035–1054.
Danko, David M. 1992. “The digital chart of the world project.” Photogrammetric
Engineering and Remote Sensing 58(8): 1125–1128.
Davis, C.B., A. Chmieliauskas, G.P.J. Dijkema, and I. Nikolic. 2012. Enipedia. Delft,
Holland: Energy and Industry group, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Manage-
ment, TU Delf. Retrieved from www.enipedia.tudelft.nl/wiki/Main Page.
Davis, Paul K., Claude Berrebi, Christopher S. Chivvis, Sarah Olmstead, Julie E.
Taylor, Ve´ronique Thelen, Stephen Watts, and Elizabeth Wilke. 2009. Dilemmas
of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Santa Monica,
CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute.
DeNardo, James. 1985. Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and
Rebellion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
232
Dobbins, James. 2003. Barred From Main Road, Palestinians Fear Two-Tiered Sys-
tem: Foreign Desk. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute.
Dunlop, John B. 1998. Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ecola, Liisa, Charlene Rohr, Johanna Zmud, Tobias Kuhnimhof, and Peter Phleps.
2014. The Future oF Driving in Developing Countries. RAND National Defense
Research Institute.
Edgerton, David. 2008. The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since
1900. Profile Books.
Elvidge, Christopher D., Paul C. Sutton, Tilottama Ghosh, Benjamin T. Tuttle, Kim-
berly E. Baugh, Budhendra Bhaduri, and Edward Bright. 2009. “A Global Poverty
Map Derived from Satellite Data.” Computers and Geosciences 35(8): 1652–60.
Environmental Protection Authority. 2012. National Report of Ethiopia. Federal
Democratic Reupblic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa: United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development (Rio+20).
Ethiopian Airlines. 2014. “History.” Retrieved from
http://www.ethiopianairlines.com/en/corporate/history.aspx.
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. 2013. “Corporation History.” Retrieved from
http://www.eepco.gov.et/corporationhistory.php.
Ethiopian Roads Authority. 2011. Road Sector Development Porgram (RSDP): RSDP
13 Years Performance and Phase IV. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Re-
trieved from http://www.era.gov.et/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gKxlKrClyQQ%3D.
Ezrahi, Yaron. 1997. Rubber Bullets: Power and Conscience in Modern Israel. New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fearon, James D. 1998. “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of Interna-
tional Relations.” Annual Review of Poitical Science 1(1): 289–313.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”
The American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 1995. “Constitution of
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.” Retrieved from
http://www.africanlegislaturesproject.org/sites/africanlegislaturesproject.org/files
/Constitution%20Ethiopia.pdf.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 2003. “Council of Minis-
ters Regulations No. 82/2003 Ethiopian Airports Enterprise Establish-
ment Council of Ministers Council of Ministers Regulations No. 82.2003:
Ethiopian Airports Enterprise Establishment Council.” Retrieved from
http://www.fsc.gov.et/resources/Negarit%20Gazeta/Gazeta-1995/Reg%20
233
Ferguson, James. 1990. The Anti-politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization,
and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fisher, Erik, Roop L. Mahajan, and Carl Mitcham. 2006. “Midstream Modulation of
Technology: Governance From Within.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society
26(6): 485–496.
Foltz, William J. 1995. “Reconstructing the State of Chad.” In Collapsed States: The
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 15–2.
Foster, Vivien, and Elvira Morella. 2011. “Ethiopia’s Infrastructure: A Continental
Perspective.” Unpublished paper, Policy Research Working Paper 5595.
Francisco, Ronald A. 1995. “The Relationship between Coercion and Protest An
Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution
39(2): 263–282.
Fritsch, Stefan. 2011. “Technology and Global Affairs.” International Studies Per-
spectives 12(1): 27–45.
Gadaa. 2010. “Ethiopia: Did the rush to complete Gilgel Gibe II
for the election result in its collapse?” Gadaa . Retrieved from
http://gadaa.com/oduu/2416/2010/02/15/ethiopia-did-the-rush-to-complete-
gilgel-gibe-ii-for-the-election-result-in-its-collapse/.
Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Millinger. 1999. “Geography and
Economic Development.” International Regional Science Review 22(2): 179–232.
Gates, Scott. 2002. “Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebel-
lion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1): 111–130.
Gberie, Lansana. 2005. A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the Destruction
of Sierra Leone. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Develop-
ment in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Giles, Tom. 1989. “Mengistu steps up war as drought bites; Ethiopian crisis.” The
Times (London) . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
Ginty, Roger Mac. 2003. “The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq.” Third
World Quarterly 24(4): 601–617.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg,
and Havard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2011: A New Dataset.” Journal
of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637.
Global Energy Observatory. 2013. “Global Energy Observatory.” Data obtained from
“http://GlobalEnergyObservatory.org/”.
234
Goertz, Gary. 2003. “The Substantive Importance of Necessary Condition Hypothe-
ses.” In Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications, eds. Gary
Goertz, and Harvey Starr. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Goertz, Gary. 2006. Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
Gompert, David C., Terrence K. Kelly, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Michelle Parker, and
Kimberly Colloton. 2009. Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military
Counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Insti-
tute.
Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1979. “The Reemergence of ‘Peripheral Nationalisms’: Some
Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and
Economic Growth.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 21(03): 303 – 322.
gRoads-Committee on Data for Science and Technology Global Roads Data De-
velopment Working Group, and Center for International Earth Science Infor-
mation Network/Columbia University. 2009. CODATA Catalog of Roads Data
Sets, Version 1. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications
Center. Retrieved from http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/groads-codata-
roads-catalog-v1. Accessed 27 May, 2013.
Guarnieri, Mya. 2010. “Israel’s ‘Street Apartheid’.” McClatchy-Tribune Business
News .
Gurr, T. R. 2009. “Minorities at Risk Dataset.” Retrieved from
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Haas, Ernst B. 1990. When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in Inter-
national Organization. Vol. 22 Berkely, CA: University of California Press.
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. We-
instein. 2007. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?”
Political Science Review 101(04): 709–725.
Hadera, Amanuel. 2006. “Djibouti: Ethio-Djibouti Railway Rehabilitation Accord
Signed.” The Ethiopian Herald .
Hagmann, Tobias, and Benedikt Korf. 2012. “Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and
Sovereignty in the Ethiopian-Somali frontier.” Political Geography 31(4): 205–214.
Hale, Henry E. 2008. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and
Nations in Eurasia and the World. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, Peter A. 1993. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of
Economic Policymaking in Britain.” Comparative Politics 25(3): 275–296.
235
Harris, Clive. 2003. Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries:
Trends, Impacts, and Policy Lessons. World Bank Working Paper Series World
Bank Publications.
Hathaway, Terri. 2008. What Cost Ethiopia’s Dam Boom? A look inside the Expan-
sion of Ethiopia’s Energy Sector. International Rivers Network.
Henry, Neil. 1990. “Tigray Province: A Land of the Night; Rebellion That Thrives
in Darkness Threatens Ethiopia’s Rule.” The Washington Post . LexisNexis Aca-
demic. Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
Hensel, Paul R. 2012. “Territory: Geography, Conentious Issues, and World Politics
of LegitimacyGeography, Contentious Issues, and World Politics.” In Geography,
Contentious Issues, and World Politics, ed. John A. Vasquez. Vol. 60 Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers , 3–26.
Herrera, Geoffrey L. 2003. “Technology and International Systems.” Millennium
32(3): 559–593.
Hijmans, R., , N Garcia, and J Wieczorek. 2011. “GADM database of Global Ad-
ministrative aAreas, Version 2. Data.” Retrieved from http://www.gadm.org.
Hill, Christopher, and Pamela Beshoff, eds. 1994. The Two Worlds of International
Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas. London: Routledge.
Hiltzik, Michael. 2014. “Despite today’s hijacking, fond memories of flying Ethiopian
Airlines.” Los Angeles Times .
Hughes, Thomas P. 1969. “Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in
Germany 1989-1933.” Past and Present 44(1): 106–132.
Hughes, Thomas P. 1994. “Technological Momentum.” In Does Technology Drive
History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, eds. Leo Marx, and Mer-
ritt Roe Smith. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
International Development Associaion. 2009. IDA at Work: In Ethiopia All Roads
Lead to Development. The World Bank.
International Finance Corporation. 2006. Enterprise Surveys Ethiopia: Country Pro-
file 2006. Financial and Private Sector Development World Bank.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2003. “Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Soceity.” In States of Knowl-
edge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order, ed. Sheila Jasanoff. New
York: Routledge , 106–132.
Jasanoff, Sheila, and Marybeth Martello. 2004. “Introduction: Globalization and
International Governance.” In Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental
Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff, and Marybeth Martello. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
236
Johnston, Michael. 1986. “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassess-
ment.” Comparative Politics 18(4): 459–477.
Jones, Christopher F. 2013. “Building More Just Energy Infrastructure: Lessons from
the Past.” Science as Culture 22(2): 157–163.
Judah, Tim. 2002. Kosovo: War and Revenge. Second ed. Yale University Press.
Kapferer, Bruce. 2011. Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and
Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. New York: Berghahn Books.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzz. 2010. “The Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators : A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues.”
Unpublished paper, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430.
Keeley, James F. 1990. “Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes.”
International Organization 44(1): 83–105.
Keller, Edmond J. 1991. Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic.
Number 646 Indiana University Press.
Keneally, Thomas. 2000. “Back to Asmara.” Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) .
LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2014/07/01.
Kennedy, James. 2008. Structures for the Displaced: Service and Identity in Refugee
Settlements. Delft, Holland: International Forum on Urbanism.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Knowlton, Brian. 2007. “Rebels Raid China-run Oil facility in Ethiopia; 9 Chinese
workers among 74 killed.” The International Herald Tribune .
Kolodziej, Edward A. 1992. “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector.” In-
ternational Organization 36(2): 82–105.
Lansing, John Stephen. 2006. Perfect Order: Recognizing Complexity in Bali. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Larson, Eric B., Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richard-
son, Lowell H. Schwartz, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Derek Eaton, Thomas S. Sza-
yna, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Forrest E. Morgan, Diana Dunham-Scott, and Kristin J.
Leuschner. 2001. Addressing Commanders’ Needs for Information on “Soft” Fac-
tors. Number RB-9628-A RAND National Defense Research Institute.
Le Billon, Philippe, and Arno Waizenegger. 2007. “Peace in the Wake of Disaster?
Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.” Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers 32(3): 411–427.
237
Levy, Jack S. 1994. “Learning and Foreign-Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.”
International Organization 28(2): 266–297.
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate
Studies of Repression and Dissent: The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression
and Dissent.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 31(2): 266–297.
London˜o, Ernesto. 2013. “Report: Iraq reconstruction failed to result in lasting,
positive changes.”.
Lucas, Samuel R., and Alisa Szatrowski. 2014. “Qualitative Comparative Analysis in
Critical Perspective.” Sociological Methodology 44(1): 1–79.
Lujala, Pa¨ivi. 2009. “Deadly Combat over Natural Resources Gems, Petroleum,
Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
53(1): 50–71.
Lujala, Pa¨ivi, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore. 2005. “A Diamond
Curse? Civil war and a lootable resource.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
49(4): 538–562.
Mahoney, James. 2012. “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.”
Sociological Methods Research 41(4): 570–597.
Mahoney, James, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2004. “The Possibility Principle and Case Se-
lection: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Analysis.” American Political
Science Review 38: 653–669.
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2012. A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and
Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Mahoney, James, Erin Kimball, and Kendra Koivu. 2009. “The Logic of Historical
Explanation in the Social Sciences.” Comparative Political Studies 42(1): 114–146.
Maier, Karl. 2008. “World Bank Ends Funding for Chad-
Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project.” Bloomberg . Retrieved from
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSAU.JEI7g0o.
Majeski, Stephen, and David Sylvan. 2009. U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective:
clients, enemies and empire. New York: Routledge.
Malici, Akan. 2011. “Learning to Resist or Resisting to Learn?” In Rethinking for-
eign policy analysis: states, leaders, and the microfoundations of behavioral inter-
national relations, eds. Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer. New
York: Routledge.
238
Marcus, Harold G. 2002. A History of Ethiopia: Updated Edition. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Marshall, Monty G., and Benjmin R. Cole. 2010. State Fragility Index and Matrix
2010. Global report 2011: Conflict, governance, and State Fragility.
Maykuth, Andrew. 1999. “BRUTAL CONFLICTS, FROM AFRICA TO BE-
YOND.” The Philadelphia Inquirer . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed:
2014/07/01.
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic Shocks
and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political
Economy 112(4): 725 – 753.
Mitchell, Christopher Roger. 1981. The Structure of International Conflict. London:
Macmillan.
Mody, Ashoka, ed. 1996. Infrastructure Delivery: Private Initiative and the Public
Good. Africa Technical Department Series Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Moe, Terry M. 1984. “The New Economics of Organization.” American Journal of
Political Science 28(4): 739–777.
Moore, Will H. 1998. “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing.”
American Journal of Political Science 42(3): 851–873.
Mussa, Mohammed. 2003. Ethiopia-Emergency Recovery and Rehabilitation Project:
Environmental Assessment. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Retrieved
from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2388823/ethiopia-
emergency-recovery-rehabilitation-project-environmental-assessment.
Mustapha, Marda, and Joseph J. Bangura, eds. 2010. Sierra Leone Beyond the Lome
Peace Accord. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mwase, Ngila. 2003. “The Liberalisation, De-regulation and Privatisation of the
Transport Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences, Challenges and Opportuni-
ties.” Journal of African Economies 12(Supplement 2): ii153–ii192.
Nalbandov, Robert. 2013. Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts. Global Security
in a Changing World Ashgate Publishing, Limited.
New African. 2011. “Providing World-Class Infrastruc-
ture And Service.” New African . Retrieved from
http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/index.php?option=com k2&view=
item&id=350:providing-world-class-infrastructure-and-service&Itemid=678.
Nordhaus, William D. 2006. “Geography and macroeconomics: New data and
new findings.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA
103(10): 3510–3517.
Nye, David E. 1994. American Technological Sublime. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
239
Nye, Joseph S. 1967. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis.” American Political Science Review 62(2): 417–427.
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. 2003. A Unified Mis-
sion Plan for Post-Hostilities Iraq. Washington D.C.: . Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/orha.html.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2006a. Iraq Re-
construction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement. Washington, D.C.: The
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2006b. Iraq Recon-
struction: Lessons in Human Capital Management. Washington D.C.: The Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2007. Iraq Recon-
struction: Lessons in Program and Project Management. Washington D.C.: The
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2009. Hard lessons:
The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. Washington, D.C.: The Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2011. Iraq Recon-
struction Lessons in Inspections of U.S.-funded Stabilization and Reconstruction
Projects. Washington D.C.: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruc-
tion.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2012a. Iraq Recon-
struction Special Report: Reconstruction Leaders’ Perceptions of the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program in Iraq. Washington D.C.: The Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2012b. m SIGIR Spe-
cial Report Number 2: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during
Iraqi Freedom. Washington D.C.: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Recon-
struction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2012c. Special Report
Number 3: Special Report Number 3: Special Report Number 3: Interagency Re-
building Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District. Washington
D.C.: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 2013. Learning From
Iraq. Washington D.C.: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Olson, James M., C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna. 1986. Relative Deprivation
and Social Comparison: The Onatario Symposium. Vol. 4 of Ontario Symposia on
Personality Series Psychology Press.
240
Olson, Mancur. 2009. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Group. Vol. 124 New York: Harvard University Press.
Olzak, Susan. 1983. “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization.” Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy 9: 355–374.
Orr, Robert C. 2004. Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict
Reconstruction. Vol. 26 Washington, DC: CSIS Press.
P-I News Services. 2004. “Isreal Begins Building Road for Settlement Expansion.”
The Seattle Post-Intelligencer , A4.
Paul, Longley, Michael F Goodchild, David J. Maguire, and David W. Rhind. 2005.
Geographic Information Systems and Science. John Wiley & Sons.
Penketh, Anne, and Steve Bloomfield. 2007. “Ethiopia pledges to track down oil
workers’ killers.” The Independent (London) . LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date
Accessed: 2014/07/01.
Perrow, Charles. 2011. Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. Prince-
ton paperbacks Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pierskalla, Jan H., and Florian M. Hollenbach. 2013. “Technology and Collective Ac-
tion: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa.” American
Political Science Review 107(2): 207–224.
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Poli-
tics.” The American Political Science Review 2(94): 251–267.
Plaut, Martin. 2010. “Ethiopia Famine Aid ‘Spent on Weapons’.” BBC News . Re-
trieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8535189.stm.
Posen, Barry R. 2001/02. “The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy,
and Tactics.” International Security 26(3): 39–55.
Prendergast, John, and Mark Duffield. 1999. “Liberation Politics in Ethiopia and
Eritrea.” In Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, eds. Taiser M Ali, and
Robert O. Matthews. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and
Quantitative Strategies. Berkely, CA: University of California Press.
Ragin, Charles C. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Ragin, Charles C., and Sarah Ilene Strand. 2005. “Using Qualitative Comparative
Analysis to Study Causal Order Comment on Caren and Panofsky.” Sociological
Methods & Research 36(4): 431–441.
241
Railway Gazette. 2007. No Concession at Ethio-Djibouti Railway. Railway Gazette.
Retrieved from http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/no-
concession-at-ethio-djibouti-railway.html?sword list%5B%5D=Ethio-
Djibouti&sword list%5B%5D=Railway&no cache=1.
Railway Gazette. 2009. Grand Designs from Ethiopian
Railway Corp. Railway Gazette. Retrieved from
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/grand-
designs-from-ethiopian-railway-corp.html?sword list%5B%5D=Ethio-
Djibouti&sword list%5B%5D=Railway&no cache=1.
Rhoads, Steven E. 1985. The Economist’s View of the World: Government, Markets,
and Public Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Rihoux, Benoit. 2008. “Case-Oriented Configurational Research: Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis (QCA), Fuzzy Sets, and Related Techniques.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Political Methodology, eds. J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H.E. Brady, and
D. Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little,
Brown.
Road Development Authority (RDA). 2013. “Project Details.” Retrieved from
www.rda.gov.lk/source/project details.htm.” Accessed Febrauary 17, 2014.
Roeder, Philip G., and Donald S. Rothchild, eds. 2005. Sustainable Peace: Power
and Democracy After Civil Wars. Vol. 15 Cornell University Press.
Rokkan, Stein, and Derek W. Urwin. 1983. Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of
West European Peripheries. London: Sage.
Roland, Ge´raard. 2002. “The Political Economy of Transition.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 16(1): 29–50.
Roniger, Luis. 2004. “Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy.” Com-
parative Politics 36(3): 353–375.
Rosenblatt, Daniel. 2004. “An Anthropology Made Safe for Culture: Patterns of
Practice and the Politics of Difference in Ruth Benedict.” American Anthtopologist
106(3): 459–473.
Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators.” In State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I.
Rotberg. Washington D.C.: World Peace Foundation , 1–25.
Rotberg, Robert I., and Deborah L. West. 2004. The Good Governance Problem:
Doing Something About It. Vol. 39 of WPF reports Cambridge, MA: World Peace
Foundation.
Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdepen-
dence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton and Company.
242
Sabatier, Paul A. 1988. “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and
the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein.” Policy Sciences 2-1(2/3): 129–168.
Sagen, Scott Douglas. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and
Nuclear Weapons. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Salehyan, Idean, and Kistian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. “Refugees and the Spread of
Civil War.” International Organization 60(2): 335–366.
Schneider, Carsetn Q., and Claudius Wagemann. 2010a. “Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets: Agenda for a Research Approach and a Data
Analysis Technique.” Comparative Sociology 9(3): 376–396.
Schneider, Carsetn Q., and Claudius Wagemann. 2010b. “Standards of Good Prac-
tice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets.” Comparative
Sociology 9(3): 397–418.
Schneider, Carsetn Q., and Ingo Rohlfing. 2013. “Combining QCA and Process
Tracing in Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research.” Sociological Methods Research
42(4): 559–597.
Schneider, Carsetn Q. Q., and Claudius Wagemann. 2012. Set-Theoretic Methods
for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Schock, Kurt. 1999. “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Move-
ment Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma.” Social Problems
46(3): 355–375.
Schwab, Klaus. 2012. The Global Competitiveness Report. Geneva, Switzerland:
World Economic Forum.
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Seawright, Jason. 2005a. “Assumptions, Causal Inference, and the Goals of QCA.”
Studies in Comparative International Development 40(1): 39–42.
Seawright, Jason. 2005b. “Qualitative Comparative Analysis Vis-a-Vis Regression.”
Studies in Comparative International Developmen 40(1): 3–26.
Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study
Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.” Political Research
Quarterly 61(2): 294–308.
Sel, Jan. 2003. Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israel-
Palestine Conflict. Library of modern Middle East studies New York: IB Tauris.
Sen, Amartya Kumar. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Oxford University
Press.
243
Senese, Paul D., and John A. Vasquez. 2008. The Steps to War: An Empirical Study.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Serafino, Nina, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto. 2006. U.S. Occupation Assistance:
Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared. CRS Report for Congress, The Library of
Congress.
Shapin, Steven. 1994. A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-
Century England. Science and Its Conceptual Foundations Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Shaw, Helen. 1995. “Some have called the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict Africa’s first
high-tech war because the two nations have employed jet aircraft, artillery and
armor. But it is more like World War I, where waves of foot soldiers periodically
attempt to dislodge entrenched foes to win a few miles of land of questionable
value.” The Irish Times . 1010 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed:
2014/07/01.
Siroky, David, and John Cuffe. 2014. “Autonomy Loss, Nationalism, and Separatism.”
Comparative Political Studies .
Skolnikoff, Eugene B. 1994. The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and
the Evolution of International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Solomon, Seyoum Hailu. 1998. “Hydropower of Ethiopia: Status, potential and
prospects.” Ethiopian Association of Civil Engineers Bulletin 1.
Sorel, Eliot, and Pier Carlo Padoan. 2008. The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for
the 21st Century. OECD Publishing.
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1996. Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation State. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Stiles, Kendall W. 2005. Case Histories in International Politics. Fouth ed. New
York: Pearson/Longman.
Sundber, Ralph, Mathilda Lindgren, and Ausra Padskocimaite. 2010. UCDP GED
Codebook Version 1.5-2011. Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict
Research.
Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander. 2013. “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced
Event Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 50(4): 523–532.
Szayna, Thomas S., Derek Eaton, James E Barnett II, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Ter-
rence K. Kelly, and Zachary Haldeman. 2009. Integrating Civilian Agencies in Sta-
bility Operations. Vol. 801 Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research
Institute.
Taber, Robert. 1970. The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory
and Practice. London: Paladin.
244
Tanzi, Vito, and Hamid Davoodi. 1998. “Corruption, Public Investment, and
Growth.” In The Welfare State, Public Investment, and Growth, eds. Shibata Hi-
rofumi, and Toshihiro Ihori. Springer.
Themne´r, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2002. “Armed Conflict, 1946-2011.” Journal
of Peace Research 49(4).
Thiem, Alrik, and Adrian Dusa. 2012. Qualitative Comparative Analysis with R: A
User’s Guide. New York: Springer.
Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts,
Michael G. Findley, Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L.
Hicks. 2011. “More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development
Finance Using AidData.” World Development 29(11): 1891–1906.
Tir, Jaroslav, and John A. Vasquez. 2010. “International Studies Encyclopedia.” In
Geography and Territory, ed. Robert A. Denemark. Wiley-Blackwell.
Tobler, Waldo. 1970. “A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit
Region.” Economic Geography 46(2): 234–240.
Tollefsen, Andreas Forø, H˚avard Strand, and Halvard Buhaug. 2012. “PRIO-GRID:
A Unified Spatial Data Structure.” Journal of Peace Research 49(2): 363–374.
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). 1992. “Proclamation no 26 of 1992.
A problamation to provide for the establishment of national/regional self fovern-
ments.”.
Tybout, James R. 2000. “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How well
do they do and why?” Journal of Economic Literature 38(1): 11–44.
UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2002. The EUE Web. The United Nations.
Retrieved from http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue web/eue mnu.htm.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1997. Monthly Situation Report for Ethiopia.
United Nations. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/monthly-
situation-report-ethiopia-aug-1997.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1998a. Monthly situation report for Ethiopia.
United Nations. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/monthly-
situation-report-ethiopia.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1998b. Monthly Situation Report Jan 1998.
United Nations. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/monthly-
situation-report-jan-1998.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1999a. Ethiopia Situation
Report for period Aug 1999. United Nations. Retrieved from
http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-period-aug-1999.
245
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1999b. Ethiopia Situation
Report for period July 1999. United Nations. Retrieved from
http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-period-jul-1999-
0.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1999c. Ethiopia Situation
Report for period May 1999. United Nations. Retrieved from
http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-period-may-1999.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 1999d. Horn of Africa: The Monty Review,
01. United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/hoa-
jan99.html.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2001. Somali Region Field Trip Report
13. United Nations. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/somali-
region-field-trip-report-13-18-feb-2001.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2002a. Current situation and progress
of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population segments affected by
the border conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region. United Nations. Re-
trieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/current-situation-and-progress-
humanitarian-assistance-vulnerable-population.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2002b. Ethiopia-Afar Re-
gion: A deeper crisis looms. United Nations. Retrieved from
http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-afar-region-deeper-crisis-looms.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2002c. Ethiopia: Food aid is not de-
velopment: the dark side of food aid. United Nations. Retrieved from
http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-food-aid-not-development-dark-
side-food-aid.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2003a. Ethiopia: Critical food short-
age and nutritional situation in parts of Dawuro zone of SNNPR (South-
ern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region). United Nations. Re-
trieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-critical-food-shortage-
and-nutritional-situation-parts-dawuro-zone-snnpr.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2003b. Ethiopia: Intra-regional voluntary
resettlement in Amhara: A possible way out of the chronic food trap? United Na-
tions. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-intra-regional-
voluntary-resettlement-amhara-possible-way-out-chronic-food.
UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2003c. Focus on Ethiopia Jan 2003. United
Nations. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/focus-ethiopia-jan-
2003.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2005. After the Tsunami: Rapid
Environmental Assessment. New York: United Nations Environment Programme.
246
United States. 2004. “Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005.” Conference report to accompany h.r. 4200 United States Congress
Washington, DC: .
United States Department of State. 2003. “The Future of Iraq Project.” Retrieved
from http://www2.gwu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm.
US Agnecy for International Development. 2003. Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq. Wash-
ington D.C.: . Retrieved from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/pdaby341.pdf.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First
World War.” International Security 9(1): 58–107.
Van Evera, Stephen. 2001. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” In Nationalism
and Ethnic Conflict, eds. Michael E. Brown, Owen F. Cote´, Sean M. Lynn-Lones,
and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vasquez, John A. 1993. The War Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.
Verkuilen, Jay. 2005. “Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis.” Sociological
Methods and Research 33(4): 462–496.
Walker, Henry A., and Bernard P. Cohen. 1985. “Scope Statements: Imperatives for
Evaluating Theory.” American Sociological Review 50(3): 288–301.
Walker, Iain, and Heather J. Smith. 2002. Relative Deprivation: Specification, De-
velopment, and Integration. Cambridge University Press.
Walt, Stephen M. 2005. “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in Interna-
tional Relations.” Annual Review of Politics Science 8: 23–48.
Waterbury, John. 1973. “Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime.”
World Politics 25(04): 533–555.
Weaver, Robert Kent, and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. Do Institutions Matter?: Gov-
ernment Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution.
Weber, Marx. 2009. The Theory Of Social And Economic Organization. New York:
The Free Press.
Weidmann, Nils B, Doreen Kuse, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2008. “The Geog-
raphy of the International System: The CShapes Dataset.” International Interac-
tions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 36(1): 86–106.
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside Rebellion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Winner, Langdon. 1986. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age
of High Technology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
247
World Bank. 1997a. Chad-Poverty assessment: constraints to rural development.
Report No. 16567-CD Washington D.C.: World Bank.
World Bank. 1997b. Ethiopia-Road Sector Development Program Support
Project. orld Development Sources, WDS 1998-1 World Bank. Retrieved
from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1997/12/693837/ethiopia-
road-sector-development-program-support-project.
World Bank. 1997c. Ethiopia-Third Road Sector Project
(TRSP). Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1997/09/694103/ethiopia-third-
road-sector-project-trsp.
World Bank. 1999. Ethiopia-The Gilgel Gibe Resettlement Project.
Number 141 Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/08/12587057/ethiopia-gilgel-
gibe-resettlement-project.
World Bank. 2000. World Bank Supports Ethiopia’s Recovery Program. World Bank.
Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/world-bank-supports-ethiopias-
recovery-program.
World Bank. 2008a. Ethiopia - Road Sector Development Pro-
gram. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9390110/ethiopia-road-
sector-development-program.
World Bank. 2008b. Ethiopia Agriculture and Rural Development Public Expenditure
Review 1997/98-2005/06. Report No. 41902-ET World Bank.
World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators. Washington D.C.: World Bank
Publications.
Wright, Jr., Thodore P. 1991. “Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in
Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis.” Comparative Politics 23(3): 299–312.
Young, John. 1998. Peasant Revolution in Ethipia: The Tigray People’s Liberation
Front: 1975-1991. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Zartman, I. William. 1995. “Posing the Problem of State Collapse.” In Collapsed
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William
Zartman. Rienner Publishers, 1–14.
Zelikow, Philip, and Graham T. Allison. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Vol. 2 New York: Longman.
248
APPENDIX A
RAW DATA MAPS
249
Figure A.1: Railroad Density for Sample
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Figure A.2: Major Road Density for Sample
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Figure A.3: Airport Density for Sample
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Figure A.4: Power Plant Density for Sample
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Table B.1: Fuzzy Set Data
Location Unemployment Aid Peripheries PoorQuality Instability
AF 1 0.45 0.8 0.99 1.00
AO 1 0.75 1 01 0.51
AZ 0.315 0.35 0.4 0.68 0.53
BS 0 0 0.2 0.85 0.42
BA 1 0.05 0 0.358 0.43
TD 0.65 0 0.25 0.98 0.67
HE 0 0.65 0.8 0.13 0.11
ET 1 0.66 0.5 0.6 0.94 0.78
ET 2 0 0.4 1 0.94 0.64
GT 0 0.3 0.6 0.61 0.48
IN 1 0 0.15 0 0.69 0.57
IN 2 0 0.25 0.6 0.59 0.52
ID 1 0 0 1 0.78 0.58
ID 2 0 0.3 1 0.61 0.45
IR 0 0.9 1 0.22 0.44
IQ 1 0.9 0 0.8 0.68 1.00
IQ 2 0.65 0.75 1 0.57 0.95
IQ 3 0.65 0.45 0.8 0.56 0.92
IL 0.088 0.54 1 0.11 0.54
LR 1 0.4 1 0.88 1.00
MM 0 0.75 1 1 0.72
NP 1 0.45 1 0.67 0.73
PE 0 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.53
RU 0.165 0.4 1 0.19 0.69
RW 1 0.75 0.2 0.89 0.59
RS 0.425 0.5 0.5 0.284 0.34
SL 0 0.65 0 0.90 0.43
SO 1 0.55 1 0.99 1.00
SK 0 0.35 1 0.32 0.69
TJ 0.635 0.8 1 0.52 0.85
UG 0 0 1 0.86 0.56
UK 0.015 0.55 0 0 0.00
YE 0.075 0.2 1 0.94 0.64
Note: Scores are rounded to the nearest hundredth.
Table is provided per the recommendation of Schneider and Wagemann (2010b).
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CASE STUDY SELECTION
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Chapter 5 is comprised of a case study of post-conflict reconstruction. This Ap-
pendix describes the steps taken that ultimately led to the decision to further investi-
gate Ethiopia. As alluded this chapter’s introduction, the goals of this case studies are
to: (1) provide a narration of both IST and the relationship between infrastructure
and reconstruction to political instability and (2) find potential mitigating factors in
this relationship and possible missing variables/conditions. To address these goals,
a typical case, which has membership for both condition/independent variables and
outcome/dependent variable, is useful when trying to provide a narrative and detan-
gle causal mechanisms. Cases where causal mechanisms should be easily visible act as
an ‘easy case’ to test IST (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). I recognize that choosing
a typical case to examine does risk breaking the “choosing on the dependent variable”
rule common in social science research. While case selection bias can be an issue for
small-N studies, I reduced this risk by basing my selection off the medium-N, mul-
tivariate analyses found in Chapter 3’s geospatial longitudinal analysis and Chapter
4’s fsQCA (Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004).
Figure C.1: Plotting of Cases in Intermediate Solution
Note: Top-left plot from Schneider and Rohlfing (2013).
CAPS represents membership while lowercase represents non-membership.
To begin with, the cases can be categorized by plotting fsQCA membership
scores—–the top left panel of Figure C.1 depicts the type/category of case based
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on plotting location. All membership scores from Chapter 4’s final solution are plot-
ted here. As can be seen, there were no cases that meet the requirements to be a fully
typical case in all three configurations. Nevertheless, Ethiopia stands out as a unique
typical case. In the first Ethiopian case, which covers the years from 1991 to 2001
following the fall of the Derg, Ethiopia is a deviant case by not having membership in
any of the three configurations while still having membership in political instability
(0.64). In the second Ethiopian case though, which covers from 2001 to 2008 follow-
ing the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, Ethiopia moves into being a mostly typical case with
membership in two of three configurations while also having increased membership
in instability (0.78). Though other cases have similar membership scores, Ethiopia
is unique in that it has two substantively different cases in the population. When
treated together, Ethiopia offers the opportunity to examine the temporal process
behind infrastructure and reconstruction induced political instability.
Though not a typical case, the first Ethiopian reconstruction period following
their Civil War does offer some benefits when allayed. Choosing then a deviant
case, an anomaly that is different in outcome membership/dependent variable yet
minimally different in regards to input memberships/independent variables, provides
the maximum amount of leverage (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The second
goal of this case study is to find potential mitigating factors in IST relationships
and possible missing variables/conditions, which requires a case that IST does not
seemingly fit.
Figure C.2: Residuals for Cases
With this potential case in mind, I went back to Chapter 3’s results to see how
well the geo-spatial longitudinal model does predicting the Ethiopian cases. To begin
with, the model overall miss predicts in the first Ethiopian case 33% of the grid-
years while miss predicting conflict only 10% of the grid-years (the model predicts
no-conflict when there was in fact conflict). However, this improves for the second
Ethiopian case, which has an overall miss prediction rate of 10% while never miss
predicting conflict. Such improvement is not surprising as the second Ethiopian case
also becomes a typical qualitative case. These model prediction rates become more
clear when taking into consideration they residuals. In Figure C.2 where residuals
are plotted by case, the model seems to expect over-predict conflict in a subset of
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grids in the second Ethiopian case (seen in the number of outlier residuals to the left
of the box). This effect was not as drastic previously in the first Ethiopian case. In
summary, a cases study on both Ethiopian reconstruction periods will help pinpoint
where this error is coming from and better elucidate geographical areas where the
model and IST is weak (seen as outliers).
When these two reconstruction periods are placed side by side, the causal mecha-
nisms connecting reconstruction and political instability will be brought to life. The
additional knowledge would provide better insight into the types of reconstruction
policy that would better decrease political instability risks.
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